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ABSTRACT
This study is an attempt to understand better how the 
Congress of the United States worked to establish the proper 
size and form of the Peace Establishment of the United 
States between 1821 and 1855. Central to this study is an 
attempt to determine if partisan or sectional attitudes were 
key factors in how Congress viewed the Regular Army.
The research in this study is centered on the primary 
materials generated by the Congresses under study. The 
debates and speeches conducted in Congress as found in the 
contemporary reports of the day, the Journals of the House 
and Senate, and the reports and documents produced by the 
two Houses during the period are key sources Roll call 
votes are analyzed when available in an attempt to determine 
if there were any party or sectional differences in the 
voting patterns. Since only a few roll calls were taken and 
recorded on the issue, each vote is treated separately.
In an attempt to clarify the sectional issue, a three 
region model is used. A state is placed in its traditional 
North or South region unless it bordered a frontier area. 
States bordering a territory are placed in the Frontier 
region. Districts which have differing characteristics than
V l l
their parent states have been moved into the region with 
which they share the most in common.
The conclusions of the research show that party and 
section played no significant role in the debates to find 
the proper size of the Peace Establishment between 1821 and 
1855. With only the most minor exceptions, no party or 
section disagreed with the decisions of the Congress on the 
eight individual issues studied. At most, one party or 
section supported the change to a greater or lesser degree 
than the rest of the Congress. The general trend to 
increase of the Regular Army between 1821 and 1855 occurred 
in response to the great increase in the size of the country 




The Army of the early American republic, born out of a 
desire to forge a new nation, was both cherished and 
distrusted. Americans deemed the Continental Army necessary 
to secure their immediate liberty but it was also feared as 
a possible threat to their future liberty. A fear of the 
power of a standing army, long a factor in American 
politics, was to be an object of debate well into the 
nineteenth century. Those in favor of a large standing army 
argued that such a force was needed for the protection of 
the country from possible adversaries and saw little chance 
that the Army would threaten the people's liberties. A 
great many people, however, felt that a standing army was a 
danger and argued that it would be best to keep any such 
organization small.
This study shows how one segment of the political 
culture dealt with the Army; specifically, how the Congress 
of the United States Congress acted to control the size and 
form of the Army between 1821 and 1855. Congressmen had to 
consider not only the national needs for Army expansion or 
contraction but also the local interests of their 
constituents. The debates on this issue, traced through a
1
2
generation of American politics, highlight key aspects of 
the relationship between the Congress and the Army. An 
understanding of such a relationship is intriguing, since 
the defense of the country is the most basic of the national 
interests.
The time period covered in this study was easily 
determined. It starts with Congress reducing the Army in 
1821 during the first attempt to fix the proper size of the 
standing peacetime Army. The study ends in 1855 with the 
last of a series of increases that saw the strength of the 
peacetime Army nearly triple over thirty years.1 The period 
from 1821 to 1855, with the brief exception of the Mexican 
War years, is a homogeneous one. The concerns of the nation 
and the Congress during the period were to field a viable 
and cost-effective peacetime military establishment.
There is no single work which deals exclusively with 
how the Congress viewed and acted towards the Army in the 
period. However, a variety of primary and secondary sources 
discuss the relationship in varying detail.
Among secondary sources Russell F. Weigley's History of 
the United States Army most nearly retains the designation 
of being a standard work. Other general works, including
1-The increase was from 5,773 in 1821 to 15,911 in 1855. 
Unless otherwise noted all strength figures in this study 
will be taken from Russell F. Weigley, History of the United 
States Army (New York: MacMillain Co, 1967), 566-7. 
Weigley's figures are used because he includes the 
volunteers and militia called to duty as well as the Regular 
Army. For a selected listing of such figures from 1789 to 
1861 see Appendix 1.
3
Oliver Spaulding's The United States Army in War and Peace, 
William Addleman Ganoe's The History of the United States 
Army, and Emory Upton's The Military Policy of the United 
States. remain useful, if somewhat dated, guides.2 Other 
useful secondary works include Warren Hassler's With Sword 
and Shield: American Military Affairs, Colonial Times to 
the Present, and Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski's For the 
Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of 
America.3
Some very good monographs discuss certain events 
involving the Army and shed light upon Congressional 
attitudes toward the Army. Foremost among these are Francis 
Paul Prucha's illuminating works The Sword of the Republic; 
The United States Army on the Frontier and Broadax and 
Bayonet, John K. Mahon's History of the Second Seminole War, 
and Edgar Bruce Wesley's Guarding the Frontier: A Study of 
Frontier Defense from 1815-1825.4
201iver Lyman Spaulding, The United Stats Army in War 
and Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934); William 
Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United States Army (New 
York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924); Emory Upton, The
Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: 
GPO, 1904; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).
3Warren W. Hassler, With Sword and Shield: American 
Military Affairs: Colonial Times to the Present (Ames: 
Iowa University Press, 1982); Allan R. Millett and Peter 
Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of 
the United States of America (New York: The Free Press, 
1984) .
^Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The 
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (Toronto: The 
Macmillan Company, 1969), Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and 
Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army in the
Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Madison: The State
4
An unexpected source of information concerning the 
relationship between Congress and the Army can be found in 
biographies of the few men of stature who were Secretary of 
War before 1860. Both John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis 
were fierce Army advocates and information about their 
activities is vital to understanding how the acts of 1821 
and 1855 were passed. The most useful books about these men 
are William C. Davis's Jefferson Davis: The Man and His 
Hour, Hudson Strode's Jefferson Davis: American Patriot, 
1808-1861, and Charles M. Wiltse's John C. Calhoun: 
Nationalist, 1782-1828.5 Two Ph.D. dissertations, John 
Muldowny's "The Administration of Jefferson Davis as 
Secretary of War," and Rodger J. Spiller's "John C. Calhoun 
as Secretary of War, 1817-1825," were also very helpful in 
understanding how Congress dealt with the Army and the 
executive branch.6 *56
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953); John K. Mahon, The 
History of the Seminole War: 1835-1842 (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1967); Edgar Bruce Wesley, 
Guarding the Frontier: A Study of Frontier Defense from 
1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota 
Press, 1973).
5William C. Davis, Jefferson Davis: The Man and His 
Hour (New York: Harper Collins, 1991); Hudson Strode, 
Jefferson Davis: American Patriot, 1808-1861 (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1965); Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: 
Nationalist, 1782-1828 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1944).
6Rodger J. Spiller, "John C. Calhoun as Secretary of 
War, 1817-1825" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 
1977); John Muldowny, "The Administration of Jefferson Davis 
as Secretary of War" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1959).
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Journal articles on Army-Congressional relations are 
disappointingly sparse. Several good articles, especially 
in the Calhoun and Davis periods, are available, however.
The most useful of all sources for this study are the 
debates and roll call votes of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate. These treasures are published variously in 
The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United 
States (1789-1824), Register of the Debates in Congress 
(1824-1837), and the Congressional Globe (1833-1873).7 A 
vital guide to the confusing and often contradictory history 
of the above three publications can be found in a 
wonderfully researched dissertation by Elizabeth Gregory 
McPherson, "The History of Reporting the Debates and 
Proceedings of Congress."8
The official journals of the House and Senate cover the 
same materials as the unofficial reports and are helpful in 
understanding the parliamentary procedures of the two 
bodies. They provide occasional texts of proposed measures 
and amendments and can also be used to double check the 
accuracy of the vote totals found in the debates.
7Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress 
of the United States. 18 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & 
Seaton, 1789-1824); Congress, The Register of Debates in 
Congress, 14 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1824- 
1837); Congress, Congressional Globe. 46 vols. (Washington 
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873).
8Elizabeth Gregory McPherson, "The History of Reporting 
the Debates and Proceedings of Congress" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of North Carolina, 1940).
6
Additional sources of information are the documents and 
reports authorized by the various Congresses. These 
documents can be frustrating to work with because of their 
unpredictable topics, but many important items are covered 
in depth.
A great many documents concerning the Army and 
Congressional attitudes towards it can be found in the 
National Archives. While often highly inconvenient to use, 
many of the Record Groups (especially Record Group 107, 
Letters Received by the Secretary of War) are gold mines of 
information.
An excellent way to judge the reaction of informed 
public opinion to changes in the strength of the Peace 
Establishment is through editorials in the leading 
newspapers of the day. Though coverage of the issue is 
often spotty, and almost always of a highly partisan nature, 
these editorials often give insight into how the public 
viewed the Army.
Vital sources for untangling the complex relationships 
of the various members of Congress include the Biographical 
Directory of the United States Congress; 1774-1989, and the 
Congressional Quarterly's Members of Congress Since 1789.9 *
^Congress, Senate, Biographical Directory of the United 
States Congress; 1774-1989 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1989); 
Congressional Quarterly, Members of Congress Since 1789, 3rd 
ed., Ed. Mary Ames Booker (Washington D. C.: Congressional 
Quarterly Inc., 1985.
7
The methodology of this study will be to use the 
primary materials produced during several different sessions 
of Congress to discern what prompted members to vote for a 
larger or smaller Army. The speeches and debates of 
Congress will be the primary resource used to support 
conclusions reached. When available, roll call votes will 
be subjected to a statistical breakdown in an attempt to 
discover if party, section, or a combination of these 
factors were important determinants in how Congressmen 
voted. Other primary and secondary sources will be used to 
discover additional reasons why members voted as they did. 
Each effort to change the size and composition of the Army 
will be examined first by itself and then compared with 
other efforts to see if there was any discernable pattern 
throughout the period.
The statistical method for investigating the roll call 
votes in the individual sessions will be fairly simple.
Since none of the debates under study took more than four 
votes to resolve, sophisticated computer analysis would not 
be particularly useful. Instead, this study will use the 
votes for final passage in each House as the basis for the 
statistical breakdown. If no such vote exists a vote to 
pass a bill to the other House may be used.10 Although not 
all votes on an issue may be addressed, any vote which shows
10Roll call votes were not used for some final votes 
because the results were not expected to be close. In such 
instances votes were by voice or simply not recorded.
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a significant divergence from the vote used in the 
statistical breakdown will be discussed.
The time period used in this study lends itself to a 
traditional North-South division. In the first Congress in 
this study, the Sixteenth, the issue of most interest before 
the two Houses was the uncompleted Missouri Compromise. The 
most important issue before the last Congress studied, the 
Thirty-third, was the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Throughout this 
period the slavery issue raised tensions in Congress on many 
occasions and it is possible that these tensions may have 
affected the course of other issues.
Adding to a North-South view by considering a third 
region, the Frontier, makes the geographic division more 
useful because the unigue interests of those living on the 
Frontier could cause their Congressmen to view the Army 
differently than those from the East. Using a three-region 
model also improves the results from the other two sections 
since the states remaining will be more homogeneous in 
nature. In this model states will be placed in their 
traditional sections unless they border a territory. States 
bordering a territory will be considered Frontier states.
Since the country experienced great growth between 1821 
and 1855, some states in the Frontier category would 
necessarily move into the North or the South sections while 
other, newer, states would take their place on the Frontier. 
Appendix 2 lists which states belong to which sections 
during the various years under study. One flaw in such a
9
model is that some Representatives from non-Frontier states 
might actually represent districts that had frontier 
characteristics. It is also possible to have unusually 
populated districts in Frontier states that had few frontier 
characteristics. When these districts occur they will be 
moved into the appropriate section. One area in particular 
will be affected by this concept. The northern-most states 
of the country (Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire) had many 
characteristics of frontier states due to their proximity to 
Canada. Certain Congressional districts in these states, 
especially early in the period, will often be moved to the 
Frontier region.
A word also needs to be said of the parties involved in 
this study. The Democratic Party underwent much change 
between 1821 and 1855 and is the only party to survive 
throughout the period. The sharp decline and eventual death 
of the Federalists as a viable opposition after 1815 and the 
birth of the Whigs during the 1830s were also factors 
contributing to political upheaval. Even with this 
upheaval, however, it would be useful to attempt to find 
similarities in the positions of the parties with regard to 
the Army.
Along with the issues of section and party allegiance 
there were many other issues that affected the course of the 
debates on the correct size of the peace establishment of 
the Army. One recurring issue was the question of 
government economy, which then, as now, was a constant
10
source of political maneuvering between the parties.
Interest in cutting the expenses associated with the Army 
was highest during economic downturns, as in 1821 and 1842, 
but was a concern throughout the period. Other issues, 
usually dealing with concerns over security for a portion of 
the country, also had impact on the various debates. A few 
of these were: the Black Hawk War (1832-1833), the Cherokee 
removal (1832), fears over frontier security (1835-1836), 
conflict with Britain over the Canadian border (1836-1838), 
conflict with Mexico over Texan annexation (1835-1845), the 
second Seminole War (1838-1842), post Mexican War 
territorial expansion (1848-1855), and a host of other 
conflicts with Indians on the plains. The debates over the 
correct size of the Army from 1821 to 1855 clearly did not 
occur in a party or sectional vacuum.
The hypothesis to test in this study is fairly clear. 
The author expected to see clear differentiation between the 
three sections on the guestion of the appropriate size of 
the Army. The Frontier states had a clear interest in 
maintaining an Army of sufficient strength to ensure order 
on the sprawling Frontier. As the Frontier grew there would 
be a need for the Army to keep pace. It would be a matter 
of importance to the settler to have some recourse if 
affairs with the local Indian population became unfriendly. 
The Army would be available if it was not neglected.
The case for the South and North does not seem as clear 
cut. Since both regions are defined in the negative (i.e.,
11
non Frontier) it would be tempting to think they might feel
similarly towards the Army (or at least the majority of each
section old enough to be considered fully mature). There
is, however, some evidence to suggest that the South was
more likely than the North to support a strong, professional
Army. Such a view is stated in John Hope Franklin's
somewhat dated, but still intriguing, work The Militant
South: 1800-1861. Franklin noted that
in the ante-bellum period, large numbers of observers, 
including Southerners, made more than a passing 
reference to those phases of Southern life and culture 
that suggested a penchant for militancy which at times assumed excessive proportions.il
Franklin believed that the South displayed a special love of
the military for six main reasons: the rural Southern
environment, a high danger of Indian attack, a fear of
slaves, an old world concept of honor, and an arrogant self
satisfaction with its culture and an increasing sensitivity
towards attacks upon it.1 2 13 Franklin supports his first
contention by suggesting that
the growth of the South's population and the 
development of its economic system did not 
substantially modify the conditions of life that 
prevailed from the beginning. There persisted down to 
the Civil War a remarkable number of the elements of 
the most rudimentary frontier existence, including long 
stretches of uninhibited land, inadequate roads and 
means of transportation and very few towns of 
considerable size.13
11John Hope Franklin, The Militant South: 1800-1861 




Even though he did not state it explicitly, Franklin 
suggested the South was, at times, more like the Frontier 
than the North.
It is possible that these factors would encourage only 
local military organizations and would not transfer to 
national concerns. Even if local military organizations 
were important in the South, however, the interests of the 
Regular Army would probably be important as well. Franklin 
agrees with such thinking by stating his belief that 
Southern support for a strong Army remained solid at least 
"down to the 1830's."14
Unfortunately a hypothesis supporting Franklin's 
thinking about the South does not hold true. As this study 
will show, the South's interest in, and support for, the 
military did not extend to increasing the Regular Army more 
than the other two sections. The South actually supported 
such increases slightly less often than the North did.
The hypothesis of this paper is that there was a 
tendency in the period 1821-1855 for the Frontier states to 
support a strengthened Army more than the Northern or 
Southern states, and that there was little difference 
between North and South. It also appears that the parties 
of the period did not take opposing stands on the various 
attempts to change the size and form of the Army as one 
might expect. Consistency on the topic over the entire
14ibid., 214.
13
period is problematic considering the vast changes in the 
parties between 1821 and 1855.
14
CHAPTER ONE
EARLY ATTEMPTS AT SIZING AN AMERICAN ARMY: 
THE ARMY BEFORE 1821
Congressional oversight of the Army of the United 
States had a particularly spotted record before 1789. The 
Continental Congress first authorized the muster of troops 
under its own sponsorship on June 14, 1775, in an attempt to 
unify the often conflicting command relationships between 
the various colonial militias. After a year's delay the 
Continental Congress took the next step towards solving this 
problem by creating twenty-eight uniform regiments which 
were to become the mainstay of General George Washington's 
Continental Army.l This act signaled the start of 
Congressional efforts to shape the size of the Army.
The Continental Congress deserves much of the blame 
for the uneven performance of the Army during the 
Revolution. It waited until February 1781 to appoint a 
Secretary at War and develop a War Department.2 The 
creation of a War Department and Secretary was an important 
step in the Congressional control of the Army and its
-̂Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army 
(New York: Macmillian Co., 1973), 62.
2Ibid., 48-9. The Department itself was established in 
February with the appointment of Major General Benjamin 
Lincoln occurring, after much political infighting, in 
October. The title of the head of the department was 
Secretary at War until changed to Secretary of War in 1789.
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foundation was one of the few contributions the Continental 
Congress made in shaping the regular Army.
After the Revolution there was intense debate as to 
whether or not an army was needed by the new country.
George Washington felt that some standing force was vital to 
the security of the country. He wrote Alexander Hamilton in 
1783 that
although a large standing Army in time of peace 
hath ever been considered dangerous to the 
liberties of a Country, yet a few troops, under 
certain circumstances, are, not only safe, but indispensably necessary.5
Washington wanted a "regular and standing force for 
garrisoning" forts and a reliable militia that could be 
called out in time of war. His final recommendation was to 
employ four regiments organized much like those of the 
Continental Army and totaling 2,631 men.4 In January 1784, 
the Congress organized under the Articles of Confederation 
authorized eighty men.5
The reasons why the United States in Congress Assembled 
so sharply disagreed with the country's preeminent military 
authority over the need for a standing force were not based
^Washington to Hamilton, May 2, 1784, George 
Washington, The Writings of George Washington, ed. John C. 
Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1938), 
26:374-5. Emphasis in the original.
^Ibid., 377. Washington's plan was to expand the army 
in times of crisis by adding men to each company and adding 
an additional flank company. Such a system would allow the 
Army to expand the rank and file by nearly two thirds 
without requiring any new units and few additional officers. 
Washington was the first American to suggest such a concept.
5Weigley, 80.
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entirely on military matters. Many men of high political 
standing had a deep mistrust of military power because of 
various abuses of civil liberties by military authorities 
throughout English and American history. As one writer 
suggested, political authorities of the time were often 
"fearful that liberty stood more in danger [from a standing 
army] than a nation poorly defended."6 Frightened of the 
effects that any standing army would have on newly won 
rights, the founding fathers left the new nation with almost 
no ready military power.
The political situation of the 1780's did not favor the 
creation of a standing army in part because the government 
of the Articles of Confederation had few strong central 
powers. Even when the Congress, concerned over conflicts 
with Indians on the frontiers, passed an act in 1784 raising 
the 1st American Regiment, only the area directly threatened 
filled its guota.7 This inability to field an effective 
regiment was just one example of the weakness of the 
government, a weakness which would soon lead to a new 
constitution and a new Congress.
On August 7, 1789, the newly seated First Congress 
passed an act establishing "an Executive Department, to be
6Rodger J. Spiller, "Calhoun's Expansible Army: The 
History of a Military Idea," The South Atlantic Quarterly 79
(Spring, 1980): 193 .
7Weigley, 82.
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denominated the Department of War."® Within two months the 
remaining men raised under the Articles of Confederation had 
become the foundation of the First Infantry Regiment. 
Congress had quickly moved to create a new standing army and 
it was not long before these regulars were tested and found 
wanting. General Josiah Harmer led the First Regiment, and 
militia from Kentucky and Pennsylvania, against the Miami 
and Kickapoo tribes in 1790. His defeat convinced the 
Congress to establish a second infantry regiment.
The debate to raise a second regiment led to little 
discussion and the bill passed easily, indicating that the 
Congress would willingly look to Federal power in times of 
crises. Unfortunately for the Army the use of the newly 
created Second Regiment was to prove as disastrous as the 
prior use of the First. General Authur St. Clair led an 
insufficiently trained Second Regiment, and more Kentucky 
militiamen, into a serious defeat at the hands of the 
Northwest Indians in November 1791. It was the second 
defeat for American arms and when the details of the debacle 
became known in Congress it led to the first real debate 
over American defense policy.
The debate to increase the Army in 1792 revolved around 
the central defense question of Washington's administration: *
^Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress 
of the United States, 18 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & 
Seaton, 1789-1824), 1st Cong., Vol. 2, 1589. Hereafter 
cited as Debates. For an excellent overview of the early 
United States Army see, Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword:
The Federalists and the Creation of the Military 
Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 
1975) .
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was a standing Army needed to deal with the Indian problem
of the Northwest or could militia and volunteers be trusted
with the defense of the region? One unnamed House member
used an argument that would reappear whenever the subject
was discussed in future Congresses by stating:
Every man who has seen militia in the field, 
cannot but know that a very trifling disaster or a 
slight cause of discontent is sufficient to make them disband.9
Many Congressmen apparently believed that there was some 
validity to this charge and the majority of the speeches 
favored at least some additional regular regiments to 
augment the militia. When passed, the 1792 act "for making 
further and more effectual provisions for the protection of 
the Frontiers of the United States" authorized the 
completion of the current artillery battalion, the raising 
of three additional infantry regiments, and the creation of 
a troop (roughly a battalion) of light dragoons (mounted 
infantry).10 Since all the new regiments were to consist of 
three battalions, the effect of the act was to nearly treble 
the size of the military establishment of the country.
An important characteristic of the 1792 debate was that 
the New England states were not in favor of the increase.11
^Debates, 2nd Cong., 347.
10Ibid., 1343. For the Senate Journal debate see 
Claussen, Senate,Washington, 4:168. Richard Peters and 
George Minot, eds., United States Statutes at Large 10 vols. 
(Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1846-1861),
1:241. Hereafter cited as Statutes at Large.
11Theodore J. Crackel, Mr Jefferson's Army: The 
Political and Social Reform of the Military Establishment,
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The main reasons for this was that New England was the 
section least affected by Indian difficulties at that time 
and that New England had a stronger militia tradition. Both 
reasons help explain why the section might not feel the need 
to upgrade the standing army.
The force provided by the 1792 increase, and a corps of 
artillery and engineers voted for in 1794, was the basis for 
the Legion that General "Mad Anthony" Wayne used to defeat 
the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in August 1794. 
The Regular Army, increased and strengthened by Congress, 
had won its first victory.
During the administration of John Adams the Army was 
viewed differently than it had been previously. The French 
war scare of 1797-1799 caused the Congress to see the Army's 
main function as a defense against external enemies. The 
most important measures passed during these years gave the 
President the authority to raise a provisional army of an 
additional twelve regiments in 1798 and a further 29 
regiments in 1799.12 These proposed increases in the size 
of the Army did not reassure President Adams and his allies 
in Congress, however. Many Congressmen, including a great 
number of Federalists, were becoming uncomfortable with the *l
1801-1809 (New York: New York University Press, 1987), 10. 
For an excellent view of the party and sectional breakdown 
on this issue see Elbert Sam Baker, "Congress and Early 
Federalist Military Policy: An Examination of Defense 
Related Roll Calls in the Second United States Congress, 
1792-1793" (M.A. thesis, University of North Dakota, 1992).
l2Pebates, 5th Cong., 1st 
Large, 1:568, 725.
sess., 3729, 3934; Statues at
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proposed increases to the Army.33 If all the authorizations 
had been carried out the Army would have contained a 
staggering 46 regiments totaling nearly 40,000 men.
President Adams took a firm stand against what he saw as an 
unnecessary increase and refused to implement many of the 
proposals passed by Congress. The Federalists had split 
over how far to expand the Army.
During the early part of the Jefferson Administration 
the emphasis once again shifted back towards relying on the 
militia as the primary means of defense. A relaxation of 
tensions towards France and Democratic-Republican control of 
the Seventh Congress, a shift towards a party traditionally 
mistrustful of centralized power, combined to permit Thomas 
Jefferson to reduce the army in 1802. Because most of the 
authorized increases of 1798 and 1799 had not been carried 
out the Army had grown only to 4,051 men in seven regiments 
by 1801.I4 President Jefferson thought seven regiments were 
still too many, and with little reason to fear external 
invasion Congress quickly agreed. The Army was therefore 
reduced to just three regiments; two of infantry and one of 
artillery. Most of the Federalists, now out of power, 
agreed with the reduction, and some, after years of trying 
to increase the number of the higher ranks, even tried to 
eliminate the one brigadier general who was left to the 13*
13Crackel, 30.
^Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 13.
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Army. The sentiment for reducing the Army was so 
overwhelming that the voting pattern showed little 
differentiation between the section or party.
For several years after 1802 the strength of the Army 
fluctuated little. An attempt to increase the Army seemed 
only natural, however, after the 1807 Chesapeake-Leopard 
affair and the Embargo Act shortly thereafter had increased 
tensions with the England and France. The arguments during 
the 1808 debate were similar to those in 1798 because of the 
urgency of strengthening an Army understood to be too weak 
for fighting a war. The few Congressmen who disliked the 
bill did not take their position because of what the bill 
contained but objected to it because they thought war 
unlikely. The bill passed easily and the resulting act "to 
Raise for a Limited Time an Additional Military Force" 
ensured that the country would have an additional five 
regiments of infantry and one each of riflemen and light 
dragoons for at least five years.15 Once again the threat 
of war had trebled the army.
The most interesting aspect of the 1808 Army increase 
was that the Democratic-Republicans had changed their 
position on the necessity of having a large standing army. 
This change was the opposite of the one undertaken by the 
Federalists between 1799 and 1802. Distrustful from the 
beginning of the anti-republican attitudes an Army was 
supposed, to foster, the Democratic-Republicans became much
15Pebates, 10th Cong., 1st sess., 2849 .
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less fearful of the institution once in power. One 
important reason for the change was that the President 
controlled which officers served and Jefferson could ensure 
that the new officers would pose no threat to the party.16 
An abandonment of a principle of this sort can not fail to 
change a party, however. The historian Henry Adams 
suggested that the party had "found itself poorer by the 
loss of one more traditional principle" when it began to 
back a larger, federally controlled, force.17
The War of 1812 necessitated large increases in the 
size of the Army. In 1811, certain that war with England 
was near, Congress voted for 30,000 volunteers and a regular 
army of nearly 25,000 men. When completed, the Army would 
be expanded from 10 to 24 regiments of various kinds. Early 
in the war Congress authorized the strength of the existing 
regiments to be increased by 25 percent and created an 
additional eight regiments. These increases were generally 
passed by a proportion of three to one, though several of 
them carried by smaller percentages than the peacetime 
increase of 1808.16 *8 Overall the increases of 1798-99, 1808, 
and 1811-14 showed that a large majority in Congress would
16Crackel, 160.
l^Henry Adams, History of the United States During the 
Second Administration of Thomas Jefferson, 2 vols. (New 
York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1890), 2:218; quoted in
Crackel, 2.
18Pebates, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 2229. Congress 
increased the Regular Army by a further nineteen regiments 
in January 1813 and by four more in March 1814.
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support an increase to the Regular Army if it appeared the 
country was in danger of going to war.
After the War of 1812 was concluded the Congress was 
faced with a difficult problem. It had increased the Army 
to a bewildering array of 48 infantry and rifle regiments 
with many other types of formations as well. Obviously a 
cut had to be made but it was unclear how it should be done. 
Three days after President James Madison submitted the 
Treaty of Ghent to the Senate for its advice and consent, he 
asked the Congress to provide for "an adeguate regular 
force" without making any deep cuts in the Army.19 The 
President, worried about problems which might arise with 
Great Britain or Spain, directed his Secretary of War to ask 
the Senate for the retention of at least 20,000 troops.20 
The Senate, agreeing with the President, wanted the Army set 
at 15,000 men. The House, less concerned over the threat of 
foreign intervention, wanted the Army reduced to only 6,000 
men, its prewar strength.19 *21 The hurried nature of the 1815
19Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study 
of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1973), 66.
2(1James Monroe, A Message to the Military Affairs 
Committee, in The Writings of James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus 
Murray Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York: AMS Press, 1969), 5:324.
2 J-Debates, 13th Cong., 3rd sess. , 287, 1266; Statutes 
at Large, 3:224. For the House Journal debate see Martin P. 
Claussen, ed. The Congressional Journals of the United 
States, 9 vols. The Journal of the House, James Madison 
Administration (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier Inc.,
1977), 9:787. For the Senate Journal debate see Martin P. 
Claussen, ed. The Congressional Journals of the United 
States, 9 vols. The Journal of the Senate, James Madison 
Administration (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier Inc.,
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decrease did not allow for a calm reflection of how the 
country's peacetime military establishment should be shaped. 
Such a debate would not occur until 1821.
The voting on the 1815 reduction provided one 
unexpected fact; every Southern Federalist voted for it.22 
This trend is especially intriguing since the Northern 
Federalists voted in much the same way as the rival 
Democrat-Republicans. Southern Federalists had previously 
been amongst the most reliable of the strong government men 
in Congress. A complete acceptance of the reduction of the 
Army by this group may be an indicator that the First party 
system was undergoing change, if not strain, by 1815.
The relationship between Congress and the Army was an 
uneven one before 1821. On several occasions Congress voted 
for far fewer men than the leaders of the Army thought 
appropriate. If the Congress showed that it was willing to 
increase the Army in times of crisis (1798-99, 1808, and 
1811-14), it also showed that when the crisis had passed 
reduction would occur (1784, 1802, and 1815).
How the parties viewed modifications in the size of the 
Army underwent significant changes in the period. Before 
1808 the Democratic-Republicans were distrustful of almost 2
1977) , 8:531. The final form of the act provided for the 
President to determine which types of regiments would be 
most needed by the country. Eventually ten regiments (eight 
infantry, one artillery and one light artillery) were formed 
by merging all of the current regiments into new formations.
22James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists: 1800- 
1816 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana States University Press,
1978) , 187.
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any standing force. As soon as they faced their first 
crisis in power, however, they rapidly moved to expand the 
Army. The Federalist support for a standing force also 
became less strident after they lost power in 1800. It is 
difficult to imagine the Federalists happily reducing the 
Army in 1802 if they had still controlled officer 
appointments. The best description of party attitudes in 
the period is that the Democratic-Republicans favored a 
larger standing army less than the Federalists, but that 
both parties were more willing to increase the Army when 
they controlled the government than when their opponents 
controlled the government..
Among the sections only New England showed any 
sustained difference from the national norm regarding the 
Army. First in 1792 and later in 1815 the section was on 
the side wanting fewer troops. In other years, however, the 
region displayed little difference from the rest of the 
country.
The period before 1821 saw few firm trends concerning 
the differing attitudes towards the Army in the disparate 
sections and parties. Trends were rare partly because the 
atmosphere of crisis which usually prevailed when the 
debates occurred and partly because attitudes about the Army 
were rarely considered a test of party or sectional loyalty. 
Discussions about the Peace Establishment during times of 
increasing party regularity and sectional tension could show 




JOHN C. CALHOUN'S EXPANSIBLE ARMY PLAN AND ARMY REDUCTION
Any discussion of the Sixteenth Congress must quickly 
recognize that the early 1820s was a time of change in 
American politics. The First American Party System 
completed a slow breakup during the period. What was taking 
its place was what one historian called the "personal 
politics of the early 1820s."1
The Federalist Party, having last held either House of 
Congress or the Presidency in 1801, had gone two decades 
with little influence in national politics. The breakdown 
of the Federalist Party was a slow process, however. Until 
1818 the party usually retained a quarter of the seats in 
the House. After the election that year Federalist strength 
dropped sharply, from 65 members to a meager 27, just 15 
percent of the House.2 Many writers have linked the demise 
of the Federalists with their activities at Hartford in 
1815, but one historian has made the case that the *2
-̂Norman K. Risjord, The Old Republicans: Southern 
Conservatism in the Age of Jackson (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1965), 229.
2Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States. 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975),
2 :1084.
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"Federalist party in the South was not crushed by popular 
revulsion against the Hartford Convention" but instead 
gradually disappeared through "the voluntary decision of its 
leaders."3 He further suggested that Federalists did quite 
well in local elections in many places in the South in 1816 
and 1817, partly because national issues were no longer of 
overriding importance.4 The Federalists then were a party 
in decline by 1821, failing to even run a national candidate 
against Monroe in 1820, but it was also a party that 
maintained a semblance of national stature.5
The Democratic Party was also undergoing change during 
the Sixteenth Congress.6 Throughout the 1820s the 
discipline and organization of the party declined due to the 
loss of cohesion of the Federalists.7 The Democrats were, 
in some ways, more a collection of interests than a unified 
party by 1821 and without the threat of a strong rival 
regularity decreased. One faction of the party in 
particular, the Old Republicans, acted largely independently 
of the rest of the party.
3James H. Broussard, The Southern Federalists; 1800- 
1816 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 
177.
4Ibid., 175.
5Richard P. McCormick, The Second American Party 
System: Party Formation in the Jacksonian Era (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1966), 324.
6For the sake of brevity the Democratic-Republicans 
will be called Democrats throughout this chapter even though 
the former name is more accurate.
7Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties: Their 
Natural History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 98.
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The Old Republicans were essentially what their name 
implied, men who agreed with the earliest republican views, 
namely that federal contributions to public life were 
undesirable. Numbering about thirty members in the House, 
and with several influential allies in the Senate, these men 
wanted to keep Congress and the federal government from 
becoming more influential in American political life.8 910 All 
the members of the group were Southern and they are often 
seen as the link between the Anti-Federalists of 1788 and 
the States Rights Democrats of the Jacksonian era.9 Though 
small in number their cohesion allowed them to wield a 
disproportionate amount of influence in a time when party 
unity was on the decline.
Another key to the decline of the First American Party 
System was the large turnover of Representatives in the late 
teens and early twenties. Of the 185 members of the 
Fifteenth Congress, 126 (68 percent) were new members. 
Turnover for the Sixteenth Congress, while not as high, was 
also large. Such turnover, in a time of lessening party 
loyalties, could cause greater swings on issues in Congress 
than might normally occur.
The political background of the Sixteenth Congress and 
a lessening of party regularity with a great number of new 





described the period, the "War Department and the military- 
establishment as a whole were caught up in the political 
activities which inaugurated the Second American Party 
S y s t e m . L u c k i l y  for the Army it had its finest Secretary 
of War, to date, during this time of change.
In 1817 John C. Calhoun, a young "War Hawk" Congressman 
from South Carolina, took over a War Department that was "in 
utter chaos."!2 Calhoun, who had first attracted attention 
to himself for his nationalistic views during the War of 
1812, had to deal with the reputation of the War Department 
as a post held mostly by second rate men. Presented with 
this situation Calhoun "took up his duties with a zeal that 
rarely had been seen in his predecessors."!2 Most of 
Calhoun's policies were aimed at making the Army a strong, 
professional force. Calhoun expected that a third war with 
England would break out over the Northwest frontier and he 
wanted the Army better prepared than it had been in 1812.
To help ensure the Army would perform better, Calhoun 
guickly settled many of the administrative problems plaguing *l
URodger J. Spiller, "John C. Calhoun as Secretary of 
War, 1817-1825" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 
1977), 245.
l2Gerald M. Capers, John C. Calhoun-Opportunist: A 
Reappraisal (Gainsville: University of Florida Press,
1960), 62.
l3Rodger J. Spiller, "Calhoun's Expansible Army: The 
History of a Military Idea," The South Atlantic Quarterly 79 
(Spring, 1980) : 193.
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the service and by 1818 had fought for, and won, a 
reorganization of the Army staff.14
Because of his expectation of another confrontation 
with Britain, Calhoun's early plans called for the majority 
of the Army to be based in strong fortifications in the 
Northwest and on the trans-Mississippi frontier, with small 
garrisons in the forts of the rest of the country.15 
Calhoun felt that it was also strategically important to 
have fewer garrisons, which would allow for greater strength 
and flexibility at key points along the frontier. He 
thought that it would be possible to use the waterways of 
the region to speed troops to troubled areas, thereby 
allowing the Army more flexibility in dealing with problems 
on the Frontier.
For his ideas to work, Calhoun needed an Army 
numerically strong enough to garrison the coast line and man 
the larger Frontier forts. Although having a paper strength 
of over 12,000, the Army could count only 8,446 men in its 
ranks in 1817. The reasons for this shortfall were complex 
and ranged from poor recruiting to desertion due to the 
terrible living conditions soldiers had to endure. Calhoun 
was concerned about the shortfall of men, and it probably 
did little for Calhoun's equanimity to have attempts to
14Spiller, "Secretary", x; Warren W. Hassler, With 
Sword and Shield: American Military Affairs: Colonial 
Times to the Present (Ames, Iowa University Press, 1982), 
109-10.
15Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun: Nationalist, 
1782-1828 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1944), 166; Capers, 
64 .
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reduce his department brought forward "almost every time 
Congress met."16 Unfortunately for Calhoun, such attempts 
were to be repeated until they were successful.
On March 4, 1817, the newly elected James Monroe gave 
his first inaugural address to the nation. In it he 
proclaimed
Our land and naval forces should be moderate, but 
adeguate to the necessary purposes--the former to 
garrison and preserve our fortifications and to meet 
the first invasions of a foreign foe, and, while 
constituting the elements of a greater force, to 
preserve the science as well as the necessary 
implements of war in a state to be brought into 
activity in the event of war.17
Monroe thought the need for a standing army above debate and
that such a force should be used both as a training force
and as a ready reserve to be employed until the superior
weight and resolve of the militia could be brought into play
after an invasion. The first point seems to have enjoyed
surprising agreement by the end of the War of 1812.
Throughout the arduous battles trying to reduce the army
during Monroe's administration no member of Congress
seriously suggested that the nation did not need a standing
army. The "old style of republican hostility to any army
had passed away" and in its place sprang an argument perhaps
16Edgar Bruce Wesley, Guarding the Frontier: A Study 
of Frontier Defense from 1815 to 1825 (Minneapolis, The 
University of Minnesota Press, 1973), 77-78.
17James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 20 vols. (New York: 
Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1897), 2:576.
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even tougher to settle; what would land forces "moderate, 
but adequate to the necessary purposes" look like?18 *
Even though the Peace Establishment of 1815 had cut 
Army strength from a war-time high of over 33,000 to just 
over 10,000, it had not approached the 1812 figure of 6,686. 
Throughout the first two years of the Monroe administration 
several bills were introduced to further reduce the Army.
In 1817 Jeremiah Mason, a Democrat from New Hampshire, spoke 
for a reduction of the Army by suggesting that "in modern 
warfare, national wealth is essentially national 
strength."10 Mason wanted spending on the Army cut to avoid 
strain upon the Treasury. Most of the attempts to cut the 
size of the Army during this time were linked to this cause.
Another effort to trim the size of the Army was 
undertaken in April 1818. Lewis Williams, a Democrat/Old 
Republican from North Carolina, introduced a motion 
directing the House Military Affairs Committee to inquire 
into the expediency of reducing the Army. Williams, a long­
standing Army critic, tabled his own motion later in the 
session because he thought cutting the Army to be 
unrealistic during the First Seminole War, then going on in 
Florida.20 Throughout 1818 and 1819 attempts to reduce the
18Spiller, "Expansible", 202.
10Spiller, "Secretary", 5.
20Congress, The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress 
of the United States, 18 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & 
Seaton, 1789-1824), 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1766; 2nd sess., 
399, hereafter cited as Debates. Michael Stuart Fitzgerald, 
"Europe and the United States Defense Establishment:
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Army continued to flounder on the same objection. The Army 
was fighting an undeclared but exhausting war in Florida, 
against a clever and elusive enemy.21 Even the most 
virulent critic of the Army realized that a reduction during 
such a time was unlikely if not altogether undesirable.
Many Congressmen had another reason why they thought a 
reduction in government expenditures would soon be 
desirable. In 1817 Congress had removed an internal tax 
that had originally been raised to help pay for the War of 
1812 and some Congressmen were eager to cut government 
spending, even if revenues had not yet started to fall much. 
By 1819 the manufacturing slowdown which had began in 1818 
could be felt throughout the economy. The Panic of 1819, at 
its height as the Sixteenth Congress first convened, 
occurred in large part due to overspeculation in Western 
lands and the tightening of credit at the Bank of the United 
States. As the amount of money entering the treasury began 
to drop sharply, more Congressmen began to worry about the 
growing deficit. Calhoun, in a rare lapse of political 
judgement, thought that the War Department could ride out 
any loss of treasury receipts, in part because he seriously 
misjudged the drop in revenues. He wrote a former 
Congressional colleague that "many who are calculating on 
our monied embarrassment [in 1821] will be disappointed."22 21
American Military Policy and Strategy, 1815-1821" (Ph. D. 
diss., Purdue University, 1990), 273.21Risjord, 193.
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Any rumblings being heard to the contrary Calhoun marked off 
as simply being the "murmers [sic] of the factions."23 When 
he finally realized the depth of the problem he would 
already be on the defensive about using the Army as a source 
of cutting costs.
Treasury Secretary William H. Crawford disagreed with 
Calhoun's estimate of the state of the nation's finances.2  ̂
His treasury report of December 1820 (for the year 1821) 
forecast a deficit of 4.8 million dollars on just over 21 
million in expenditures.25 He thought that the problem was 
severe enough to reguire either cutting the budget or 
raising new loans to cover the deficit. Since loans were an 
anathema to American politicians at the time, and since 
Crawford had Presidential aspirations, it is not surprising 
that the Treasury Secretary was not favorable to the latter 
course. Crawford understood that a 10,000 man Army, the 
largest peacetime army in the country's history, was the 
perfect place to begin reduction efforts; there were many in 
Congress who agreed.
22Calhoun to Samuel D. Ingrahm, November 6, 1820, John 
C. Calhoun, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, eds. Robert L. 
Merriwether, et al., 20 vols. to date (Columbia: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1959-), 5:425-26.
23Ibid., 426.
2^Crawford had been Secretary of War from August 1815 
to October 1816, immediately preceding Calhoun.
25Congress, American State Papers, Class XI, Finance, 
(Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832-1861), 620.
C. Edward Skeen, "Calhoun, Crawford, and the Politics of 
Retrenchment," South Carolina Historical Magazine 72 (May 
1972): 146.
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To complicate the dynamics of the coming Congressional 
debate a strong political motive was mixed with these 
economic considerations. In 1821 the traditional path to 
the Presidency was through the Executive branch, in part 
because a display of strong executive skills was thought 
necessary to stand for the office. Every President after 
John Adams had served as Secretary of State before becoming 
President. Both Crawford and Calhoun thought of themselves 
as potential candidates for the office by 1821 and each 
thought that efficient administration of their departments 
would allow them to contend with John Quincy Adams (Monroe's 
Secretary of State) for the honor.26
Both Calhoun and Crawford understood that the reduction 
attempt was an important issue. Michael Fitzgerald has 
written that Crawford was aligned with the Kentucky Whig 
Henry Clay in an effort to form a majority against Calhoun 
and the Army, using the southern Old Republicans as a 
base.* 27 Charles Francis Adams (the son of John Quincy Adams 
and editor of his memoirs) suggested that it was "a 
coalition of all partisans of Mr. Crawford, of DeWitt 
Clinton [Governor on New York], and Mr. Clay" which joined 
to undermine Calhoun.2  ̂ To make matters more difficult for
2 6Wiltse, 209-210.
27Fitzgerald, 330; Wiltse, 210. Most, but not all,
Old Republicans tended to be supportive of Crawford. Eldred 
Simkins, who represented Calhoun's old seat, stayed loyal to 
him while Hugh Nelson, of Virginia, was a close friend of 
Monroe's and often represented his interests in the House. 
See Risjord, 196.
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Calhoun, President Monroe took a neutral position on the 
subject publicly, even though there is considerable evidence 
that he did not support a general reduction of the Army.29 
It was therefore a powerful coalition that lined up 
against Calhoun and the Army in 1820. Southern friends of 
Crawford were showing "a spiteful spirit towards the War 
Department almost constantly," hoping to reduce Calhoun's 
popularity by putting him in the position of supporting a 
large Army.* 2930 At the same time many Northern Congressmen 
were supporting reduction efforts from a genuine concern for 
the solvency of the government.31 32 Calhoun and the Army were 
increasingly isolated politically as the year moved on.
On December 28, 1819, Lewis Williams, the Representative
who had repeatedly urged Army reduction in the Fifteenth
Congress, gained the House floor and pushed through a motion
to have the Secretary of War
report to the House the aggregate amount of the 
military peace establishment of the United States 
actually in service for each and every year since the 
year 1815, distinguishing between the number of 
officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and the number of privates.33
Though mild-sounding, this motion was the beginning of the 
effort to reduce the Army in the Sixteenth Congress.
23Skeen, 149n.
29 Ibid., 142.
30Spiller, "Secretary", 256; Skeen, 142.
31Risjord, 194.
32Pebates, 16 Cong., 1st sess., 801. See also 
Congress, House, House Journal. 16th Cong., 1st sess.,
Serial 30, 84. Hereafter cited as House Journal.
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For most of 1820 the effort to reduce the Army was 
carried forward using various motions, documents, and 
reports of the two Houses of Congress. Just three days 
after Williams had asked for his first report Calhoun sent 
to the House his manpower numbers for each year from 1815 to 
1819. His report is summarized in Table l.33
TABLE 1
NUMBER OF OFFICERS, NCOS, MUSICIANS, AND PRIVATES, 1815-1819
Year Officers NCOS Musicians Privates Total
1815 638 1,109 325 7,341 9,413
1816 726 1,071 356 7,871 10,024
1817 640 923 320 6,338 8,221
1818 644 887 306 5,839 7,676
1819 641 826 326 6,295 8,088
What Calhoun's response showed was that the number of 
officers was generally steady even when the enlisted ranks 
fluctuated. Between 1815 and 1819 the total force of the 
Army decreased by 14 percent while the number of officers 
remained stable. The supporters of Army reduction used this 
report in an attempt to prove that the Army tended to have 
too many officers.
Not all the documents coming out of Congress were 
harmful to the Army's cause, however, for the Army was not
33Congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War, 
Transmitting a Report of the Aggregate Amount of the 
Military Peace Establishment of the United States, 16th 
Cong., 1st sess., House Document 25, Serial 32, 1.
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without its backers. A second document produced by the 
House in January 1820 showed that the savings that Calhoun 
had tried to instill in his new staff alignment were 
beginning to have effect.34 The cost that the Army paid to 
equip each soldier had dropped from an average of $383.60 
for the years 1809 to 1811 to $336.56 in 1820.35 The 
author of this report, Adjutant General Daniel Parker, 
stated that due to the recent reforms it would soon be 
possible to keep below the $300 per man level, or roughly 
what the cost had been in 1802.
A report much more to the liking of the anti-Army 
faction was House Document 107. It showed that an 
astounding 822,191 men were on the muster rolls of the 
various state militias. This horde was theoretically 
assigned to 1,124 regiments, 289 brigades and 113 
divisions.36 Even though the rolls were vastly out of date 
(some states had not sent in returns for 15 years), and 
despite the fact that the states had only a fraction of the
34Congress, House, Report of the Adjutant and Inspector 
Generals; Exhibiting a Comparative View of the Army 
Expenditures Before the Late War, and the Estimate 
Appropriations for the Service of the Year 1820, 16th Cong., 
1st sess., House Document 53, Serial 33, passim.
35The final 1820 number in the document was $302.88. 
This figure did not include some ordnance charges and 
rebates that were not paid to newly recruited soldiers. The 
number is therefore not totally accurate and the higher 
number is used.
36Congress, House, Message from the President of the 
United States Transmitting an Abstract of the Military of 
the United States, 16th Cong., 1st sess., House Document 
107, Serial 37, passim.
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weapons needed to arm that many men, the sheer size of the 
numbers in the report seemed to suggest that cutting the 
regular Army could be done safely. It would be hard to 
claim that a modest cut in the Army would be damaging to the 
country's security when the republic supposedly had nearly a 
million men ready to spring to its defense, though the 
experience of militia in the War of 1812 gave little 
indication that the militia would be useful in the defense 
of the country.
Calhoun and the key officers of the Army were not 
impressed with notions of a large militia or of an officer 
corps that was considered too large for the Army it led. As 
early as December 1817, Major General Winfield Scott wrote 
Calhoun to tell him that "the peace establishment is already 
too small for the object to which it is applied or which it 
is intended."37 Understanding that the Army was not going 
to be increased, Scott first proposed a plan to decrease the 
size of companies while increasing their number. Scott knew 
that this plan would not accomplish any reduction in the 
overall size of the Army, however, and that such a plan 
would not pass Congress. In an attempt to plan the 
reorganization of the Army if a cut were ordered, Scott then 
proposed an alternative plan which would have reduced the 
staff officers by 63 and the total force by 1,759.3^
37Major General Winfield W. Scott to Calhoun, May 10, 




For his part Calhoun seems to have readily agreed with 
Scott. He reported to Congress in 1818 that the current 
strength of the army "cannot be pronounced extravagant" and 
that "our present organization . . .  is probably better 
adapted to the nature of our country and service than any 
other."39 Unfortunately for Calhoun those favoring reducing 
the Army's cost controlled the House of Representatives.
Debate on reduction occurred sporadically for several 
months in early 1820, but it was unfocused, wavering between 
discussions of reducing officers' pay, closing the Military 
Academy, the strength of the militia, and the need to cut 
the Navy as well as the Army. On May 20, 1820, John Cocke, 
a Democrat from Tennessee, offered a proposal to drastically 
cut the officer corps. The Kentucky Democrat Henry Clay 
quickly tried to amend the bill to reduce the entire Army to
6,000 men. Since the House was involved in the complex 
maneuverings surrounding the Missouri question, many in 
Congress had no desire to get sidetracked on the military 
question at that time. The solution was to call on Calhoun 
to submit "a plan for the reduction of the Army to six 
thousand officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and 
privates . . . and, also what savings of the public revenue
will be produced by such an arrangement of the Army."40
-^congress, American State Papers, Class V, Military 
Affairs, 7 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832- 
1861), 1:779.
40pebates, 16th Cong., 1st sess. , 2233.
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With Clay's deft maneuvering the motion passed 63 to 59 and 
the House retreated back into the Missouri debate.41
Throughout the summer and fall of 1820 Calhoun 
struggled to bring together a plan that would meet the 
directives of the House, but which would not unduly hurt the 
Army. It was a daunting task. There is some evidence that 
Calhoun knew the general outline of what he was to propose 
soon after Congress asked him for the plan.* 42 * He then spent 
much of the summer asking the senior commanders of the Army 
their opinions. What emerged from these discussions was a 
surprising consensus from the nation's military leaders on 
how the Army should be reduced if such an option could not 
be avoided.
The first officer to report to Calhoun, Brigadier 
General Edmund P. Gaines, showed a stunning lack of 
political acumen by suggesting an increase of the Army by 
several regiments--up to 3500 men. When he finally 
addressed reducing the Army he suggested that any reduction 
"should be confined exclusively to the rank and file."4  ̂ To 
accomplish the necessary reduction by this method Gaines
4-*-Ibid. Unfortunately the roll call for this key vote 
was not recorded.
42Wiltse, 224. The principles of the broad outline of 
the plan he was to submit had been with Calhoun since the
1815 Congressional debate on the proper size of the peace 
establishment.
43Edmund P. Gaines to Calhoun, July 27, 1820, Calhoun, 
Papers. 5:293-96.
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proposed reducing the companies to forty-seven NCOs and men, 
a cut of over a third.44
Major General Andrew Jackson, commander of the Southern 
division, proposed a slightly different plan. Jackson 
thought it important that any cuts to the Army be such that 
they could be quickly restored. His plan called for a 
reduction of the Army to 374 line officers and 6,040 men.
The force would be flexible, however, since "the body . . .
may be filled up or reduced as the exigencies of the case 
may require."45 in the event of war Jackson felt confident 
that the service could quickly be filled out to 580 officers 
and 11,350 men in the line, greater than the authorized 
strength of the Army in 1820. Although willing to cut some 
line officers, Jackson, like Gaines, was adamantly opposed 
to cutting any of the staff or senior officers.
The commander of the Northern division, Major General 
Jacob Brown, also wanted to keep the number of officers from 
being cut. He explained to Calhoun that the "military 
experience [of officers] is too laborious and tedious of 
acquisition to be sacrificed [sic] without urgent 
necessity."46 General Scott concurred with this view by *46
44see Appendix 3 for a list of company strength from 
1785 to 1855.
^S^ndrew Jackson to Calhoun, August 9, 1820, Ibid.,
5:317-19.
46Jacob Brown to Calhoun, October 6, 1820, Ibid.,
5:328 .
43
stating in his report that "the parts the least useful [to 
the Army] should be sacrificed to those more so."47
The only officer to view the reduction much differently 
than his peers was the Quartermaster General, Thomas Jesup, 
who felt that the line companies were poorly organized and 
contained to many officers, especially in the artillery 
corps. He wanted to streamline the structure of each 
company to ensure that they could be rapidly expanded in 
size at the start of any future conflict. He assumed that a
6.000 man Army, properly constructed, could guickly grow to
24.000 if the need arose.48
All of the officers polled by Calhoun for their views 
on reduction thought that it would be harmful to the Army. 
There was a consensus, however, that if reduction had to 
occur the best place to reduce would be the rank and file. 
Calhoun used these views, and his own, when delivering his 
final report to Congress.
Calhoun's reply to the House motion of May 20, 1820, 
was delivered to Congress on December 12, 1820. It was, 
perhaps, his most important paper while Secretary of War. 
Historians have generally had deep respect for the plan, one 
calling it a "brilliant conception, logically thought out,"
47Scott to Calhoun, August 20, 1820, Letters Received 
by the Secretary of War, Records Group 107, National 
Archives.
48Thomas S. Jesup to Calhoun, December 1, 1820, Calhoun 
Papers, 5:464.
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while a second referred to it as "a somewhat remarkable 
document, well ahead of its time."49
At the start of his paper Calhoun stated that no one, 
not even its fiercest critics, wanted the Army done away 
with. Calhoun felt this to be true because although the 
militia was "the great national force," it needed the help 
of a regular army in some areas, especially the ability "to 
create and perpetuate military skill and experience."49 50 51
Calhoun identified three things that had to be done if the 
Regular Army was to act as a repository of military 
knowledge. First, the staff must be fully formed and in 
place at all times; second, the line should be formed so 
that it could be guickly augmented to meet any threat 
without relying on the creation of new regiments; and 
finally the army must make every effort to keep men of 
"adeguate talents and respectability" to lead the 
formations.51 By this last statement Calhoun hoped to 
convince Congress to keep the Army's two Major Generals and 
four Brigadier Generals, even though the force he was 
requesting did not call for that many General officers.
49Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The 
United States Army on the Frontier. 1783-1846 (Toronto: The 
Macmillian Company, 1969), 153; Oliver Lyman Spaulding, The 
United Stats Army in War and Peace (New York: G. P. Putanm's 
Sons, 1974), 152-3.
50John C. Calhoun, The Works of John C. Calhoun, Ed. 
Richard K. Cralle. 6 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and 
Company, 1856), 5:82. The plan is also located in Congress, 
House, Plan for the Reduction of the Army, 16th Cong., 1st 
sess., House Document 21, Serial 47.
51Calhoun, Works, 5:85.
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In his proposal to reduce the line the Secretary of War
had but one constant; the number of officers must not be
reduced. "No position," Calhoun wrote,
connected with the organization of the peace 
establishment is susceptible of being more rigidly 
proved, than that the proportion of its officers to the 
rank and file ought to be greater than in a war establishment.52 *
To achieve the desired reduction with his plan Calhoun would 
have to cut the rank and file sharply. His plan was to 
retain all nine infantry regiments (eight line and one 
rifle), and keep them at ten companies each. He wanted to 
reorganize the artillery into five battalions, removing the 
distinction between the light artillery and other units. By 
advocating companies of just 64 enlisted for the artillery 
regiments and 37 for the infantry he could keep all 130 
companies and still be close to the House request of 6,000 
(the final total in Calhoun's plan called for 6,391 rank and 
file).53 Calhoun's plan would allow the rapid expansion of 
the Army to over 11,500 men by simply filling out the 
"skeletal" regiments and to over 19,000 with the addition of 
just 258 junior officers in new regiments led by experienced 
senior officers released from other duties.
52Ibid., 5:90.
52congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War, 
Enclosing a Statement of the Organization of the Army, 16th 
Cong., 2nd sess., House Document 31, Serial 48, 7. The 
total in the Calhoun plan does not match the total number of 
men in the regiments due to personnel assigned to non-
regimental duty. Company strengths for the different 
regiments are listed in Appendix 3.
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While the idea of an expansible army had been discussed
for years, and had been suggested by many of the Army's
senior officers, Calhoun was the first to propose it
officially. His closing statement made clear his feelings
about the utility of the plan:
By no propriety of language, can that arrangement be 
called economical, which, in order that our military 
establishment in peace should be rather less expensive, 
would regardless of the purposes for which it ought to 
be maintained, render it unfit to meet the dangers 
incident to a state of war.54
The reaction towards Calhoun's plan was decidedly 
mixed. The senior line officers of the Army--no doubt 
influenced by the thought that the plan did not reduce their 
numbers, and that if Congress decided to act differently it 
would be Calhoun selecting those who would be demoted or 
released— were supportive. Colonel Henry Atkinson wrote to 
Colonel Thomas S. Jessup that even though he thought there 
might be a small chance for a reduction it probably would 
not occur because Generals Jackson and Brown both had 
support in Congress from different regions (Jackson in the 
South and West and Brown in the North and East), and any 
reduction of the Army would force the reduction of the staff 
to one Major General.55
The two generals to whom Atkinson referred liked 
Calhoun's efforts. After seeing the report Jacob Brown 
said, "The report is what it should be— more I cannot say in
54Ibid., 93.
55Henry Atkinson to Thomas S. Jesup, December 27, 1820, 
Calhoun, Papers. 5:516.
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its favor."56 Andrew Jackson wrote Calhoun that "it [the 
plan] is calculated for peace. It is a good basis to build 
on in war."57 As has been shown, neither general was in 
favor of any reduction in the Army but both suspected that 
the tenor of the Congress was running against them. Brown, 
in particular, thought the Army was being unfairly 
criticized by Congress, calling those who proposed reduction 
as being "save six pence and spend pound gentlemen."58 As a 
whole, the entire senior staff of the Army felt the same 
way.
Unlike the Army, the nation's press took widely 
diverging views on the Army reduction in late 1820. The 
National Intelligencer called the Army reduction issue "one 
of great vital importance to the honor, to the independence, 
and to the safety of the Republic."59 On November 11,
1820, the paper published an editorial pointing out that 
although the shortfall in revenues was going to be less than 
expected in 1821, it was still going to be high enough that 
some action would have to be taken. The editor thought that 
it would be foolhardy to divest "the nation of its military 
or naval armour" or to arrest construction of "its permanent
56Brown to Calhoun, December 29, 1820, Calhoun, Papers, 
5:519.
57Jackson to Calhoun, January 4, 1821, Calhoun, Papers, 
5:528.
58Brown to Calhoun, December 29, 1820, Calhoun, Papers, 
5:519.
59National Intelligencer, January 18, 1821.
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works of defense."6° He suggested that a revival of the 
internal tax abolished in 1817 would be an excellent way to 
overcome the looming shortfall. A reestablishment of such a 
tax was unlikely even to be discussed seriously in Congress, 
however, due to the great distaste most Americans of the 
period had for any tax directly levied by the government.
The Federalist leaning New York Post surprisingly 
published several letters that were hostile to the Army 
during the first few months of 1821. One, signed by 
Farrell, claimed that Calhoun's proposed Army was worth only 
the command of a single brigadier and not the assortment of 
generals favored by the Secretary of War. The writer urged 
deep reduction of the staffs and little severance pay to 
those officers released.®1
The Richmond Enquirer took a moderate view of 
reduction. The editorial position of the paper was that 
"the most efficient and only proper peace establishment of 
the United States is that which employs the least force."
The editors wanted an "army of instruction for the militia," 
since the militia was the bulwark of American defense. 2̂ 
The editors then declared that such an army was what the 
country already possessed in 1820. They suggested that "the 
numerical strength of the army is in conformity to the duty 
we assign to it. Our institutions would forbid it to be 60*2
60Ibid., November 11, 1820.
61-New York Post. January 18, 1821.
62Richmond Enquirer, November 24, 1820.
49
greater; our necessities prevent it from being less."63 jn 
essence the editors of the paper agreed with many of the 
pro-reduction arguments while being against reducing the 
Army. The Editors of the Enquirer did not hold the Army to 
be sacred, however. In a later editorial they stated that 
although "the numerical strength of the army [was] 
inadequate to the national necessities," by "judicious 
management its numbers might even bear reduction and the 
nation be equally well served."64 The policy of the 
Richmond Enquirer was, therefore, pulled equally by concerns 
of national defense and fiscal responsibility.
The National Gazette and Literary Register 
(Philadelphia) supported those in favor of a strong Army. 
Echoing the National Intelligencer, it declared that an 
internal tax would keep the Army strong and reduce the risk
of war. The editors of the paper wrote that a defensive
attitude was needed for the country and that the main
ingredient of such an attitude was the retention of a strong 
military establishment. They feared the destruction of the 
Army would be more serious than any short term financial 
difficulties.65 By ^he end of 1820, however, the editors 
realized that the tide of opinion in Congress had turned and 
that some reduction was inevitable. In an editorial in late 634*
63Ibid.
64lbid., December 7, 1821.
65National Gazette and Literary Register, November 13,
1820.
50
December they urged that the staff changes that Calhoun had 
implemented in 1818 be given a chance to work. They also 
pointed out that any savings gained by reducing the officer 
corps would be small when compared to the larger cuts that 
could be wrung from the rank and file.66 The National 
Gazette closely supported the policies of the Secretary of 
War on the Army reduction issue.
Public opinion on the reduction was therefore mixed, 
it alone would not be a decisive influence upon Congress.
From the very start of the Sixteenth Congress those 
members who wished to prevent Army reduction were on the 
defensive. After a messy and drawn out fight, revolving 
more around factional control than any other issue, the 
House elected New York Democrat John W. Taylor over South 
Carolina Democrat William Lowndes to be its Speaker. This 
was unfortunate for both the Army and Calhoun, since Taylor 
was a Crawford supporter and favored reduction, while 
Lowndes took a pro-Army position and was a close friend of 
Calhoun.67
Taylor's election as Speaker was important to the 
reduction debate because as Speaker he controlled committee 
assignments. His appointments to the seven member House 
Committee on Military Affairs were to make the reduction 
faction very happy. Of the one Federalist and six Democrats 
he appointed, Taylor selected six members who supported the
66Ibid., December 27, 1820.
67Skeen, 144.
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proposed cuts. The only member of the committee who opposed 
such a course was its chairman, Virginia Democrat Alexander 
Smyth. Smyth, who had served as the Colonel of the Rifle 
Regiment from 1808 to 1812 and as the Inspector General of 
the Regular Army during the early part of the War of 1812, 
was not to be much help to Calhoun and the Army, however, 
since he was a rather ineffectual politician and had little 
influence over the other members of the committee.68 The 
work Taylor had done to stack the committee was understood, 
if not appreciated, by almost all in Washington. General 
Brown commented, "Mr. Speaker Taylor has done us much 
mischief by carefully arranging the military and naval 
comts. of the House so as to secure a majority hostile in 
e a c h . T h e  forces against the Army appeared very strong 
as debate on the subject began.
Other events in the House also tended to go against the 
pro-army faction early in the Sixteenth Congress. After the 
motion reguiring Calhoun to submit his report was passed in 
May little happened until he sent it to the House in mid- 
December. One important event did occur on December 1,
1820, when Treasury Secretary Crawford submitted his yearly 
report. Crawford forecast a national debt of $2.6 million 
by January 1, 1821, a change of almost $4.5 million from the 
$2 million surplus in the treasury the year earlier. Most 




customs duties due to the business slowdown. Crawford 
forecast a national debt of $7.5 million by 1822, indicating 
a yearly deficit of almost $5 million.70 Many Congressmen 
were alarmed by these figures. The projected deficits in 
1820 and 1821 combined would reach $9.5 million, a serious 
problem when Crawford projected an income of only $16.5 
million 1821. Crawford's report, even though later amended 
by a second report showing a more favorable treasury 
balance,7  ̂ caused attention to be focused on the reduction 
issue.
On December 20, shortly before Crawford's report was 
amended, the chairman of the House Military Affairs 
Committee, Alexander Smyth, reported House bill 180, which 
called for the Military Peace Establishment of the country 
to be reduced to "6,000 Non-commissioned officers, 
musicians, and privates with a due proportion of field and 
company officers."72 The bill also called for the 
consolidation of all artillery units, the amalgamation of 
the rifle regiment with the infantry, the discharge of the 
Topographical Engineers, and the reduction of senior
70Pebates. 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 489-90.
71Ibid., 690. On December 28, 1820, Crawford reported 
to Congress a second time. In the second report he stated 
that due to an error concerning War Department money held by 
the Treasury Department the debt as of January 1, 1822 was 
expected to be only $4.7 million, a difference of over $2.7 
million from his first report just weeks earlier.
Supporters of the Army and Calhoun made much of the error in 
the political infighting during the debates.
72Ibid., 688-9.
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officers to one Brigadier General with a greatly reduced 
staff. The bill was straightforward on what would happen to 
any men in excess of these requirements, calling for all 
"supernumerary officers, non commissioned officers and 
privates, to be discharged from the service."* 745 After the 
bill was read twice it was sent to the Committee of the 
Whole on the State of the Union, on December 28, 1820.74
The debate on reduction in the Committee of the Whole 
started with a much broader scope than House bill 180 
reflected.75 A resolution was presented stating that it was 
"expedient that the annual expenses of the government should 
be reduced."76 The resolution called for dramatic cuts in 
the Navy and coastal fortifications as well as in the Army. 
Reflecting the mood in the House for serious and lasting 
reduction of government expenditures, the resolution also 
called for all government employees to have their pay 
reduced to 1809 levels, and for the closure of any
75Ibid., 688. It is an irony that Smyth, a pro-army 
man, brought forth from his committee a bill so unfriendly 
to the Army. With his committee firmly packed with men who 
viewed the army unfavorably, however, he presented the bill 
to Congress as was his duty.
74House Journal. 16th Cong., 2nd sess. , Serial 47, 94.
75Reflecting the inexact style of reporting on Congress 
during the period there were at least ten speeches not 
reported on during the debate over the next several weeks. 
All the missing speeches are mentioned briefly in the 
Debates and there is no discernable pattern based on party, 
section, or position on reduction.
76Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 715-6.
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government offices "not immediately necessary for the public 
business. "77
Supporting the call for a general reduction in 
government expenditures was Thomas W. Cobb, a Georgia 
Democrat. Cobb admitted that he was "one for radical 
retrenchment"78 and he quickly outlined ways to cut over 
three million from the federal budget. Of this total, 
however, nearly 93 percent was to come from various defense 
items, including a reduction of the Army and Navy and a 
cancellation of most new ship and fortress construction.
Cobb wanted to perform radical retrenchment only on the 
military. The Army was to be realigned but not along 
Calhoun's plan, which Cobb complimented by suggesting it was 
"the ablest, most ingenious, and upon the whole, the best 
defense of a standing army in time of peace."79 Cobb's 
speech is important in the debate because he couched his 
desire to cut the Army in a broad context. Though he 
clearly thought the Army needed to be cut (and thought it 
should be cut first) he advocated other cuts as well. Many 
who followed his speech did not ask for any cuts outside of 
the Peace Establishment.
Alexander Smyth, as chairman of the House Military 
Affairs Committee, was one of the few leaders in the House 





he called "the great question"; the debate over which was 
more appropriate for the defense of the country, regulars or 
militia.80 Smyth clearly did not trust the militia even 
although he was careful not to state so explicitly. He 
tried to persuade other members of the importance of the 
Army by quoting Washington as saying, "To place any 
dependence upon the militia is assuredly resting on a broken 
staff."8! He thought that militia troops were useful only 
under controlled conditions which would not often occur 
during a war with a European power.
Although he made a fair case for his position, Smyth 
also showed in his speech that he was probably not the ideal 
man to have marshalling the pro Army forces. In a strange 
statement for a Committee chairman who should have known 
better, Smyth remarked that he "would not have been willing 
to discharge a single soldier" had not Calhoun presented a 
plan discharging part of the service.82 Surely Smyth should 
have known that Calhoun had been directed by the resolution 
of May 20, 1820, to provide a plan for the contraction of 
the Army to 6,000 men, but there was no comprehension of 
this in his speech. It was not a good sign for the Army to 
have so vital a supporter be so confused about the very 





On January 8, 1821, a Federalist from Ohio, Philemon 
Beecher, requested an end to debate on Cobb's proposal to 
have a general effort at reduction. With very little debate 
Beecher's motion passed 82 to 49. Beecher then moved that 
the House take up the report from the Military Affairs 
Committee (House bill 180). When the motion passed, on a 
voice vote, all reduction efforts in the House were focused 
squarely on the Army.
Ironically, the first speaker after Beecher's 
maneuverings was Calhoun's close friend and replacement in 
the House, Eldred Simkins, another South Carolina Democrat. 
Simkins started his speech by saying the time had come to 
forcefully state the case for the Army. He first lauded the 
work done since 1815 to reorganize, and increase the 
efficiency of, the Army, allowing it to cut expenditures by 
nearly a third while adding several thousand men.83 He also 
took pains to point out the apparent confusion emanating 
from the Treasury Department over the size of the debt 
forecast for the coming year and suggested that even the 
much improved figures from Crawford's second report would 
show still further improvement throughout 1821. Simkins 
suggested that since the public had not demanded a reduction 
but only "fidelity and accountability in the application of 
funds," and that since even the Secretary of the Treasury 
thought the deficit problem was easing, it would not be 
necessary to cut the Army's size. Men who would cut the
83Ibid., 762.
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Army for short term financial reasons he deemed "penny wise 
and pound foolish."®4
Echoing the thinking of Calhoun and the Army, Simkins 
saw a second, more meaningful, argument for not cutting the 
officers of the Army. Since generals were "not made in a 
day" Simkins feared what the loss of so many senior officers 
would do to the Army. Speaking with passion and eloguence 
on the need to retain the officers who would lead men into 
future battles he stated:
We may calculate the loss of dollars and cents, but who 
can calculate, by what criterion can you calculate the 
value of union, the waste of our moral character and 
energies, and the sacrifice of our best blood.85
Simkins was determined to stop the loss of senior officers
if he could.
One argument that had not yet been heard in the debate 
involved the long standing belief that any standing army was 
a danger to the republic, and that the "necessary evil" any 
such army represented should be kept as small as possible. 
Following Simkins in debate, Jarad Williams was prepared to 
make precisely that argument.
Williams, a Virginia Democrat, thought that the 
government should be unobtrusive and that the best way to 
accomplish this was to keep government expenses as low as 
possible at all times. Williams had only contempt for Army 




animated into existence by the sunshine of the treasury."88 
He also thought that the idle officers had a negative moral 
effect on the nation. Williams felt there were other 
problems with the Peace Establishment as well, keeping his 
greatest scorn for the notion that the state of military 
science would be hurt with the release of any of the Army's 
generals. Calling such a concept "utterly fallacious," 
Williams called for the reduction of the Army senior command 
to just one Brigadier General as well as deep cuts in staff 
positions.87
After a day of little debate on the Army John Cuthbert 
of Georgia, another Democrat, asked two guestions on January 
10, to try to clarify the debate. Cuthbert first asked "is 
the military establishment proposed in this bill 
sufficiently large for the wants of our country" and 
secondly, if not, "are the resources of our country . . .
adequate to the support of a larger establishment?"88 He 
quickly came to the center of the entire debate when he 
declared that 6,000 men could not garrison the fortresses 
needed to protect the country while also serving as a 
"depository of military science."8  ̂ Cuthbert was sure the 
country could afford the cost of an adequate force even if 






Following Cuthbert in the debate was yet another 
Democrat, Charles Fisher from North Carolina. Fisher 
pointed out that "the ordinary revenues of the country are 
insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of the 
government."90 Since he disagreed with Cuthbert's 
willingness to wait out the loss in revenues, Fisher saw but 
three options to solve this problem: government loans, more 
taxes, or retrenchment and economy. Fisher was convinced 
that the public would not support new taxes and he was 
egually convinced that further loans were a bad idea unless 
there was an immediate threat to the country, so he favored 
the retrenchment option.
Fisher had other concerns with the Army besides its 
expense. He felt that any large, professional force would 
harm the militia since it would tend to divert attention 
away from the citizen force. Fisher did not think the 
Regular Army alone could provide security for the country 
and that it should be reduced and efforts made to diffuse 
military knowledge throughout the militia and the 
citizenry.91
Thomas Cobb then attempted to again broaden the debate 
to cover other military items that could be reduced. He 
proposed that the Navy Department be asked to find ways to 
limit the number of seamen in the service and he asked that 




pensions. The first initiative passed on a voice vote and 
the second failed by a close vote of 53 to 59. That the 
issue of cutting pensions was even mentioned, and that the 
resulting vote was close, shows how serious many were about 
reducing the deficit. Normally pensions, once granted by 
Congress, were not the subject of further debate.
Debate on Army reduction resumed on January 11, with a 
speech from Newton Cannon, a Democrat and Old Republican 
from Tennessee. Cannon gave the first overtly anti-officer 
speech of the debate. He called the reduction "a subject of 
great importance" since he thought it was the people of the 
nation who had to bear the burden imposed by officers who 
would "elevate [themselves] too high."92 After mentioning 
that he thought the Army's role was simply to man the forts 
and keep munitions ready for the militia, Cannon decried the 
increase of public debt to keep such an unnecessarily large 
force. Cannon was also straightforward in his view of 
public debt, calling it "one of the greatest evils in any 
country" and "a threat to public liberty."93 Cannon saw it 
as his duty to fight the twin evils of a standing army and a 
growing public debt.
After several days conducting other business, the House 
returned to reduction on January 13, with an effort by 
Kentucky Democrat George Robertson to set up a special 




to save money and to investigate if certain salaries of 
government employees could be cut. Robertson, who voted 
against the final Army reduction, could have been attempting 
to draw the focus away from the Army with such a resolution. 
After receiving support from Thomas Culbreth, a Maryland 
Democrat, the committee was established.
The last major speech on reduction was given by the 
Kentucky Democrat David Trimble. Trimble did not think the 
guestion under debate should be whether the militia or 
regular army could best serve the nation since he thought 
both had their purposes. He did pose three questions he 
felt were important (the first two being similar to 
Cuthbert's). Trimble was not only interested in whether the 
present army was necessary for service during peace and 
whether the treasury could support it, he wanted to know if 
a reduction to 6,000 men would lessen the strength and 
security of the nation.94 Trimble made great fun of the 
fact that of the 124 forts the Army had listed in its last 
report to Congress 68 had garrisons of ten men or less. 
Alluding to the frequent assertion that one of the main 
purposes of the Army was to garrison these forts, Trimble 
called such strength "just enough to lock the gates."95 
Obviously closing these forts would not adversely effect the 
nation's security. Turning his attention to the lengthening 




garrisoned at interior forts had increased more than seven 
times from 1809 to 1820 (from 318 to 2,235). Trimble 
rhetorically asked if these troops could not also be used on 
the Frontier, thereby reducing the number needed for duty. 
Overall, Trimble thought a reduction was possible because 
the militia was the rightful body to handle any invasion, 
that 10,000 men was too large a force to simply garrison the 
Frontier, that the country could not afford the current 
Army, and that a reduction would not hurt the safety of the 
country.96
The day after Trimble's speech saw the start of intense 
parliamentary maneuvering as both sides tried to amend House 
bill 180. The first to make a motion was the Maryland 
Democrat Samuel Smith, who wanted to strike out the first 
section and insert a substitute which would keep the light 
artillery corps and the rifle regiment in the Army.9  ̂ After 
his proposal was voted down Smith tried another change by 
proposing that the Quartermaster General be held at the rank 
of Brigadier General instead of reduced to Colonel. His 
motion lost on a surprisingly close division (50 to 58), for 
the amount of scorn that had been heaped on the 
Quartermaster department during the debate.
Any momentum the supporters of the Army might have felt 
quickly dissipated when Charles Mercer, a Virginia Democrat, 
requested that the Topographical Engineers not be disbanded.
96Ibid., 885.
9 7 Ibid., 891.
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After much debate the corps was voted down 43 to 60. After 
failing to revive the Topographical Engineers the House 
quickly defeated, by voice votes, motions to give enlisted 
men three months' separation pay, to restore some of the pay 
cuts to certain staff officers, and to keep one extra 
Adjutant General.98 Those for reducing the Army had won 
these key votes easily.
On January 20, one of the few Northerners to speak 
during the debate expressed his support for the bill.
Gideon Tomlinson, a Connecticut Democrat, admitted that the 
House was eager to end debate but thought he needed to 
remind the House that the only way not to reduce the Army 
was to take from the people, either in taxes or debt passed 
on to future generations. On the debt Tomlinson was clear 
about his feelings. "I for one", he declared, "cannot 
consent to transmit that inheritance which was achieved by 
the wisdom and valor of our predecessors to posterity 
encumbered with the expense of our imprudence99
Tomlinson's speech was the last of any substance on the 
bill. In its final form the bill reduced the Army from nine 
regiments of infantry to five and combined the artillery 
into five battalions of just twenty companies.-'-̂ ® The bill *9
9 8ibid., 905.
9 9 Ibid., 912.
lO^Congress, Senate, Estimate of the Comparative 
Expenses of the Army, Under the Organization of the Bill 
Passed by the House of Representatives and that of the 
Military Committee of the Senate, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 
Senate Document 77, Serial 43, passim.
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called for 5,190 privates and just under 6,000 enlisted 
troops, one Major General, two Brigadier Generals, 
reductions of other staff positions, the abandonment of the 
Topographical Engineers, and the merging of the artillery 
and ordnance corps. On January 22, 1821, the House passed 
bill 180 to a third reading by a vote of 109 to 47. The 
next day it received final passage, 109 to 48, and was sent 
to the Senate.
There is an especially noteworthy aspect to the vote to 
pass House bill 180--there is almost no differentiation 
between party or section in its passage. As Tables 2 and 3 
show, each party and section not only voted in favor of the 
bill's passage, but did so by astonishingly similar 
percentages. Clearly party and sectional differences did 
not play a role in passage of the bill. The one minor 
regional difference, that New England was slightly more 
willing to decrease the Army than the South or Frontier and 
the mid-Atlantic states were slightly less willing, is a 
continuation of a trend from before the period.102
Such uniformity is unexpected for several reasons. 
First, the desire of the Frontier states to help reduce the
-̂Olpebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess. , 936-7; House 
Journal, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 160-1. Even though the 
Debates and House Journal agree on the vote the raw data in 
House Journal is wrong. The real tally is 109 to 48.
Appendix 2 for a list of region's to which 
various states and districts belong. Tables 2 and 3 show a 
swing of only a few votes in the New England and Mid 
Atlantic sections or among the Federalists would bring the 
corresponding percentages in line with the national vote.
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TABLE 2
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS, BY REGION
Region Yeas Neas Total
New England 25 (79%) 7 (21%) 32 (100%)
Mid Atlantic 28 (64%) 16 (36%) 44 (100%)
North (total) 53 (70%) 23 (30%) 76 (100%)
South 35 (69%) 16 (31%) 51 (100%)
Frontier 21 (70%) 9 (30%) 30 (100%)
Total 109 (69%) 48 (31%) 157 (100%)
TABLE 3
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS, BY PARTY
Party Yeas Neas Total
Democrats 85 (70%) 37 (30%) 122 (100%)
Federalists 13 (62%) 8 (38%) 21 (100%)
Other/Not knownl^3 11 (79%) 3 (21%) 14 (100%)
Total 109 (69%) 48 (31%) 157 (100%)
l°3The number in this category is particularly high due 
to the problem of identifying party membership of some of 
the obscure members of the Sixteenth Congress.
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Army is intriguing. It would be natural to assume that the 
Frontier would want the protection the Army offered. Instead 
the Representatives from the Frontier districts voted as did 
other Representatives to reduce the Army. Perhaps the 
people of the Frontier felt that their local militia would 
be better suited to fighting the Indians and protecting 
their homes than the Army, which normally was raised mostly 
in the East. Such a belief would be especially strong in 
Alabama and Georgia in 1821 after the Army had to request 
the help of the state militias in subduing the Seminoles in 
Florida. Even if such a bias existed, however, it would 
only make sense to reduce the Army if the Frontier states 
felt secure with their local protection.
A second reason for the Frontier's desire to cut the 
Army was a fear that any new taxes to pay for the deficit if 
the Army was not reduced would have to be largely borne by 
themselves. Writing to a friend, Major J. J. Abert 
supported this view when he wrote that the Frontier states 
"wished to avoid the possibility of taxing their lands . . . 
and to effect this they have gull'd the Atlantic over into 
our abandonment of the defenses of their towns."104 That 
the Frontier states were worried about new taxes during an 
economic downturn makes sense; an area dependent on capital 
to expand and build an infrastructure would be even more 
concerned than the rest of the country about a tax increase.
104Major J. J. Abert to Christopher Vandeventer, 
January 25, 1821; quoted in Spiller, "Secretary", 281.
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Such a fear, added to a faith in the ability of the local 
militia, could be enough for a section to vote for 
reduction.
A second surprise in the uniformity of the vote against 
the Army was that the South voted for reduction by a margin 
of two to one. John Hope Franklin's theory about Southern 
militarism, first discussed in the introduction, does not 
hold in this instance. In fact, even though the main 
proponents of the Army were from the South (Simkins from 
South Carolina and Smyth of Virginia), many of the leading 
members pushing for reduction were from the South as well 
(Williams from Virginia, Fisher from North Carolina, and 
Trimble from Kentucky). On this question about the 
military, the Southern Congressmen held a nearly identical 
opinion with the rest of the country.
One reason why the voting percentage in the South was 
so close to that of the other sections was that the Old 
Republicans voted overwhelmingly in favor of the reduction. 
The Old Republicans stayed true to their heritage of 
believing in a small and unobtrusive government. As Table 4 
shows, while the Old Republicans voted overwhelmingly for 
reduction, the rest of the Democrats voted much like the 
Federalists and the House as a whole.105 Several Old 
Republicans, most prominently Newton Cannon of Tennessee,
105The one Old Republican who voted against the 
reduction was Hugh Nelson of Virginia. He was a close 
friend of President Monroe and was known to be a reliable 
reporter of House events to Thomas Jefferson. There is no 
record of why he voted no on the measure.
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also had key roles in the reduction debate, and John Cocke 
of Tennessee was on the House Military Affairs Committee.
The Old Republicans were the most distinctive voting bloc in 
the reduction debate.
TABLE 4
OLD REPUBLICAN VOTE TO PASS HOUSE BILL 180
Yeas Neas Total
Democrat/ 14 (93%) 1 (7%) 15 (100%)
Old Republicans
All other Democrats 71 (66%) 36 (34%) 107 (100%)
Total Democrats 85 (70%) 37 (30%) 122 (100%)
Federalists/Others 24 (69%) 11 (31%) 35 (100%)
That the Democrats and Federalists voted in such a 
similar pattern (70 versus 62 percent) shows that party 
affiliation was not a strong factor during the debate. 
Considering that non-Old Republican/Democrats voted much 
more like Federalists on reduction (66 versus 62 percent) 
than their Old Republican colleagues (93 percent), the idea 
of any kind of Democratic unity on the issue dose not seem 
supportable. This behavior seems to support the hypotheses 
that lack of discipline in the Democrat-Republican Party 
coupled with the weakness of the Federalists could also be
69
seen as a sign of the weakening of the First American Party 
System.
Unlike the House, the Senate of the Sixteenth Congress 
was not necessarily convinced that either the Army or the 
expenditures of the government had to be reduced. The 
forces favoring the Army were much stronger than in the 
House and, as a whole, the Senate was reluctant to take up 
the reduction debate.106 The House bill arrived in the 
Senate on January 23 and was sent to the Senate Committee on 
Military Affairs the next day. The bill that came out of 
that committee in late February was markedly different from 
House bill 180.
The biggest change in the Senate version of the bill 
was that it called for the retention of seven regiments of 
infantry and four regiments of artillery (36 companies) 
versus four infantry regiments and five artillery battalions 
(20 companies) in the House version.106 07 The only way the 
Senate could maintain these regiments and not greatly 
increase the cost of the bill was to reduce the size of the 
component companies. This the Senate chose to do, thereby 
reducing the number of privates in a company from 68 to 48 
in infantry regiments and from 100 to 42 in artillery 
regiments.108 With these cuts in the rank and file the
106Skeen, 150.
107Congress, Senate Document 77, passim.
108Ibid. With these reductions the Senate actually 
ended up with smaller artillery companies, 42 versus 54, 
than Calhoun had suggested in his report to the House.
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Senate version would end up costing only $20,000 more than 
the House version while allowing several more regiments.
When Senate debate began on February 21 it was 
generally restrained and typically followed many of the same 
arguments that had been heard in the House. The debate 
itself was often cut short because of the coming end of the 
session, just a matter of days away. Several members did 
defend the quartermaster and ordnance corps for their 
"unexampled excellence" and Freeman Walker, a Georgia 
Democrat, proposed an amendment to keep the ordnance and 
artillery corps separate. His motion lost by the close vote 
of 18 to 19.109 *
The speaker who took the most time in the Senate 
debate, and who seemed the most vexed with the Senate 
version of the bill, was New Jersey Democrat Mahlon 
Dickerson. Dickerson thought the Senate bill was fatally 
flawed because it did not propose "an equal reduction of the 
officers of the Army" in proportion to the reduction of the 
Army itself.H O  Dickerson believed that the staff 
realignment of 1818, even though generally well thought of 
by almost everyone in and out of the military, had been 
botched, thereby leaving the Army top heavy with officers. 
After two days of parliamentary maneuvering Dickerson and 
his allies tried to cut the Adjutant General's position and 
reduce the one remaining Major General position to a
109Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 365.
H°Ibid. ' 367 .
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Brigadier. Their attempts at the former floundered by a 
vote of 17 to 20 while the latter failed even more 
decisively, 16 to 24.111 With these defeats any attempts to 
rework the Senate version collapsed and the bill was sent 
back to the House, on a voice vote, on February 24, 1821.
When the Senate version of the reduction bill was 
reported back to the House, the House Military Affairs 
Committee made a few minor changes and sent it to the floor. 
When members of the House started to balk at some of the 
changes made by the Senate version, Henry Clay, who had only 
recently taken his seat that session and had missed the 
first debate, and Virginia Democrat Phillip Barbour pushed 
the bill through with little opposition or debate.112 * The 
only real dissatisfaction expressed was by Newton Cannon, 
the Tennessee Democrat who felt that the number of regiments 
should be reduced so the number of remaining officers could 
also be reduced. His proposal to reduce the Army to four 
Infantry regiments and two artillery regiments was narrowly 
defeated 73 to 79.112 Final passage of the bill occurred 
after the Senate agreed to a few minor amendments insisted 
upon by the House. The bill was signed into law, and the 
Army reduced to just over 6,000 men, on March 2, 1821.114
111Congress, Senate Journal, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 
Serial 41, 213; 214-15.
112Skeen, 150.
112Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 1242-43.
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Reaction to the final passage of the reduction law was 
mixed. President Monroe wrote to James Madison that the 
"painful duty" of reducing the Army was finished but 
throughout the debate he failed to intervene, nor did he 
indicate now that he wished he had done so to make events 
turn out differently.115 Secretary of War Calhoun was so 
distressed by the act that he wrote to the National 
Intelligencer. under the name of the great French 
fortification expert Vauban, and suggested that the House 
had acted "in a panic" to ensure retrenchment. Calhoun felt 
the policy to be "neither wisdom nor economy" and stated 
that it would seriously hamper the Army's ability to defend 
the country.116 The editors of the National Gazette and 
Literary Register simply complained of the actions of the 
House being "inscrutable to us" and called the whole 
reduction effort "economical fury."117
The results of the reduction were quickly felt. 
Brigadier Generals Henry Atkinson and Alexander Macomb were 
reduced to Colonels, with Atkinson being offered the command
114Richard Peters and George Minot, eds., United States 
Statutes at Large 10 vols. (Boston: Charles C. Little and 
James Brown, 1846-1861), 3:615.
115James Monroe to James Madison, May 19 1821, James 
Monroe, The Writings of James Monroe, ed. Stanislaus Murray 
Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York: AMS Press, 1969; reprint, New 
York: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1899-1903), 6:179.
116National Intelligencer, April 10, 1821. Calhoun 
admitted his authorship of the article in a letter to Virgil 
Maxcy on April 11, 1821. See Calhoun, Papers, 6:41-42.
117National Gazette and Literary Register. January 25,
1821.
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of a regiment and Macomb given command of the Corps of 
Engineers. These reductions left Edmund P. Gaines and 
Winfield Scott the two remaining Brigadiers, and Jacob Brown 
as the Army's lone Major General (Andrew Jackson had left 
the Army to become the military Governor of Florida).
Several thousand officers and non-commissioned officers 
"were cast out of the service without any provision for 
their welfare" while the rank and file was allowed to reduce 
through attrition.
Unlike Army reduction, the history of other 
retrenchment efforts in the Sixteenth Congress showed mixed 
results. An effort to fix and reduce the size of the Navy 
quickly floundered. After little debate one vote was taken 
in the House to reduce the number of officers in the Navy 
but it was defeated on February 8 by the vote of 63 to 
87.119 The drj_ve to cut appropriations for other military 
projects showed better results. The fortification budget 
for 1822 was cut from $800,000 to a guarter of that amount 
and spending on new ordnance was cut entirely.120 
The coalition that had been created to reduce the Army fell 
apart entirely, however, when the debate turned to civilian 
spending.
HSwilliam Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United 
States Army (New York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924), 158.
119Pebates, 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 1062.
120Skeen, 151.
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Thomas Culbreth took the floor of the House during 
February 1821 and requested that salaries of those on the 
civil list of the federal government be cut by 20 percent. 
Supporters of Henry Clay and DeWitt Clinton refused to 
support the measure, however, especially after John 
Campbell, an Ohio Democrat, linked such a cut to 
Congressional salaries as well.121 without support from 
these two factions those favoring reduction knew they could 
not win and did not even bring the issue to a vote. After 
this rebuff the forces of government economy were fractured 
and raised the issue no more. Their only success was the 
reduction of the Army.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the Army 
reduction of 1821. The first, and most obvious, was that 
Congress found it easier to cut the military establishment 
of the country than to cut civilian employment. The main 
reason for this was that the military had only moderate 
public support, with many citizens feeling that the duties 
asked of the peacetime Army were not enough to require many 
men. A second reason is that very few civilians worked for 
the federal government in 1821. The total number of 
civilian employees that year was 6,914, of which only 2,108 
were not postal workers.I22 There simply was little cutting 
to be done in the civilian work force.
121Ibid.; Risjord, 196. 
122Census, 2:1103.
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It also was apparent that Congress, as a whole, was 
more indulgent of the Navy than the Army. While Naval 
expenditures and strengths were comparable to the Army's in 
the period, the Navy was never made to contemplate a fixed 
Naval Peace Establishment. The reason for this is two-fold. 
Firstly, the Navy was often considered more important than 
the Army in the nation's defense, for the Navy was the first 
line of defense and had no civilian or militia counterpart 
as did the Army. Secondly, navies, by their very nature, 
posed less of a threat than a standing army to a republican 
form of government.
The reasons why the Army received major cutbacks, and 
other departments did not, are not simple, however.
Certainly Michael Fitzgerald's thesis that the move to 
reduce the Army was in large part a political contest 
foreshadowing the 1824 Presidential election deserves some 
consideration. Both Crawford and Calhoun had Presidential 
aspirations, and political infighting on the subject of 
government expenditures happens even in the best of times. 
However, to declare such tensions to be the main cause of 
the reduction is to give short shrift to the many in 
Congress who passionately cared about the governments fiscal 
health.
In the end, the debate and votes in Congress on the 
Army reduction showed one clear trend: regional and party 
differences played little to no role in the passage of the 
bill. The House vote by section is grouped between 67 and
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71 percent and by party between 62 to 70 percent. The fact 
that only the Old Republicans can be easily identified as 
diverging much from the national norm in voting for 
reduction had far less to do with the party or section of 
the group's members than it did with their old-fashioned 
views.
The lack of any other party or sectional breakdown on 
the issue is certainly a surprise. The parties and sections 
traditionally supportive of the Army did not vote 
differently than the rest of the political establishment.
In the midst of the unravelling of the First American Party 
System the attitudes towards the Army in Congress also 
seemed to be changing.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE EVER INCREASING ARMY: FRONTIER DEFENSE IN THE 1830s
After the retrenchment of 1821 was complete the United 
States Army settled into a new routine, guarding the nation 
with reduced manpower in a time of increasing 
responsibility. The loss of one infantry regiment and 
nearly five thousand men would make the Army's task of 
Frontier defense much harder to perform throughout the 
1830s.
It did not take long for the difficulty of guarding the 
Frontier with 6,000 men to become apparent to Secretary of 
War Calhoun and the commanders of the Army. In 1823 the 
lack of manpower caused the Army to abandon Fort Dearborn 
near Chicago. The fort, an important supply and staging 
area, was closed because it was no longer on the most 
exterior line of the Frontier. Calhoun was unhappy with the 
fort's loss, calling the decision a choice "between two 
evils" and the choice made "not absolutely good of itself, 
but [the one] which has the fewest objections."1 Just two
•̂Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of 
the United States Army in the Development of the Northwest: 
1815-1860 (Madison: The State Historical Society of 
Wisconsin, 1953), 23.
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years after the reduction of 1821 the Army was having to 
make difficult choices in how to guard the Frontier.
During 1826 the men at Fort Crawford (at Prairie du 
Chien, Territory of Wisconsin) had been moved to Fort 
Snelling (near the present day city of St. Paul) because 
Snelling was considered key to the defense of the upper 
Mississippi.2 in the absence of any regular troops at Fort 
Crawford serious difficulties occurred between the 
Winnebagos and the white settlers around Prairie du Chien, 
which the militia of the area proved roundly incapable of 
stopping. To keep the area peaceful the Army had to move 
men back into the region, reoccupying not only Fort Crawford 
in 1827 but Fort Dearborn in 1828 as well.3 These movements 
further strained the Army's meager resources.
In 1828 the Commanding General, Major General Jacob 
Brown, reported to Congress that he favored placement of two 
infantry and two cavalry companies at each frontier post.
The main idea of the report was that the infantry would hold 
the post while the cavalry would sweep the surrounding 
areas, thereby pacifying them.4 The only flaw in the plan, 
of course, was that in 1828 the Army had no cavalry units. 
The Senate attempted to remedy this in 1830 by passing a
2Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of 
the United States: 1789-1895 (Madison: The State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953), 108.
3Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: The 
United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 (Toronto: The 
Macmillan Company, 1969), 319-20; Prucha, Guide, 71.
4Ibid., 235.
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bill raising mounted troops but the House refused to take up 
the bill and it died at the end of the session.5
The constant shifting of forces that occurred in the 
late 1820s was not an efficient way to bring peace to the 
frontier. Almost everybody interested in the military 
establishment in the early 1830s felt that some kind of 
fixed, long-term plan was needed to bring stability to the 
Army. Lewis Cass, the Secretary of War after the start of 
Andrew Jackson's Presidency in 1829, took reguests for such 
a plan from both the House and Senate Military Affairs 
Committees in 1830 and fashioned a proposal which called 
for the use of cavalry in much the same manner as Brown's 
report did in 1828.6 7 The adoption of cavalry units would 
solve the two main problems of frontier defense: the 
shortage of men and units imposed by retrenchment, and the 
infantry's inability to control the behavior of the Indians. 
Unfortunately for the Army, many Congressmen still opposed 
any expansion, regardless of how many plans advocated it.
In this atmosphere, in December 1831, Missouri Senator 
Thomas Hart Benton sponsored a bill "to authorized the 
mounting of a part of the army of the United States."7
5Ibid., 239. Congress, The Register of Debates in 
Congress, 14 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1824- 
1837) 21st Cong., 1st sess., 272, 274. Hereafter cited as 
Register.
6Prucha, Sword, 340.
7Congress, Senate, Senate Journal, 22nd Cong., 1st 
sess., Serial 211, 31. Hereafter cited as Senate Journal.
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Benton, considered the "driving force" of the 1832 
debate by many historians, was a Westerner who was not 
afraid to complain to the Senate about the exposed condition 
of the Frontier.8 Like others from the region, he was 
concerned about the numerous small uprisings that had 
occurred throughout the Northwest in the previous years. 
Although there had not been a general Indian uprising the 
settlers and Representatives of the region lived in fear of 
one. To make things more uncomfortable for those living on 
the Frontiers, most had little faith in the ability of the 
regular infantry to protect them. It was these two factors: 
fear of the Indians and a lack of faith of the effectiveness 
of regular infantry in the region, that led to Benton's call 
to mount part of the existing army.
Even though Benton did not seek to increase the Army, 
merely to rearrange it, his bill was tabled after it had 
been reported out of his Military Affairs Committee. It is 
probable that no further action would have been taken to 
provide the Army with cavalry in 1832 except for effects of 
the Black Hawk War then underway in Wisconsin.
The Black Hawk War, named for the Sac and Fox war chief 
who led the Indians, started in July 1831 when Black Hawk 
and several hundred of his warriors attacked a tribe of 
Menomonies near Fort Crawford. In a report sent to the
8Otis E. Young, "The United States Mounted Ranger 
Battalion, 1832-1833," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 
41 (December, 1954): 454.
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Department of War on July 31, 1831, the chief of the Indian 
Bureau declared the situation a serious offence since the 
two tribes had conducted a treaty of peace the year before 
and because the Menomonies had been under the protection of 
the United States flag when attacked.9 Black Hawk might 
have led the attack in retaliation for a previous outrage 
but that was not known at the time.10 Lewis Cass agreed 
with his bureau chief, however, and stated so in his report 
to Congress on the matter. Cass said that "this aggression 
. . . shows the necessity of employing upon the frontier a 
corps of mounted riflemen, to be stationed at the most 
exposed points" of the Frontier.H Cass also warned that 
infantry would be of little use against the Sac and Fox due 
to the distances involved and suggested that if regular 
cavalry was not provided to the Army the nation would be 
"frequently compelled to adopt more measures more expensive 
and inconvenient to us and more injurious to the Indians."12
Congress could observe the positive aspects of using 
cavalry on the Northwestern frontier during the war.
Colonel Henry Dodge skillfully led a militia battalion of 
mounted rangers during the war and caused the Fox and Sac 
tribes many problems with his unit's speed and 9
9Reqister, 22nd Cong., 1st sess., appendix, 18.
lOReuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Collections of the State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin. 20 vols. (Madison:




aggressiveness.13 The work of Dodge and his men impressed 
many in Congress who knew that the regular army had no such 
capability. The Congress, however, did not move quickly to 
implement Benton's plan for several reasons. Among the most 
important of these was cost. Cavalry had always been many 
times more expensive than infantry and it was this issue 
which insured that there would be no mounted troops after 
the reduction of 1821. A second reason to avoid cavalry, 
and perhaps a more compelling one to many in Congress, was 
that the Cavalry arm was considered to be much less 
democratic, and even aristocratic, when compared to the 
other arms. Such attributes were not helpful in the 
Jacksonian era.* 14 Congressional caution, based in large 
part on these two points, continued throughout early 1832.
On June 9, 1832, the Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs reported to the Senate a bill authorizing "the 
President to raise mounted volunteers for the defense of the 
frontiers." After months of inaction the Congress roused 
itself to provide mounted troops for the Frontier by passing 
this bill in only six days. It is difficult to isolate any 
specific event in the Black Hawk War which could have 
generated such a change, except that it lasted longer than 
the generals and politicians had expected. One writer has
13RUSell F. Wiegley, History of the United States Army 
(New York: Macmillan Co, 1973), 159. The preference for 
mounted troops was so great on the frontier that of the 




suggested that "the train of causation which led to the 
organization of the rangers can not be defined with 
certainly."^5 Of course, unlike Benton's bill of the 
previous December, the new bill called for mounted 
volunteers instead of mounting a part of the regular army, 
an important distinction which could explain the ease of 
passage of the bill introduced in June.
The only member of the Senate to speak on the bill on 
June 9 was the man who had reported it out of committee, 
the Indiana Democrat, John Tipton. Tipton, a Brigadier 
General in the Indiana militia, warmly praised mounted 
riflemen, describing them as "being better suited to a 
border warfare than any other" type of unit.!5 Tipton 
pointed out that the proposed volunteers would work better 
than mounting a part of the Army because the regular 
officers of the Army would have little knowledge about 
either the country or the type of warfare the unit would 
have to engage in. Even though Tipton protested that "no 
man can have a greater confidence in the skill and courage 
of our Army than I," he also urged the passage of the bill 
because the "inhabitants of the frontier would have more 
confidence in being defended by their fathers, husbands and 
brothers . . . than by comparative strangers."!7 15*7
15Young, 454.
!6Reqister 22nd Cong., 1st sess., 1069
17Ibid., 1069-70.
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Tipton also pointed out the unique status of volunteers 
in peace time. A battalion raised as requested in the bill 
would have a curious dual nature. It would be under the 
direction of officers appointed by the President and would 
be paid, equipped, and commanded as a Regular Army unit, but 
it would also have to attract new recruits yearly since the 
term of enlistment would run for only twelve months. While 
this system would make it hard for the unit to be cohesive 
due to rapid turnover, it would allow the unit to be easily 
disbanded if the situation called for it. Many Congressman 
approved of the plan because they hoped that the 
disturbances on the Frontier would be temporary.!®
After Tipton's speech the Senate passed the bill to the 
House, by a voice vote, without further debate. The House, 
in an unusual action, referred the bill to committee and 
allowed it to the floor on the same day. The debate which 
ensued in the House was much like that in the Senate.
William Ashley, a Missouri Whig, suggested that the bill 
should be amended to increase the term of enlistment in the 
unit to a minimum of three years, that being the minimum 
length of time needed to make a soldier. Kentucky Democrat 
Charles Wickliff and Ambrose Sevier, the delegate from 
Arkansas, both discussed the folly of trying to train 
infantry to use and care for horses, and both claimed that 
such a plan would surely fail.19 Benton's plan of mounting
18Ibid., 1070.
19 Ibid., 3395-96 .
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a portion of the Army played virtually no role in the coming 
debate; the issue was not considered seriously.
One member who was decidedly against any use of 
regulars was Massachusetts Whig George Grennell. Grennell 
gave a fiery speech calling Regulars "dregs and outcasts of 
society" and "men of evil habits and ferocious passions." 
Grennell asserted that only the "substantial yeomanry" of 
the country was needed to outwit the Indians and declared 
that he was for simply sending in as many militia as might 
be needed to put down the uprising.20 Grennell saw no need 
for volunteers and certainly none for the hated regulars.
After little additional debate, the House amended the 
size of the battalion from 500 to 1,000 men on the advice of 
Joseph Duncan. Duncan, an Illinois Democrat, was a Major 
General of Militia and commander of all the forces from his 
state involved in the fighting against Black Hawk in 1831. 
Duncan also moved to amend the bill so as to allow militia 
units to be used directly instead of becoming volunteers. 
This amendment would have had the effect of repealing the 
long standing law that militia could serve for only three 
months. Duncan felt that the one year enlistment, renewable 
if needed, would provide all the protection needed on the 
Frontier and would do so within the framework of the militia 
forces. After first agreeing to increase the size of the 
battalion, the House agreed, 79 to 31, to accept only
• t20Ibid 3396 .
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militia troops. The House then passed the bill back to the 
Senate for its consideration.
After the weekend adjournment the Senate again debated 
the bill on June 11, 1832. Tipton made a speech calling for 
the quick arrival of troops upon the Frontier. Tipton 
declared that, unlike some, he had no fear about the 
discretionary power to call up troops given to the President 
by the bill. He felt assured that President Jackson would 
act to have mounted troops on the Frontiers within thirty 
days of the passage of the Act. Tipton also renewed his 
plea to let the Frontier states protect their own. He 
asked, "Do you gentlemen expect us to beg the lives of our 
families upon our knees?"21
Tipton's fellow Democrat from the Frontier, Elias Kane 
of Illinois, also thought that the rapid arrival of troops 
upon the Frontier was crucial. He knew that the House had 
doubled the size of the battalion and that many in the 
Senate would object to the larger figure but Kane still did 
not think it was worth the time to amend the bill. He 
wanted the bill passed regardless of the type or quantity of 
the troops provided. William Hendricks, the other 
Democratic Senator from Indiana, disagreed with Kane on the 
need for speedy passage, however. Hendricks proposed 
amending the bill to provide a 600 man battalion with six 
companies. He was also the first speaker to declare that he 
was not "legislating for the present emergency at all" since
21Ibid 1076.
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"that emergency had, in all probability, before this passed 
away."22 Because of this fact Hendricks felt that 
volunteers were the better choice to enforce the peace in 
the Northwest. Hendricks's approach differed widely from 
Tipton's and Kane's even though they were all from the same 
party and section and were after the same result, the 
security of their constituents.
After Hendricks's speech the Senate next debated the 
increase on June 14, with Tipton again speaking first. By 
this point Tipton was becoming upset that the bill had not 
passed, even though the bill's progress had been extremely 
rapid up to that point. He complained bitterly about the 
regular infantry not being able to bring the Indians to 
battle even though they had over 1,200 men within forty 
miles of Black Hawk just months before. Tipton blamed this 
failure on the large amounts of baggage the Regulars carried 
and suggested that they were "sunshine soldiers" for their 
craving of good living.23 To Tipton, this wasted 
opportunity was just a further example of the inability of 
infantry to control Indians upon the Frontier.
Soon after Tipton's speech Robert Hayne, a South 
Carolina Democrat, made a speech supporting the bill and 
making an overt attack on the militia, one of the country's 
most revered institutions. Hayne, a man who had been a 




militia and not the Regulars were responsible for Black Hawk
being undefeated since it was the Militia which was supposed
to embody the majority of any force once it had mobilized.
Hayne disliked the part time aspect of the Militia and his
contempt of the institution ran deep. He stated that he
objected to these paper men, who appeared on the roll 
transmitted to the Government as an efficient body, and 
as such received their pay, while all their duty 
consisted in going out once or twice a year on hunting frolic into the country.24 256
It made sense to Hayne to use volunteers to defeat the 
Indians on the plains since they would be organized and 
trained for that one purpose. To ensure such a course was 
followed, Hayne moved to change the status of the troops 
back to volunteers.
After Hayne's speech the Senate voted 30 to 11 to amend 
the House amendment to include Hendricks's proposal for a 
strength of 600 and Hayne's motion to use volunteers.2^
An analysis of the vote shows that even though 
Congressmen from Frontier states were the primary advocates 
of the bill in both Houses, the Senators from the Frontier 
voted against the amendment far more often than Senators 
from the other two regions (see Table 5).2^
24Ibid., 1086.
25 Ibid., 1087.
26Due to the confusion and uncertainty surrounding the 
formation of the Second Party system, especially in the 
early 1830s, votes will not be broke down by party during 
the debate of 1832. The regions in 1821 and 1833 are the 
same except for the addition of Missouri to the Frontier. 
See Appendix 2 for a complete listing of the regions.
89
TABLE 5
SENATE AMENDMENT TO DECREASE BATTALION TO 600 VOLUNTEERS
Region Yeas Nays Total
North 14 (82%) 3 (18%) 17 (100%)
South 8 (80%) 2 (20%) 10 (100%)
Frontier 8 (57%) 6 (43%) 14 (100%)
Total 30 (73%) 11 (27% ) 41 (100%)
Those from the Frontier who voted for the amendment had 
decided that it would be better to trust volunteers, formed 
much like Regulars, for the defense of their homes. Those 
voting against the measure had slightly more disparate 
reasons for wanting the House version. Some, like Kane, 
simply wanted troops in the area as guickly as possible and 
therefore favored the easily raised Militia. Others favored 
the Militia as the best force for putting down a disturbance 
like the Black Hawk War. In the end, however, the Frontier 
Senators joined with their colleagues to approve the 
battalion of volunteers. Although not in a decisive manner, 
the Frontier had chosen for an increase of the Regular Army 
over Militia.
The vote totals for the Senators of the North and South 
were again very similar. Even though the Black Hawk War had 
been raging for almost a year, and even though it probably
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would have been easier and quicker to raise militia 
companies instead of starting over with an entirely new 
force, these regions voted for volunteers. The militia, 
which had been considered sound enough to allow reduction of 
the Regular Army in 1821, was passed over in favor of 
volunteers in 1833. Because unmounted Militia had been 
ineffective in the attempt to subdue the Indians, a force 
was created that if not exactly regular was modeled more 
like the Army than the Militia.
After the bill had returned to the House it was passed 
with little fanfare, on a voice vote, on the evening of June 
15, 1832.27 The House, which days earlier had approved the 
volunteers by a seven to three margin, did not address the 
changes made in the Senate. The few Representatives who 
spoke on the subject simply declared that time was too short 
to renew the debate.
k  -k rk
The battalion of Mounted Rangers created by the Act of 
1832 worked well enough to ensure that the unit would not 
exist for very long. Secretary of War Cass announced in his 
November 1832 report to Congress that he was well pleased 
with the performance of the mounted troops. Cass also 
reminded Congress that it would not have been necessary to 
create the unit, nor would it have been necessary to move
27Richard Peters and George Minot, eds., United States 
Statutes at Large 10 vols. (Boston: Charles C. Little and 
James Brown, 1846-1861), 4:533. Hereafter cited as Statutes 
at Large.
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garrisons from the coast to the interior during the Black 
Hawk War, if the Army had been composed of the right number 
and type of regiments.28 By late 1832 Cass, and many in 
Congress, felt that there was a need to keep mounted troops 
of some kind in the Army permanently.
The first move to change the battalion into a more 
regular unit came from the House Committee on Military 
Affairs. The chairman of the committee, Richard M. Johnson, 
a Kentucky Democrat, complained that the organization of the 
battalion appeared "to be very defective."* 20 Johnson's 
voice held considerable weight in such a discussion for he 
had been the commander of the last volunteer mounted Rangers 
in the Army before 1832— the cavalry at the Battle of the 
Thames in 1813.
The main problem the committee had with the Rangers was 
one of cost. The yearly cost of the mounted battalion of 
volunteers was over $297,000. Much of this money was spent 
on the recruiting, eguipping and transport costs associated 
with resupplying the unit with yearly volunteers. Johnson 
was especially dubious of using such volunteers when a 
regular regiment of mounted troops would cost only $143,000 
a year after it was formed.20 The volunteer mounted Rangers 
were not disparaged in the report; it was simply that
28Reqister. 22nd Cong., 2nd sess., appendix 8.
20Congress, House, Mounted Rangers, 22nd Cong., 2nd 
sess., House Document 17, Serial 236.
20Ibid.
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regular cavalry would be cheaper and easier to command than 
the volunteer mounted rangers. Because of this the 
Committee reported a bill to the House entitled "An Act for 
the more perfect defence of the frontier" calling for the 
replacement of the mounted volunteers with a regiment of 
dragoons.31 Part of the reason for the new bill was the 
subtle difference in the different types of mounted troops. 
Dragoons were meant to be used more like mounted infantry 
while mounted rangers were scouting formations that would do 
little full scale fighting. The debate on the committee's 
bill was extremely brief, so brief and fragmentary in fact 
that not all of the debate could have been included in the 
Register. There is one item of importance covered, however. 
The man who attempted to amend the 1832 act in the House to 
include militia instead of volunteers also tried to amend 
the 1833 bill. On February 16, 1833, Joseph Duncan moved to 
increase the battalion of mounted volunteers into a 
regiment. He said that he "did not believe they [the 
dragoons] would be as efficient in service, or as acceptable 
to the settlers on the frontier, whom this troop was 
intended to defend."32 Duncan's motion was quickly brushed 
aside. This change in the House is surprising. The body 
that voted heavily in favor of militia over volunteers in 
1832 decided that it would rather have a fully regular 
regiment of dragoons instead of a volunteer force in 1833. 31
31Register, 22nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1727.
32 ibid.
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There had been a change in how the Regular Army was viewed 
by many in the House. One possible explanation for this 
change was that the mounted rangers had served not only in 
the Northwest but in the Western Department as well in 
1832.^3 The need for mounted troops was different in the 
two regions. The West, with its far greater size, naturally 
called for more mounted troops. By 1833 the majority in the 
House were willing to increase the Regular Army to help 
protect the Western Frontier, and to keep peace in the 
Indian territory, even though there was no imminent threat 
to the region. That the act creating the First Dragoons 
passed with almost no debate in the Congress (neither House 
ever made a formal division on the bill) or in the press 
showed that the country would willingly increase the Army if 
the circumstances called for it.3 4
*  *  *
On December 28, 1835, Major Francis L. Dade was nearing 
the end of a Long and tiring journey. Dade, with one 
company from the Fourth Infantry Regiment and two companies 
of artillery, was nearing Fort King in the north central 
portion of the Territory of Florida. Having been told by 
his guide that they were nearing the fort, Dade relaxed his 
march discipline. Doing so was a tragic mistake, for in the 
vicinity were large numbers of Seminole Indians angry at the 
attempted, forced relocation of their people. Dade, unaware
33Young, 467.
34Statutes at Large, 4:652.
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of the Seminoles' presence, marched his command into an
ambush from which no one survived.35
When news of the Dade massacre reached Washington
Regular Army strength in Florida was increased rapidly and
more than 4,000 militia from the nearby states were called
into service. The early record of the regular infantry and
Militia troops was not good. The formations had trouble
finding the Seminoles and even more trouble bringing them to
battle. As one writer described the situation
A massacre would occur in one place while the troops 
were in another. Seldom was the meager force in that 
wide country able to catch up with a foe that wascapable of rapid disappearance.36
The situation did not please many in the capital.
Early in March 1836, Secretary of War Cass reported to 
the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the "present 
military force of the United States" was insufficient "to 
garrison the fortifications of the seaboard and at the same 
time give protection to the inhabitants residing in the 
States and Territories bordering on the Indian Frontier."37 
Cass's solution to the problem was to increase the Army by *3
35wiegley, 161-2; Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A 
Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784-1898 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 50.
36william Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United 
States Army, (New York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924),
178 .
37congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War, in 
Compliance with a Resolution of the Senate, Relative to the 
Numbers and Situation of the Indians on the Frontiers of the 
United States, and a Plan for an Increase of the Army, 24th 
Cong., 1st sess., Senate Document 228, Serial 281, 2.
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one artillery regiment and two infantry regiments and to 
enlarge the companies from the base of 42 men per infantry 
company and 45 for artillery to 59 and 84 respectively. 
Passage of this plan would have increased the total number 
of privates in the Army to 9,985, a 43 percent rise.38 The 
purpose of the plan was to provide a greater mass to the 
Army.
Cass also saw other ways to make the Army better suited 
to the nation's defense. Reporting to the House Committee 
on Military Affairs in January 1836, Cass emphasized the 
need to reestablish the Frontier forts closer to the actual 
Frontier and the need to link these forts with a strong 
series of military roads.39 while such roads would help the 
movement of all troops they would be particularly useful to 
dragoons. Cass did not call outright for more dragoons in 
his report, but he did imply it. For his new fortification 
plan to work there would need to be more companies of 
dragoons than the First Regiment could provide. The 
difference between the two reports could easily be caused by 
the growing pressures the Army felt during the early part of 
1836. The calls for troops in Florida were increasing while 
the Army was already spread dangerously thin.
Early press reactions to calls for an increase to the 
Army were mixed. The Richmond Whig strongly condemned such
38ibid., 4.
39congress, House, Protecting the Western Frontier,
24th Cong., 1st sess., House Document 401, Serial 294.
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moves as an attempt to use surplus revenue and insisted that 
"war is always the first plausible pretext" to raid the 
treasury.40
The editors of the National Intelligencer took a more
moderate view. Even though they thought it best to have the
discussion on an Army increase occur outside the framework
of the Florida problems, they were
opposed, certainly, to maintaining a large standing 
military force; but yet, we are not quite sure that 
true economy as well as wise foresight do not require 
some additions to be made to the effective force of the 
Army.41
To accomplish this increase the editors much preferred 
augmenting the companies already in existence instead of 
adding more regiments.
An editorial in the New York Post in early February 
found its editors much in agreement with those of the 
Richmond Whig. Their view was that some of the five 
companies stationed in New York Harbor were no longer needed 
to guard against French threats over the spoliations issue 
and could be safely moved to Florida to allow the Army to 
concentrate. The paper was firmly against increasing the 
size of the Army.42
On February 5, 1836, John Tipton sponsored a Senate 
resolution asking the Secretary of War if the Army was
4°Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser, January 15,
4lNational Intelligencer, January 26, 1836.
42new York Post, February 5, 1836.
1836 .
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"sufficiently numerous for the duties they are required to 
perform."43 Tipton claimed he did not want to be an 
alarmist and did not expect to raise troops by the end of 
the war with the Seminoles, but he thought it was time to 
put the Peace Establishment on a "respectable footing." 
Tipton went on to suggest that if there had been a proper 
number of troops at Fort King and Fort Brooke in Florida, 
Dade would not have been attacked and the Territory would 
still have been in a state of peace. Tipton also dismissed 
the fears of the citizenry over a larger Army, saying he 
knew that the people of the country would "look with a 
jealous eye upon every step taken to augment our military 
force" but that since "the army is their army; the money to 
support it is theirs; the government is theirs," he expected 
they would not complain if rightly informed about the need 
for an increase.44 Little was done in the Congress, 
however, until the Secretary of War reported back to the 
Senate asking for three new regiments and larger companies.
As in 1833, the first move to increase the Army came 
from the House Committee on Military Affairs. Richard M. 
Johnson, still the chair of the committee, moved a bill to 
the House on April 21, entitled "An act for the better 
protection of the Frontier." Johnson, as the title of the 
bill indicated, thought the real threat to the country lay 
outside Florida, and suggested "the cloud which is gathering
43Reqister, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 386.
44Ibid., 2575.
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on our western horizon warns us to make immediate 
preparation for the approaching storm."45 Johnson was 
worried about the Indians along the Western Frontier, with 
many times the potential strength of the Seminoles, rising 
up and attacking settlers. This fear was, in part, based on 
the events of the Texas revolution which had unsettled the 
entire Southwestern Frontier. The bill he reported asked 
for 10,000 volunteers, organized along the lines of the 
Regular Army, to be raised for twelve months. Because he 
asked for volunteers Johnson ensured another debate on the 
acceptability of volunteer, militia, and regular formations.
William Ashley, a Missouri Whig, suggested that what 
was needed to perfect Johnson's bill was the inclusion of 
another regiment of Dragoons to further protect the 
Frontier. Ashley did not discount the need for volunteers, 
even mounted ones, but pointed out that after the year had 
expired the Frontier would still need protection. He felt 
that the permanence of a second dragoon regiment was 
absolutely necessary to ensure that the Frontiers remained 
safe.46 Ashely moved to amend the bill to include such a 
regiment and his motion passed without a division.
James McKay, a Democrat from North Carolina, proposed 
to further amend the bill to allow only militia volunteers 
as regulated by the Militia Act of 1795. The motion, when 




able to call out volunteers only as militia and only for a 
period of three months. The amendment also limited the 
President's ability to call out the militia, letting him do 
it only during an actual invasion or insurrection and not 
before. This amendment was a significant change, all but 
rendering the volunteer portions of the bill inoperative.47
After McKay's amendment there occurred a long squabble 
over the number and length of service of the volunteers. 
Lewis Williams of North Carolina opposed adding 10,000 
volunteers because it seemed like the creation of an entire 
new Army. Williams declared that if an Indian war loomed he 
would vote for 100,000 men if necessary, but that the 
circumstances of the moment called for no more than 5,000 
men.
John Reynolds, an Illinois Democrat, a Major General of 
Militia, and the commander of his state's forces in 1832 
during the Black Hawk War, then spoke in favor of adding a 
second regiment of dragoons. Reynolds, even though a former 
militia commander, was highly complimentary towards the 
Army. The problem, as he saw it, was that even though the 
Army was as efficient as one in its position could be, it 
still could not control events on the prairies without 
cavalry.
After Reynolds's speech debate on the bill was delayed 
until the next day when the New York City Democrat Churchill 
Camberling gained the floor. Camberling made a speech
47 Ibid., 3 3 3 0 .
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identifying the Mexicans as a possible adversary. His 
position, which drew sharp rebuttals from others in the 
House, was that the Mexicans were hoping to agitate the 
Indians of the Southwest in an attempt to trigger a war 
between the Texans and Indians, in which the United States 
could not avoid becoming involved. Even though he arrived 
at his position in an unusual way, Camberling supported the 
passage of the proposed 10,000 volunteer troops.48 49
William Harrison, a Missouri Democrat, mentioned that 
he was very glad that such a vital measure was receiving 
support from the East and that he was "astonished, utterly 
confounded, to see any opposition to the bill or to the 
amendment" favoring the dragoon regiment.49 Harrison 
reminded the House that there were over 30,000 Indian 
warriors spread out on a thousand miles of Frontier. The 
Regular Army, he argued, would be hard pressed to keep the 
peace in normal times and with a war going on in Florida it 
was simply not possible.
The next speaker for the bill, Ransom Gillet, a 
Democrat from Western New York, made an appeal for passage 
based solely on sectional concerns. Using a surprising bit 
of logic, Gillet pointed out that the West had supported the 
War of 1812 when the conflict was over Northeastern shipping 
rights and that he hoped those areas would now support the 




plains if the bill was not passed. After a short discussion
of the amount of money to be provided, the House passed the
bill out of the Committee of the Whole and adjourned.
On April 26, 1836, the House resumed debate on the
bill. William Ashley made a plea for the second mounted
regiment, saying that providing less than that would be
"virtually saying to the people of the frontier; you must
take care of yourselves without the aid of the
Government."513 Echoing this view was Aaron Ward, a New York
Democrat. Ward quoted the Quartermaster General, Thomas
Jesup, from his yearly report:
Five thousand men, of whom fifteen hundred should be 
mounted, are necessary for the defense of this line 
[upon the western frontier], and it can not be safely 
trusted to less.53-
Ward admitted the expense of the bill might be objected to 
but stated that "I have yet to learn that the blood of 
American citizens is to be estimated by dollars and 
cents.1,52 After Ward was done speaking, a motion by 
Kentucky Whig John Chambers to amend the bill to simply 
increase the size of the First Dragoons, was decisively 
defeated and the bill was passed to a third reading.
After further debate of little interest, the House 




52Ibid., 3375. The actual vote was 103 to not counted. 
The other votes taken during the day showed a consistent
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seventh section, comprising the provision to raise the 
regiment of Dragoons, was passed as a separate provision and 
succeeded easily by a vote of 144 to 32.* 54 The bill, thus 
amended, was sent to the Senate.
The attitude towards the Army increase was slightly 
different once the bill reached the Senate. On May 4, the 
bill came to the full Senate from the Committee on Military 
Affairs with only a few changes. One of the changes was 
important, however, since it changed the volunteers to non­
militia formations serving twelve months. After the 
introduction of the bill Lewis Linn, a Missouri Democrat, 
immediately drew the Senate's attention to the looming 
adjournment scheduled in a few days and urged action before 
that time. William Preston, a fellow Democrat from South 
Carolina, objected to a hasty resolution of the bill, 
claiming that he had not enough information on the subject. 
Preston also mentioned that it seemed as if certain members 
were trying to move the Senate to action by using the fear 
of war.55
Henry Clay, the influential Whig from Kentucky, was 
even more direct than Preston, declaring that he did not 
want to "interrupt the pacific relations of the Government
total of approximately 170 members voting indicating a 
probable majority of 35 on the bill's passage, i.e., about 
103 to 70.
54Ibid. Congress, House, House Journal, 24th Cong.,
1st sess., Serial 285, 872. Hereafter cited as House 
Journal.
55 Ibid 1387 .
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and precipitate it into a war with Mexico."56 Clay made 
clear his belief that the 10,000 volunteers could easily be 
used in a land grab against the southern neighbor. Clay 
felt no need to provide the means for such a prospect.
After Clay finished his speech Thomas Benton chided him 
for calling the bill a war bill. Benton said he was 
"repelled by the idea thrown out" by Clay and stated that 
the bill did not look to the Texan Frontier but to the 
Northwestern one instead.57 Benton also chastised those 
Senators who were worried about the cost of the bill when 
all the money to be spent for the volunteers was to come 
from the treasury surplus that then existed.
The next speaker, Pennsylvania Democrat James Buchanan, 
warned of the "one principle [which] had been established in 
the political history of the country . . . never to 
interfere with the internal policy or domestic concerns of 
foreign nations."58 Buchanan wanted to stay out of the 
"Texan war" but did favor sending forces to the Southwestern 
Frontier if the Indians appeared rebellious.
After these speeches Benton regained the floor to 
complain that some Senators seemed intent on creating a war 
scare with talk of the Texas Frontier. He said that the 
"plan for increasing the Army grew out of the state of our 





Northwestern measure.59 Benton also tried to move further 
debate on the bill ahead of the debate on a different bill 
but his motion to suspend the rules on the subject was 
defeated.
When the Senate next took up the bill on May 18, 1836, 
several of the Senators were upset at the long delay.
William King, an Alabama Democrat, pushed the Senate towards 
a vote on the bill because he was afraid that the horrors 
occurring because of the Seminoles in Florida could also 
occur because of Creek unhappiness in his home state. After 
a short debate the bill was passed to a third reading and 
received final passage on a voice vote.
When the House received the Senate's version of the 
bill it quickly rejected it and called for a conference.
The major point of debate was on the nature of the 10,000 
volunteers: were they to be militia, covered under the
restrictive use provisions of the 1795 law (as the House 
desired), or were they to be volunteers, raised for one year 
and regulated only by the act itself and army regulation (as 
the Senate wanted)? One of the conferees for the Senate, 
former Secretary of War Calhoun, thought the House version 
was desirable since he doubted the constitutionality of some 
of the provisions of the Senate version. Calhoun objected 
to the President appointing officers without the previous 
advice and consent of the Senate. As a part of the Army, 
even if only temporarily, he felt the appointment of
59 Ibid., 1393.
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officers should be accomplished in the same manner as were 
Regulars.60
In the House discussion of the conference report the 
Delegate from Florida left no room for doubt that he 
considered the bill necessary for the defense of Florida. 
Joseph White urged the House to acquiesce in the Senate's 
view so troops could be provided for prompt duty against the 
Seminoles. White complained bitterly that the bill had been 
held up because, "like every other that does not enlist the 
passions of party," it remained unpassed "until the whole 
frontier is now bleeding."61 White, who was originally in 
favor of just a single regiment of mounted riflemen, now 
urged further action on increasing the Army. He was 
satisfied that "the good sense of the American people will 
justify an increase of the army to twenty thousand men" and 
that three additional infantry and three additional 
artillery regiments were needed.62 After White's urging, 
the House did indeed pass the bill, accepting volunteers and 
preserving the Senate's right to advise on which officers 
were to be selected for the Regiment. The Senate, led by 
Calhoun, concurred and sent the bill to President Jackson, 




63Statutes at Large, 5:32.
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While most everyone was satisfied with the act 
"authorizing the President of the United States to accept 
the service of volunteers, and to raise an additional 
regiment of dragoons or mounted riflemen," there were some 
dissenters, one being the editor of the Charleston Mercury. 
In an editorial on May 25, the editor asked if the 
circumstances which prompted the bill still existed and if 
there was a need to increase the Army. Looking to the 
Southwest he saw nothing to cause any alarm and he thought 
that the threat from the Creeks in Alabama to be very small. 
He admitted events in Florida were worrisome but thought 
that the Army and militia had things well under control.
The position paper's editor was to be against the increase 
simply because it saw no use for the volunteers.®^
Unfortunately the yeas and nays were not demanded on 
any vote important to the passage of the 1836 increase, so a 
statistical breakdown on the issue is not possible. Review 
of the debate, however, discloses that the members strongly 
advocating the bill were generally from the Frontiers. This 
could also be said of the 1832 and 1833 increases as well 
and it is possible that a majority of the Frontier 
Representatives, especially those near Florida, would once 
again have wanted militia volunteers instead of ordinary 
volunteers, but this is not assured. It is noteworthy that 
both in 1832 and 1836 the motions to take the volunteers out 
of militia units came from the House while the Senate held
^ Charleston Mercury, May 25, 1836.
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out for units comprised of individual volunteers. With a 
higher percentage of members from frontier states in 1836 
than in 1832 or 1833, it might have seemed more logical for 
the Senate to have asked for militia. Without further 
evidence, however, this question cannot be investigated.
One of the great strengths of the increase bill in 1836 
was its highly vague nature. At no time did the sponsors of 
the bill ever specify why the increase was needed. Even the 
title of the bill merely mentioned the "frontiers," an 
unhelpful term in a country surrounded by unsettled areas.
In the debate members suggested that the troops were bound 
for various places: to fight the Seminoles in Florida, to 
overawe the Creeks in Alabama, to protect those on the Texas 
Frontier from Indians stirred up by Santa Anna, and for the 
Northwestern Frontier in general. The multi-purpose nature 
of the bill helped keep it from becoming a large party or 
sectional issue in part because it could mean almost 
anything to anyone.
"k ic Jc
After the passage of the 1836 Act the Second Dragoon 
Regiment was formed and sent to the West while the 
volunteers raised by the bill spent their one year in the 
Florida region accomplishing little. The Seminole War had 
continued to go poorly for the Army in the early years of 
the conflict. By the end of 1836 over 23,500 citizens had 
taken some part in the active campaigning against the 
Indians and the strength of the regulars and militia in the
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territory was over 13,000.65 The situation had changed very 
little by the start of 1838.
On December 19, 1837, the Richmond Whig carried an 
editorial suggesting that Congress, in the new session, 
would find that the war would occupy much of its time as it 
struggled to discover the cause of the expenditure of over 
eighteen million dollars "in a disgraceful war."66 The 
editor also stated that he hoped a thorough investigation 
would be undertaken before granting the expected twelve to 
fifteen million more requested for the same purpose in the 
coming session.
Even though they must not have enjoyed being reminded 
of their failures against the Seminoles by reading about it 
in the Whig, Army leaders would probably have agreed that 
things had not gone well. In a report to Congress, the 
Adjutant General of the Army, Brigadier General Roger Jones, 
admitted that "the regular force assigned to that service 
[in Florida], at first inconsiderable, had from time to time 
been increased to nearly 5 ,0 0 0 . "67 Counting the Army, 
active duty militia, and other forces in the state, the *6
65John K. Mahon, The History of the Seminole War: 
1835-1842 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967), 
188 .
66Rjchmond Whig and Public Advertiser, December 19,
1837 .
67congress, Senate, Report from the Secretary of War; 
in Compliance with a Resolution of the Senate, with 
Statements of the Number of Troops Employed in the War with 
the Seminole Indians. 25th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Document 
226, Serial 316, 2.
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military establishment had over 8,800 men fighting the 
Seminoles. Jones also admitted to 175 men being killed in 
the fighting and a “like number" of casualties due to the 
climate since the Dade massacre. Against these losses the 
Army could show only 131 Indians killed and but 15 
prisoners.68 it was this situation that Joel R. Poinsett, 
the new Secretary of War in the Van Buren administration, 
had to deal with when he took office.
Poinsett, a man with wide-ranging, if irregular, 
military experience, was of the opinion that the Seminole 
war had been mismanaged, partly due to an Army staff that 
needed to be realigned. Poinsett was especially upset at 
the guality of the troops assigned to much of the fighting 
in Florida. Even though a former regimental commander of 
militia, Poinsett did not care for short service men whose 
"inadequate training rendered their efforts ineffective."68 9 
In his first report to Van Buren, Poinsett suggested the 
creation of a volunteer force recruited from neighboring 
states. These volunteers were to be recruited from the 
militia with the only difference between the two forces 
would being the length of service, years for the volunteers 
instead of mere months for the militia.
There were several other changes that Poinsett proposed 
in his first report as well. He wanted to establish more
68Ibid., 4.
69G. A. Hurneni, "Palmetto Yankee: The Public Life and 
Times of Joel Roberts Poinsett; 1824-1851" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of California at Santa Barbara, 1956), 244.
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forts along the exterior of the Western frontier because, 
once again, settlement had outstripped the protection the 
Army was able to provide. Poinsett was in favor of 
expanding the military road system to link the new exterior 
forts with the existing ones, thereby strengthening the 
region's overall protection. Unfortunately such a plan 
would have required 5,000 men to garrison these posts.70 
With the Army's strength at 7,000 an increase would be 
needed, especially considering that there were over 4,000 
men in Florida. Poinsett therefore proposed expanding the 
Army's resources by adding three infantry regiments, 
increasing the size of companies to 64, and adding a company 
to each artillery regiment.7  ̂ Altogether this called for an 
increase of over 4,900 men.
The senior leadership of the Army agreed with 
Poinsett's calls for an increased force. The Commanding 
General, Major General Alexander McComb, went even further 
when he suggested doubling the size of the Army to nearly 
15,000 men, the largest peacetime increase ever proposed up 
to that time. McComb would have used the majority of the 
men to increase the strength of the garrisons in Florida.72
70Congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War, 
Transmitting Various Reports in Relation to the Protection 
of the Western Frontier, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., House 
Document 259, Serial 322, 2.
71Congress, Senate, Report of the Secretary of War,




Major General Scott, the Commandant of the Army's Eastern 
Department, and the man with the responsibility for Florida, 
asked for an increase of infantry regiments from seven to 
twelve and an additional company in each Artillery 
regiment.73
Other reports by senior officers throughout late 1837 
and into 1838 pointed out the need for an increase in the 
Army. The Acting Quartermaster General, Colonel Trueman 
Cross, reported to Congress in November 1837 that if "the 
obligations are to be scrupulously fulfilled in good faith 
. . . a military force of 30,000 men on the Western Frontier
would scarcely be adequate to enable the government to 
discharge its duties."74 75 Colonel Cross, obviously a 
political sage, stated that "expediency, I presume, would 
not, tolerate" such a high number and wrote that 7,000 men 
was the minimum force required for the frontier alone.73
In his report, the Chief Engineer of the Army, Brevet 
Brigadier General Charles Gratiot, called for a total of ten 
infantry regiments, ten artillery regiments, and two 
regiments of dragoons for the defense of the country, a 
total increase of nine regiments.76
73Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1904; reprint, New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1968 ) , 159.
74Congress, American State Papers, Class V, Military 
Affairs, 7 vols. (Washington D. C.: Gales & Seaton, 1832- 
1861), number 753, serial 022, 7:782.
75Ibid.
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A final report important to the impending debate on the 
Army was sent to Congress by the Secretary of War in March 
of 1838. Poinsett was asked to supply the Senate with both 
the numbers of volunteers and militia called out between 
1832 and 1838 and the cost of using them. The report stated 
that in those six years the Government called a total of 
43,885 volunteers to service. By far the majority of these 
men were used against the Seminoles (18,514) and the Creeks 
(12,483). There were also large numbers used during the 
Black Hawk War (5,031), in the Cherokee country (3,926), and 
on the Southwestern (2,803) and New York frontiers 
(1,128),* 77
Poinsett included some interesting tables in his 
report, showing the large gap between the average cost per 
company of regulars versus volunteers, or militia. The 
following tables show that the regulars, if needed, had a 
tremendous cost savings over the use of militia or 
volunteers.78
Poinsett's report expressed two main points: first, 
that volunteers and militia were roughly twice as expensive 
to use as regulars; and second, that during the 1830's
78Congress, House, Letter from the Secretary of War, 
Transmitting Various Reports in Relation to the Protection 
of the Western Frontier, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., House 
Document 259, Serial 322, 9.
77Congress, Senate, Letter from the Secretary of War, 
Transmitting Statements of the Comparative Expense of 
Volunteers, Militia and Regular Troops. 25th Cong., 2nd 




AVERAGE COST OF ONE COMPANY OF DRAGOONS
Time Regulars Volunteers Militia
6 months $13,573 $22,575 n/a
3 months $6,786 $13,553 $12,079
TABLE 7
AVERAGE COST OF ONE COMPANY OF INFANTRY
Time Regulars Volunteers Militia
6 months $4,662 $7,287 n/a
3 months $2,331 $4,987 $3,774
temporary troops were needed fairly often. These facts 
would logically support calls for an increase of the Army, 
if for no other reason than to limit the cost of temporary 
troops.
Obviously there were a great many military issues that
were to confront the Twenty-fifth Congress when it gathered
for its second session. Historian J. Fred Rippy perhaps
stated it best when he wrote:
War with Mexico threatened; relations with England and 
France were none too friendly; the situation was 
menacing along the northern boundary; numerous hostile
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Indians threatened the security of a long western 
frontier; the Seminoles of Florida were in arms; and 
the Government had committed itself to the removal of 
more than sixty thousand Red Men then residing east of the Mississippx.79
It was going to be a busy session.
The first move to increase the Army in 1838 came from
Thomas Hart Benton, Democrat of Missouri, and longtime Army
supporter. On January 24, 1838, Benton made a speech on the
floor of the Senate supporting the increase bill that he had
previously reported from his Committee on Military Affairs.
Benton stated that "there is no diversity of opinion in the
relation to the necessity of an increase of the Army" even
if there was some on how it was best accomplished.80 The
bill that Benton had brought from his committee was a simple
one. It called for each infantry and artillery company to
have 100 privates (an increase of 58 men per company) which
would call for the total augmentation of the service by
6,148 privates, nearly doubling the line of the Army.
The Delaware Whig Richard Bayard also supported the
increase of the Army but in a different way than Benton.
His idea was both to increase the number of regiments and
increase company strength as well. Bayard wanted to
increase the size of each company to 68 men and to add three
additional infantry regiments, an action which also would
79J. Fred Rippy, Joel R. Poinsett, Versatile American 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1935; reprint, Durham:
Duke University Press, 1965), 171.
80Congress, Congressional Globe, 46 vols. (Washington 
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873), 25th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 133.
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have added nearly 5,000 men to the Army.81 Unfortunately, 
Bayard made no mention of where the three regiments he would 
have raised would have been used.
The South Carolina Democrat William Preston wanted an 
increase not only for the usual reason of frontier defense, 
but for the simple fact that many companies were so small 
and fragmented due to the demands and rigors of service that 
they did not have enough men left to drill properly. An 
increase of company size would fix that problem.
Former Secretary of War John C. Calhoun also supported 
the bill that Benton had submitted. Since it was Calhoun 
who, as far back as 1817, officially introduced the concept 
of the expansible Army this is not surprising. Calhoun 
still felt that the officers of the Army were its most 
important asset. He stated that "experience has shown where 
there are good officers, a tolerably good soldier could be 
made in seven or eight months."82 It is ironic that in 1838 
Calhoun voted to restore, and even increase, the companies 
that he proposed reducing seventeen years before.
After Calhoun's remarks Bayard moved to recommit the 
bill to the Committee on Military Affairs with instructions 
to amend the bill along the lines of his own plan to 
increase each Infantry and Artillery regiment to 68 privates 
and create three additional regiments. The motion was 




in favor of the original bill (Calhoun and Preston among 
them) joining those who did not favor any increase.83 The 
vote indicated that although the Senate might support an 
increase it did not favor creating additional regiments.
The guestion was not simply a matter of the size of the 
increase. The final Senate version had a larger increase in 
enlisted men than Bayard's amendment called for (6,148 to 
approximately 5,000). After Bayard's amendment was defeated 
the Senate sent the bill to the House by a voice vote on 
January 25, 1838.* 84
The bill to increase the Army was first reported to the 
House of Representatives on January 30. It was recommitted 
nearly a month later because the Committee on Military 
Affairs was still working on several of the provisions which 
related to the staff of the army. Due to these delays the 
bill was not reported back to the House until June 26, 1838.
The version of the bill finally reported to the House 
was different in several respects from the one sent over by 
the Senate. The House version was much more complex than 
its counterpart and had several key changes regarding the 
increase of the Army. Instead of increasing all companies 
to 100 men the House version increased the Infantry 
companies to 80 (an increase of 38) and the artillery
88Senate Journal. 25th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 313, 
124. Interestingly Benton, the reporter of the bill since he 
was the Chair of the military committee, voted for the 
recommital.
84Globe, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., 136.
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companies to 58 (an increase of 16). The House Military- 
Affairs Committee had also seen fit to add one company to 
each Artillery regiment, giving them ten each, the same 
number as the Infantry regiments, and to add an eighth 
infantry regiment. The revised bill called for the addition 
of almost 2000 fewer men (4,268 to 6,148) than the bill from 
the Senate while adding several units to the Army. It 
occupied a position neatly in the middle of the passed 
Senate version and the proposed plan of Senator Bayard.
The first man to speak on the bill, New York Democrat 
Issac Bronson, declared he would support the bill after 
asserting that regulars were cheaper than militia or 
volunteers by a margin of four or six to one. Bronson, 
echoing Poinsett's report to Congress on the subject, felt 
that if the country was going to need more protection on the 
frontier it should at least come as cheaply as possible.85
After Bronson's speech several Representatives 
suggested ways to improve the bill. The Missouri Democrat 
Albert Harrison suggested the bill was "altogether 
inadequate for the object contemplated" since it did not 
raise a permanent rifle regiment.86 Harrison felt that a 
clause in the bill allowing the President to convert an 
existing infantry regiment for that purpose was not enough. 
James McKay, a North Carolina Democrat and chair of the 




to the increase while the South Carolina Whig Waddy Thompson 
only wanted to increase the Army by the 3,236 men provided 
by expanding the companies. Thompson was guite adamant 
about not raising new regiments, declaring his "decided 
opposition to any further increase of the Army than was
absolutely necessary87
Democrat John Pope of Kentucky said he was also against 
"raising a large military force under the influence of 
imaginary danger" and declared that there was no need to 
worry about the safety of either the Northern or Western 
frontier.88 At the end of his speech Pope supported 
Thompson's modest call for increasing the companies. It is 
worth noting, however, that a member willing to talk of the 
"imaginary danger" which fueled the debate would also want 
to increase the Army. Pope's speech demonstrated the 
underlying feeling in the Congress that some increase to the 
Army was probably appropriate.
After debate on the bill resumed on June 28, 1838,
James McKay, with little additional comment, proposed an 
amendment to include a second regiment of infantry in the 
increase. During the debate on the amendment several 
members took the opportunity to state their differences with 
the bill. The banner of the militia was raised by long time 
supporter Lewis Williams of North Carolina, who declared it 




threat.89 Williams was the only member of either House to 
suggest seriously that the solution to the country's 
military problems in 1838 rested with the Militia. It is 
indicative of the growing irrelevance of the institution 
that this was so. Williams favored no increase of the 
regulars at all.
The Vermont Whig Horace Evertt agreed in part with 
Williams even though it was for a different reason. Evertt 
thought the Army was ineffective and not worthy of 
increasing because it was made up of mostly foreign born men 
who were quite useless on the frontier. He made clear his 
intention to vote against not only the amendment but the 
entire bill as well. After Williams and Everett were done 
speaking the House first defeated McKay's amendment on a 
voice vote and then adjourned.90 91
When the House resumed debate on June 29, Albert 
Harrison quickly moved an amendment to substitute the first 
section of the bill. His substitute attempted to replace 
the increase of one company per Artillery regiment and one 
Infantry regiment with two Infantry regiments. The motion 
was quickly and decisively defeated.After the defeat of 





Whig Nathanial Briggs to delete the one new regiment 
authorized.92
The debate and voting on the Briggs amendment is 
illustrative. After a spirited debate, covering much the 
same ground as in previous debates, the House voted to agree 
with Briggs and deleted the regiment by a vote of 96 to 88. 
After a long discussion on the staff of the Army the House 
then adjourned for its daily break. A second long debate on 
the configuration of the staff occurred after the House 
reconvened and a motion was made to reconsider the Briggs 
amendment. The motion to reconsider was passed, 103 to 88, 
and during the reconsideration the amendment was defeated, 
thereby restoring the regimental increase to the bill by a 
vote of 95 to 104. Unfortunately none of these vote totals 
were recorded with a roll call.93 These votes are important 
because they show the delicate balance that prevailed in the 
House on the bill. At least 88 members voted each time to 
delete the regiment of infantry from the bill. Whether the 
Congressmen making these votes made up a cohesive bloc is 
unknown. It is also unknown if those voting against the 
additional regiment of infantry were also against the entire 
bill. What is clear is that the House had achieved a fine 
balance on the increase. It is very possible that if the 




with an increase of three regiments instead of just one, it 
would have failed to pass the House.
On July 2, several members continued the debate on the 
bill by making impassioned speeches against the pay increase 
for certain officers. One member actually moved to amend 
the title of the bill to include the words "[to increase] 
the pay of the officers and privates and the patronage of 
the President."94 The debate grew so heated that a motion 
to reconsider the third reading was defeated by one vote, 94 
to 95, again showing a solid core of those opposed to parts 
of the bill.95 After this vote the House passed the bill to 
the Senate, in a "severely amended" form where it was passed 
without amendment and into law on July 5, 1838.96
The increase of 1838, like those in 1832, 1833, and 
1836, was passed relatively quickly and without much 
evidence of either party or sectional disputes. The 1838 
increase was also something of a war bill instead of being 
an act to increase the Peace Establishment. Because of the 
Seminole difficulties some increase of the Army was probably 
going to be made. In this respect the differences between 94*
94Ibid., 489.
95House Journal, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 1212.
96prucha, Sword, 337; Statute at Large, 4:256. The 
Senate found certain deficiencies concerning the staff in 
the House version so bad that they passed a supplemental 
bill which was signed into law two days after the original 
bill. The Senate did not amend the House bill because it 
was afraid the coalition to pass the bill would not stay 
together due to "the present fluctuation of numbers in that 
body" because of the coming end of the session. See 
National Intelligencer, July 10, 1838.
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the Black Hawk and Seminole conflicts were more a matter of 
size than of substance. The bill was also an opportunity 
for a new Secretary of War to rearrange the Army staff. Of 
the 87 new officers provided by the act 51 were going to the 
staff.97
TABLE 8
PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE ARMY IN 1838
Plan Regiment Company Total Total
increase increase men per increase
company
Poinsett's report 3 Inf. 1 company/ 
Art. Reg.
64 4900
McComb -- -- -- 6000
Scott 5 Inf. 1 company/ 
Art. Reg.
-- 2500
Gratiot 3 Inf ./6 Art. -- -- 4900
Senate Comm, of 
Military Affairs
-- -- 100 6148
Bayard 3 Inf. -- 68 5000
House Comm, of 
Military Affairs 
(final version)







97Coffman, 56; Rippy, 175.
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From the beginning of the session there was some 
agreement about the need for an increase, but less agreement 
on how to accomplish it. All seven of the plans proposed to 
increase the Army called for an increase of several thousand 
men (see Table 8). The senior officers of the Army 
generally favored adding more regiments while Congress 
generally favored increasing the size of companies. Adding 
more regiments meant greater flexibility in stationing 
troops around the country since there would be more 
companies available. Regiments could be split up and 
dispersed, but that rarely happened to companies (except for 
some Artillery companies on duty in some of the smaller 
forts on the Atlantic coast). Of course the increase in 
1838 was, in large part, meant to augment the Army in 
Florida so such a distinction would be less important than 
in other instances. The compromise that resulted looked 
much like the 1837 report of Secretary Poinsett.
It has been suggested that the reason for creating a 
new infantry regiment was to provide more protection for the 
Northern frontier while the rest of the increase was for 
Florida and the Western Frontier.98 Such a contention, 
while possible, is not necessarily correct. There was 
tension over the boundary of Maine and other disturbances 
over the Canadian boundary in 1837 and 1838, but almost none 




When over, the increase of 1838 provided much 
justification for the concept of the expansible Army 
advocated by John C. Calhoun in 1821. The expansion 
occurred during an ongoing conflict, with the greater part 
of the troop increase being made in the established part of 
the Army. The increase would permit rapid augmentation of 
the ability of the Army to prosecute the war.
*  *  *
The increases of the Army during the 1830s were 
generally not of a contentious nature. The Battalion of 
Mounted Rangers raised in 1832 and the change of that 
formation to dragoons the next year, the addition of the 
Second Dragoons in 1836, and the general increase of the 
Army in 1838 were all driven by the desire to meet specific 
problems: the danger of Black Hawk in 1832, the necessity
of dragoons for the western frontier in 1833 and 1836, and 
the necessity for increasing Army strength in Florida in 
1838 .
The sectional breakdown on the vote for the increase of 
1832, and the speeches of the Congressmen on the others show 
that the Frontier had a slightly different attitude toward 
the increases for dragoons than the other sections. The 
Frontier was not unified, but was somewhat more likely to 
want militia over volunteers and volunteers over regulars. 
The local nature of militia and, to a lesser extent, 
volunteers drove this desire. By 1838, however, few 
advocated volunteers or militia to increase the Army. The
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preference for the regulars over volunteers or militia 
meant one or both of two things: first, that the increase 
was expected to be permanent and that regulars were 
appropriate due to their regular enlistments; and second, 
that there was substantial agreement that in the long run 
regulars were cheaper than volunteer troops.
The slow and steady increases of the Army throughout 
the 1830s happened with little sectional or party dispute 
largely because they were perceived as necessary. When the 
editor of the National Gazette wrote in 1838 that due to 
unforeseeable circumstances, "an increase of the Army is 
rendered obligatory," he could have been writing about the 




THE PEACE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE 1840s
Unlike the 1830s, when the Peace Establishment of the 
country was slowly but consistently increased, the 
establishment of the 1840s was both decreased and increased, 
depending on the needs of the moment. Early in the decade 
the Army of the United States continued the war in Florida 
and fought a complex and often bitter war with Mexico which 
required a large, though temporary, increase in manpower.
In 1848, while the Army was marching towards Mexico City, it 
was comprised of 47,319 troops, nearly six times its 
strength before the war. The majority of these new troops 
were volunteers raised only for the duration of the war.
Some of the increases of 1846, however, were meant as purely 
peacetime measures. These distinctions are important 
because the measures clearly meant for the Mexican war are 
outside the scope of this study while others enacted, often 
simultaneously, with different concerns in mind will be 
considered. The line between a peacetime measure or wartime 
measure is often inexact. The increases of 1832, 1833, and 
1838 could, in some ways, be considered war measures since 
they were passed while the Army was engaged in pacifying 
Indian tribes on different parts of the frontier. The key 
feature that separates the acts of the 1830s and the
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volunteer bill of 1846 was the permanence of the former.
The 1846 act providing the bulk of the men was clearly a war 
measure: it had no other purpose and the men it raised were
released once the war ended.
*  *  *
In 1841 the number of Regular troops stationed in 
Florida reached an all-time high. During April of that year 
the strength of the regulars reached 5,076 men and it stayed 
at about the same level well into 1842.1 The opportunity to 
reduce the Army occurred in 1842 due to Colonel William J. 
Worth's victory over the Seminoles. Worth, when given 
command of the Army in Florida in 1841, campaigned straight 
through the summer months, destroying Indian dwellings and 
crops. The cost to Worth's men was high due to fever and 
dysentery, but the cost to the Seminoles and their 
subsistence way of life was higher. By early 1842 the 
Seminoles had broken up into small bands that were a much- 
reduced threat to the Army and citizens of Florida.2
Soon after Worth's successful campaign had concluded, a 
variety of proposals were offered to reduce the expense of 
the Army. One report pointed out the high ratio of officers 
to men in the Army. The report observed that while the 
organic law allowed only one officer to every 22.8 enlisted
^John K. Mahon, The History of the Seminole War: 1835- 
1842 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967), 293.
^Russell F Wiegley, History of the United States Army 
(New York: Macmillan Co, 1973), 162-63.
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men, the Army had an overall ratio of 14 to l.3 4 The 
problems of supernumerary officers and a large staff, issues 
which had been raised in the 1830s when the Army was 
expanding, were also discussed by those wanting to decrease 
the Army.
A second report, produced by the House Committee on 
Military Affairs, called for the reduction of both the line 
and staff of the Army. Written by the chairman of the 
committee, the North Carolina Whig Edward Stanly, the report 
proposed doing away with all centralized quartermaster 
functions, reducing money for subsistence, eliminating many 
of the special emoluments paid to the senior officers of the 
Army, and slightly reducing the size of most companies in 
the Army.4 The total savings of the proposal were modest, 
only $716,917.5 In essence, the report called for a 
moderate retrenchment of items considered not essential to a 
smoothly running peace establishment. The report was a 
clear indication that many Congressmen expected an 
opportunity to cut military costs.
3Congress, Senate, Report from the Secretary of War, 
Showing the Average Monthly Strength of the Army, Including 
the Military Academy, during the Year 1841, and the Expense 
of the Same for the Same Period, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 
Senate Document 247, Serial 398, 4.
4Congress, House, Organization of the Army, 27th Cong., 
2nd sess., House Report 904, Serial 410, 4.
5This total represented only 8.8 percent of the total 
spending on the Army in 1841. By comparison the 1821 
reduction cut spending over thirty percent. See Bureau of 
the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 2:1084.
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The House and the Senate were poles apart, however, in 
their views of military manpower policy at the start of the 
second session of the Twenty-Seventh Congress. Thus, the 
first action concerning the Army in the Senate was an 
attempt to increase its size. On April 11, 1842, William 
Preston, a South Carolina Democrat and the chairman of the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee, introduced a bill calling 
for the raising of two new infantry regiments and the 
organization of a corps of horse artillery.6 Preston made 
sure that the Senate understood that his measure was a 
peacetime proposal. He stated that the increase was desired 
by Major General Winfield Scott, the new Commanding General, 
for use on the frontier. The infantry was to be used for 
garrisoning posts while the mounted artillery would ride 
with the dragoons. The incongruity of raising the strength 
of the Army at the end of a long war was never addressed by 
Preston. He surely must have known of the intention of the 
House to look into ways to cut the cost of the Army. 
Regardless, the Senate passed Preston's bill to a second 
reading after which it was laid upon the table, not to be 
taken up again.7
The first discussions in the House on the need to 
reduce the size of the Army occurred on May 25, 1842, during 
debate on the Army Appropriations bill for 1843. James
6Congress, Congressional Globe. 46 vols. (Washington 
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873), 27th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 385. Hereafter cited as Globe.
7 Ibid., 416; 757.
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McKay, the North Carolina Democrat who supported the Army 
increase in 1838 from his position as Chairman of the House 
Military Affairs Committee, suggested the suspension of 
recruiting new enlisted men until the Army reached a 
strength of 8,000 men.
When McKay made a motion amending the appropriation 
bill to that effect Milliard Fillmore, a New York Whig, 
moved a point of order, citing the 53rd rule of the House 
which stated that the reopening of an original issue during 
debate on appropriations was not allowed.8 *10 The chair 
overruled Fillmore, who then demanded a vote of the House to 
uphold the point of order. During the ensuing debate 
several representatives supported McKay's motion. Tennessee 
Democrat Cave Johnson declared that since the troubles in 
Florida were over, the country would be able to reduce the 
Army "to the number necessary for peace."9 The speech of 
Alabama Democrat Dixon Lewis might have best summed up the 
position of those favoring reduction when he stated that he 
was in favor of the amendment since he was in favor of 
reduction and time in the session to accomplish it was 
running short. Even though Fillmore seemed on solid 
parliamentary ground in his objection, the House upheld the 
Chair, passed McKay's amendment by a vote 70 to 62, and sent 





When the Army Appropriation bill reached the Senate the
bill was split, with the appropriation portions going to the
Committee of Finance and the amendment proposing Army
reduction going to the Committee on Military Affairs. While
the bills were in committee those favoring reduction were
warmly supported by an editorial in the Richmond Whig.
The editors of the Whig carefully chose their time to
write about the debate. They addressed the subject on June
14, 1842, just as the Senate military committee was about to
complete its work. At first the editorial praised those in
Congress who would "stay the increase of the class of drones
upon the body politic" and reduce the strength of the Army.
The editors suggested that the only true reason to have a
standing Army in peacetime was "to supply a new source of
patronage to the Federal Government," and they suggested
cutting the Army by half.11 One concern of the Whig was
that the resources of the country were not enough to provide
for the Army, especially the officers, who were part of a
"privileged class" and "unproductive consumers" of the work
of others. A second, and perhaps more vital concern, was
the influence the Army had. The editors wrote:
this opposition [to reduction], and the motives of it 
thus openly avowed should ring a warning in the [ears] 
of the people. If an Army of less than 12,000 and a 
Navy comparatively small, can exert an influence upon 
the press and Congress sufficient to control the 
legislation of the country, and even cause the 
Government to borrow money to augment their resources 
and supply them with increased means for extravagance—
^ Richmond Whig and Public Advertiser, June 14, 1842.
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what may we not expect when the Army and Navy shall be doubled.12
The Whig was stridently against an increase and for a cut in 
the strength of the Army.
On June 21, 1842, the Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs reported a bill that would have maintained the 
number of regiments, but reduced each infantry company in 
the Army from 80 to 50 privates. Titled Senate Bill 283,
"An Act Respecting the Organization of the Army," the plan 
would have reduced the Army by 2,920 men, leaving a total of 
8,884. In comparison the House plan would have disbanded 
the Second Dragoons, reduced companies to 45 privates in the 
Artillery regiments and to 40 in the Infantry regiments.
The overall reduction in the House version would have been 
4,475, nearly 1,600 more than in the Senate version.I3 
Debate in the Senate centered almost solely on peripheral 
issues. After voting on a few amendments of little 
importance the Senate passed the reduction bill to the House 
by a voice vote on July 1, 1842.14
After a delay of exactly one month the House began 
debate on Senate Bill 283. The first speaker, Edward 
Stanly, the North Carolina Whig who started the reduction 
effort, moved to repeal the entire act of 1838 which had 
increased the Army. Stanly was supported by fellow Whig
12ibid.
43Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 659.
14Congress, Senate, Senate Journal, 27th Cong., 2nd 
., Serial 394, 412. Hereafter cited as Senate Journal.sess
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Roger Gamble of Georgia who declared that the "Army was too 
large for a peace establishment and, too small for a war 
establishment."15 16*
Another Whig, Thomas Campbell of Tennessee, stated that 
the House had already settled the question of Army reduction 
when the appropriation bill was sent to the Senate.
Campbell said he hoped that the House would stick to its 
rights and demand the reduction it first asked for. Ohio 
Whig Samson Mason suggested amending Bill 283 to disband the 
Second Dragoons as well as initiate the cuts asked for in 
the original House version.16 Mason's proposal would have 
had the effect of repealing both the 1836 and 1838 increases 
to the Army. Lott Warren, a Whig from Georgia, went even 
further than Mason when he suggested the disbanding of both 
dragoon regiments and the reduction of the rest of the Army 
to 1821 levels. Warren stated that such a reduction was 
acceptable since the civilized tribes, including the 
Cherokees and Choctaws, would provide better protection to 
the settlers on the Frontier than the Army.^7 At this point 
in the debate, there had been proposals ranging from cutting 
the Army a few thousand men at the company level (Senate 
version) to reducing the Army to the level of 1821.
Arkansas Democrat Edward Cross decried any talk of 
reducing the dragoons and reminded the House that over




60,000 Indian warriors were within striking distance of the 
Western Frontier and that the region was still in need of 
protection, even if things seemed peaceful at the moment. 
Pointing out that "the only place for danger" was now 
between the Red River in Texas and the northwestern corner 
of Missouri, Cross asked if any Representative would want 
only infantry to be available for duty in such a region.18
On August 2, after a day's recess John Edwards, a 
Pennsylvania Whig, set the tone for much the rest of the 
debate when he said that if peace was at hand then it was in 
the interest of the nation to reduce the Army. He also 
stated that "he would go for giving any point protection 
which was not secure" because that was the responsibility of 
the government.19 To protect the Western settlements 
Edwards thought it would be necessary to have dragoons on 
the plains. Edwards, therefore, favored moderate reduction 
in the companies but not disbanding any regiment. Such a 
line of thinking slowly gained strength in the House 
Committee of the Whole.
Cave Johnson disagreed with Edwards and moved to strike 
all but the enacting clause of the Senate Bill and insert 
sections formally repealing the 1836 and 1838 increases. 
Johnson also "deprecated the giving a party complexion to 




looking after the welfare of the country.20 Johnson's 
amendment was easily defeated by a voice vote, however, and 
the debate resumed.
John Reynolds, an Illinois Democrat, suggested that 
some members of the House shied away from cutting the Army 
since it would be ruinous to the officers involved.
Reynolds, the Governor of Illinois and commander of the 
state militia during the Black Hawk war, disagreed with such 
thinking and let it be known that he favored making some 
cuts in the number of officers in the Army.2 -̂
After another recess the Committee of the Whole spent 
most of August 3, 1842, arguing whether to make the Second 
Dragoons a regiment of mounted rifleman, a change that dealt 
more with the equipment of the troops than the cost 
involved. After this debate the Committee passed the bill 
and sent it to the Senate calling for the reduction of all 
companies in the Army to 42 privates but leaving the Second 
Dragoons untouched. After passage Cave Johnson, hoping to 
get even more reductions, attempted to get the Committee to 
reconsider the vote but was soundly defeated 65 to 116.22
When the bill was taken up by the House on August 4, 





House passed, 99 to 59, an amendment by Cave Johnson calling 
for the disbanding of the Second Dragoon Regiment.23 
There is little evidence as to why the House would vote 
against the reconsideration on the third but would vote to 
disband the Second Regiment of Dragoons on the fourth. It 
is unlikely that a swing of 82 votes occurred spontaneously, 
but there is no known reason for the shift. Of course the 
possibility of powerful arguing in the Congressional rooming 
houses the previous night is always a possibility. The 
details of the vote to disband the Second Dragoons are 
presented by region in Table 9 and by party in Table 10. As 
Table 9 shows the Frontier was the only region which favored 
the retention of the Second Dragoons. The ability of 
dragoons to move quickly on the plains, an ability often 
brought up during the debates, must have influenced the 
representatives of the region into voting for the measure.
The regional vote shows that the South voted over three 
to one against the dragoons while the North voted against 
the Regiment by a much closer three to two margin. The 
Southerners were probably much more comfortable since the 
Seminoles had been rendered ineffective but the disparity of 
the vote indicates that the South was hesitant over keeping 
a large regular army. John K. Mahon suggests that the
23congress, House, House Journal, 27th Cong., 2nd 
sess., Serial 400, 1210. Hereafter cited as House Journal. 
Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 844-5. The House Journal 
lists the vote as 100 to 70 while the Globe lists it as 100 
to 69. Amazingly the raw data in both forms show the actual 
vote as being 99 to 59, an amazingly large error.
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TABLE 9
HOUSE AMENDMENT TO DISBAND SECOND DRAGOON REGIMENT,
BY REGION
Region Yeas Nays Total
North 57 (59%) 39 (41%) 96 (100%)
South 36 (77%) 11 (23%) 47 (100%)
Frontier 6 (40%) 9 (60%) 15 (100%)
Total 99 (63%) 59 (37%) 158 (100%)
HOUSE
TABLE 10
AMENDMENT TO DISBAND SECOND DRAGOON
BY PARTY
REGIMENT,
Region Yeas Nays Total
Whigs 63 (67%) 30 (33%) 93 (100%)
Democrats 33 (53%) 29 (47%) 62 (100%)
Others 3 (100%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%)
Total 99 (63%) 59 (37%) 158 (100%)
reason why so many Southerners voted against the bill was 
that a large Army was favored by the high tariff men of the 
North and that many Southerners had genuine concerns about 
the cost of an ever growing army.24 Mahon also suggested
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that many in the Northeast voted for the Second Dragoons 
because keeping the Regiment would be useful in the ongoing 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty negotiations. While a plausible 
explanation, the debates on the bill indicate no such 
thinking on the part of the men of the Northeast.24 5 * For 
whatever reasons the large Southern vote against the 
Dragoons ensured that the amendment would pass.
A review of the vote by party indicates that the Whigs, 
in control of the House for the first time during the 
Twenty-Seventh Congress, carried 33 of the 40 vote majority 
for the amendment.25 The measure was not an outright party 
bill, for 30 Whigs still voted for the Regiment and the 
Democrats were nearly evenly split, but it was Whig votes 
which put the issue beyond doubt.
After the House had voted to disband the Second 
Dragoons it voted 123 to 62 for passage of the bill, and 
sent it back to the Senate.27 When the Senate considered 
the bill the next day it received a recommendation from the 
Committee of Military Affairs to reject the entire bill and 
ask for a conference with the House.25
24Mahon, 311.
25Ibid., 312-13.
25See Appendix 2 for a breakdown of the party structure 
in the Twenty-Seventh Congress.
27House Journal. 27th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 400,
25Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 848.
1210.
139
The Conference Committee met on the reduction issue and 
quickly worked out a compromise. The House agreed to have 
the Appropriation bill stand alone and to have all reduction 
efforts focused in Senate Bill 283. The committee agreed 
that all companies in the Army would have 42 privates, 
except for the dragoon regiments which would have 50 
privates per company. The committee also agreed that the 
Second Dragoons would become a rifle regiment instead of 
being disbanded.29 The compromise passed the Senate on 
August 18, 1842, by a vote of 29 to 7 and, even though it 
spared the Second Dragoons (albeit as a cheaper rifle 
regiment), it passed the House the following day by a vote 
of 97 to 63.30
The retrenchment of 1842 cut the authorized strength of 
the Army from 12,539 men to 8,613. Actual strength dropped 
from a peak of 11,319 in 1841 to 8,509 in 1845 and was not 
to rise again until the start of the Mexican War in 1846.31
^9 ,  854. The Second Dragoons were restored as a 
mounted unit by "An Act to repeal so much of the act 
approved the twenty third of August, one thousand, eight 
hundred and forty-two, as requires the second regiment of 
dragoons to be converted into a regiment of rifleman," 
passed on April 4, 1844. Richard Peters and George Minot, 
eds., United States Statutes at Large 10 vols. (Boston: 
Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1846-1861), 5:654. 
Hereafter cited as Statutes at Large.
30senate Journal. 27th Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 394, 
584; Globe, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 901. The House roll call 
is not recorded. Statutes at Large, 5:512.
3^William Addleman Ganoe, The History of the United 
States Army (New York: D. Appleman and Company, 1924), 191. 
Census, 2:1142.
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* *  *
The United States Army suffered a tumultuous year in 
1846. Because of disputes with Great Britain over the 
boundary and occupation of Oregon and with Mexico over the 
annexation and boundary of Texas, the Army looked 
particularly small and ineffectual at the start of the first 
session of the Twenty-Ninth Congress. The two military 
committees soon attempted to change this with partly 
conflicting bills, listed in Table 11.
TABLE 11
BILLS INTENDED TO INCREASE THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, 






A bill to provide for a Regiment of mounted 
Rifleman, and for establishing military 
stations on the Route to Oregon.
A bill to protect the Rights of Americans in 
the Territory of Oregon, until the termina­
tion of the joint occupation of the same.
A bill to authorize an Increase in the Rank 
and File of the Army of the United States.
A bill providing for the Prosecution of the 
existing War between the United States and 
Mexico
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House Bill 23 and Senate Bill 29 were both designed to 
provide more military protection for American citizens in 
Oregon. In this sense the bills were peacetime measures, 
cautionary in nature, and were introduced early in the 
session. The other two bills, House Bills 38 and 145, were 
different. House Bill 38 asked for the increase of all 
companies to 100 men each and was passed only after war had 
been declared. House Bill 145 called for 50,000 volunteers 
and provided the majority of the volunteer regiments raised 
for the war. The bill also served as the declaration of war 
between the two nations. These latter two bills were 
clearly wartime measures, acted on only after fighting had 
broken out. House Bills 38 and 145 will therefore be 
treated sparingly in this work. It is important to point 
out, however, that the coming war with Mexico affected all 
the Army bills in the session. All three bills that were 
finally enacted were passed within a week of the declaration 
of war signed on May 13, 1846.
The need to have some sort of increase for the Army was 
apparent to many in Washington in December of 1845.
Secretary of War William L. Marcy reported to the Senate 
Military Affairs Committee in that month that an increase of 
company strength to at least 64, and perhaps 84 men, was 
desirable.32 Marcy wanted the men to strengthen the 32
32Congress, Senate, Documentation in Relation to the 
Expediency of Increasing the Military Defenses of the 
Country, 29th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Document 225, Serial 
474, 1.
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"seaboard and northern and western frontiers" and thought 
the lack of protection for these regions to be so bad that 
an interim call for 50,000 volunteers was needed. Marcy 
pointed out that there were only 480 men on the Northern 
Frontier due to the worrisome problems with Mexico and also 
proposed two new Regular regiments for the posts in the 
Rockies.33
The same day that Marcy reported to the Senate Military 
Affairs Committee that an increase of the Army was needed 
(December 29, 1845), the Committee reported a bill to the 
Senate for the creation of an additional Cavalry regiment 
and a string of forts along the route to Oregon.34 After 
spending a week languishing in the Committee of the Whole 
the bill was sent to the Senate for its consideration. As 
the Chairman of the military committee, Missouri Democrat 
Thomas Hart Benton was the first to speak. Benton asserted 
that the bill "was reported as a peace measure, and had no 
reference whatever to war, or to the rumors of war which 
agitated the whole world," and that the bill "grew entirely 
out of the present defenceless state of" the Frontier.35 
Benton asked that the Senate refrain from discussion about 
foreign relations during the debate since such a discussion
33Ibid., 2. For an excellent overview of the military 
situation of the United States in early 1846 see, Ivor D. 
Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils: A Life of W. L. Marcy, 
(Providence: Brown University Press, 1959), 142-49 passim.




would not apply to the bill. The only negative comments on
the efforts to add a mounted regiment occurred on January 8,
when Kentucky Democrat John Crittenden guestioned Benton on
the cost of the forts to be constructed. After receiving
assurances that the forts would cost no more than $50,000,
Crittenden dropped his objections. The bill then passed the
Senate and was sent to the House on a voice vote.36 78
While the Senate was working on a bill to add a mounted
regiment to the Army the House was working on a bill to add
two mounted regiments. On January 2, 1846, the House
Committee on Military Affairs sent House Bill 23 to the
Committee of the Whole, asking not only for two regiments
but an increase in money spent on fortification. After
several days of debate the bill was tabled and eventually
the ideas it represented were embodied in Senate Bill 29.37
Once the Senate had passed the bill to add a third
cavalry regiment the public press took notice of the issue.
The Charleston Mercury, regardless of Benton's statement in
the Senate, linked the increase with a possible war with
Britain. The editor wrote that:
gentleman seem to think on one side that this thousand 
men is enough to conguer all North America, and on the 
other that so serious an addition to our already 
tremendous military force will convince Great Britain 
that she must prepare for a mortal struggle.38
36Ibid., 162.
37 ibid., 124.
38Charleston Mercury. January 8, 1846.
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The Mercury ended its editorial by admitting that a regiment 
used simply as internal police might make some sense but 
that the present atmosphere did not easily allow for an 
increase.
The Richmond Whig took a much more negative view of any 
Army increase than did the Mercury. Commenting on the 
debate to raise two additional regiments, which was 
occurring as the House debated House Bill 23, the editor 
wrote that the debate had seen "much clamorous profession 
and loud vaunting--much demagogism, much pretended courage, 
and much real fear of the people. "39 The Whig thought that 
a war with Britain over Oregon would be calamitous and urged 
"caution and patience" in a dispute that the paper felt 
would require 20,000 additional soldiers once fighting 
started.40
President Polk and Secretary of War Marcy had a problem 
while the bills to increase the Army were winding their way 
through the various committees and Houses of Congress. Both 
men wanted to increase the Army but both were afraid of 
being charged with war mongering if they pushed too hard for 
passage.* 4! Because of this Polk failed to directly address 
the issue in several messages to the Senate.4  ̂ Part of
^ Richmond whig and Public Advertiser, January 9, 1846.
4^ibid., February 20, 1846.
41Spencer, 149.
42james K. Polk, The Diary of James K. Polk, 4 vols., 
Ed. Milo Milton Quaife (Chicago: A.C. McClurg & CO., 1910; 
reprint, New York: Kraus Reprint CO., 1970), 2:300.
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their problem was solved when, on March 17, the Senate asked 
President Polk to comment on the need to increase the 
military or naval force of the country due to problems in 
foreign relations. Polk replied one week later by 
suggesting that an increase "both by land and sea" was 
necessary. Quoting George Washington, Polk urged Congress 
to "remember also that timely disbursements to prepare for 
danger, freguently prevent much greater disbursements to 
repel it."43 As for the situation in Oregon, Polk stated 
that Britain was making preparations that could only be 
considered warlike and that no matter how sincere the desire 
of peace might be in that country the armaments could be 
used against the United States. Referring to Mexico, Polk 
called relations with the southern neighbor "unsettled" and 
noted that "demonstrations of a character hostile to the 
United States" continued to be made.43 4 Polk thought the 
majority of the Army needed to be based in the south but 
that other areas of possible conflict needed to be protected 
as well. An increase of the Army was the only way to meet 
both these goals.
On April 7, 1846, Ohio Democrat Jacob Brinkerhoff 
reported Senate Bill 29 from the House Committee of Military 
Affairs with several amendments. The most important of 
these changed the regiment raised by the bill into a regular
43J. D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of National 
Literature, Inc., 1897), 5:2277.
44Ibid.
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rifle regiment but allowed the President to have the option 
of mounting the regiment if he felt it was necessary.45 46*
There was a wide array of opinion in the House as to the 
best way to increase the Army, not all agreeing with the 
work of the military committee. After Brinkerhoff's speech 
most of these ideas were discussed.
Frederick Stanton, a Tennessee Democrat, wanted to 
increase the Army by two cavalry regiments instead of the 
one rifle regiment that had been proposed. Considering 
unmounted troops to be a waste of money, Stanton favored no 
increase if troops of this type were offered.45 Another 
Tennessee Democrat, George Jones, disliked the whole bill.
He felt the rationale for any increase was to get Western 
men who could ride and fight the Indians into the Army.
Jones suggested that no Westerner would join the Army for a 
bounty in peacetime but would readily join once war broke 
out. The solution, according to the Tennessean, was to make 
the proposed regular formations into volunteers and recruit 
the men needed after fighting had started.4^
The next speaker in the debate, Jefferson Davis of 
Mississippi, wanted a quick passage of the bill. Davis was 
fearful that the Army would not have enough men to protect 
the emigrants to Oregon when they started to move across the




plains in May. Davis pointed out that giving the President 
the authority to mount regiments currently in the Army would 
not satisfy the situation since all the regiments already 
had been assigned different duty.48
After an adjournment of a few days the House resumed 
debate on the bill on April 10, 1846. Mississippi Democrat 
Jacob Thompson wanted the House to disagree with 
Brinkerhoff's amendment (asking for an unmounted rifle 
regiment) since he did not think the Senate would agree to 
it. Thompson also told the House that the bill was not a 
war bill and that "for twenty years the West had required a 
police such as the bill proposed."49 Disagreeing with 
Thompson was John McClernand, a Democrat from Illinois. 
McClernand thought it was foolish to propose any permanent 
increase with the bill. He saw the problems on the plains 
as a temporary inconvenience and favored dealing with the 
situation without increasing the Army. Attempts to rush 
through such an increase McClernand labeled as 
"demagogism."48 950
When his turn to speak came Jacob Brinkerhoff suggested 
a new line of thinking. Brinkerhoff stated that he thought 
that infantry was the correct form for the new regiment 
since it would not be used freely on the plains but instead 





thought the vital part of the bill was not the Army increase 
but the posts which would protect the emigrants on their 
trek across the continent.51 But since the entire Army was 
already assigned to some particular duty and the troops 
provided in the bill were to be the ones assigned to the 
posts it only made sense, according to Brinkerhoff, to 
provide for infantry instead of cavalry.
After Brinkerhoff's speech the time set for debate on 
the bill expired. The first to offer an amendment was G. W. 
Jones, a Georgia Democrat. Jones suggested that volunteers 
be accepted for two years but his motion was defeated.
Felix McConnell, an Alabama Democrat, then gave a short 
speech against the Army and facetiously moved an amendment 
to increase the Army by 21 regiments. There were also 
several attempts to increase the regiments provided for in 
the bill to two. All these amendments failed, usually by 
guite large margins.52 53
After a day's recess the House again took up motions 
pertaining to the bill on April 11, 1846. After some 
maneuvering as to whether officers should only be selected 
from among supernumerary officers already in the Army, the 
House voted 138 to 38 to pass the bill to a third reading 
and 90 to 54 to pass the bill and send it back to the 






for the vote to pass the bill to the third reading.
Presented in Tables 12 and 13, a breakdown of this vote 
shows several trends. Table 13 shows there is almost no 
differentiation in the party vote. Whigs were slightly more 
likely to vote for the increase than Democrats (84 percent
TABLE 12
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS SENATE BILL 29 TO A THIRD READING,
BY PARTY
Region Yeas Nays Total
Democrats 87 (78%) 24 (22%) 111 (100%)
Whigs 46 (84%) 9 (16%) 55 (100%)
Others 4 (80%) 1 (20%) 5 (100%)
Total 137 (80%) 37 (20%) 171 (100%)
TABLE 13
HOUSE VOTE TO PASS SENATE BILL 29 TO A THIRD READING,
BY SECTION
Region Yeas Nays Total
North 81 (84%) 15 (16%) 96 (100%)
South 46 (72%) 18 (28%) 64 (100%)
Frontier 10 (91%) 1 (9%) 11 (100%)
Total 137 (80%) 38 (20%) 171 (100%)
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to 78 percent) but the difference is small. The regional 
vote, however, shows the Frontier voting heavily for the 
bill, in part because the region felt that it was exposed to 
danger from the turmoil in Texas.
What is different from previous discussions on 
increasing the Army is the lack of discussion about 
supplying the nation with volunteers instead of Regulars.
The issue was raised only once, and then by a Southerner, 
Jones of Georgia. Such a lack of interest in increasing the 
Army in a way traditionally more acceptable to those on the 
Frontier is important. One possible explanation for this 
lack of interest was that the troops raised by the bill were 
to be used, not along the frontier, but far in advance of 
it. The route to Oregon would be a hard place to station 
volunteers and an ideal place to use regulars. Those from 
the Frontier would accept regulars without concern on these 
grounds. It is also interesting to note that the North, 
once again, supported the increase more readily than the 
South. Both regions did pass the motion by overwhelming 
margins but the South did so by the smaller percentage.
After the vote by the House to pass the bill and send 
it back to the Senate on April 11, little action was taken 
on the measure until after a series of startling 
developments. Tensions on the Southwestern frontier had 
continued to mount with both the Mexican and American 
governments placing increasingly numerous military units on
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the Rio Grande. On April 26, 1846, the clash that many
worried about but few expected occurred. Polk and his
cabinet were united on what needed to be done; the power "to
enable the President to prosecute the war" must be
granted.54 The President quickly sent to Congress what
amounted to a war message. He stated, in part:
I recommend that authority should be given to call into 
public service a large body of volunteers to serve not 
less than six to twelve months, unless sooner 
discharged. A volunteer force is, beyond question, 
more efficient than any other description of citizen 
soldiers.55 56
After a single day of debate the bill associated with the 
President's message was forced out of the Military Affairs 
Committee. With patriotism and anger over the Mexican 
attack both running high those opposed to any rash actions 
were swept before the tide of feeling. Only two days after 
the President's message had been sent to the Congress, House 
Bill 145, providing for the "Prosecution of the Existing War 
between the United States an the Republic of Mexico", was 
passed by overwhelming margins; 174 to 14 in the House and 
40 to 2 in the Senate.55
Partly because of the state of war it had just declared 
the Congress decided to pass "pell mell" every other piece
54Polk, 2:356.
55Globe, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 783.
56Ibid., 795, 804. There were twenty members in the 
House and three in the Senate who simply refused to vote on 
the measure. All fourteen no votes in the House were cast 
by Northern Whigs led by former President John Q. Adams of 
Massachusetts. See Sellers, 415-7.
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of military legislation before it.57 First to receive 
attention, and passed the same day, was a measure to 
increase every company in the Array to 100 privates for the 
duration of the war and to decrease all companies to 64 once 
hostilities had ceased.58 The effect of this bill was to 
increase the postwar army by several thousand men since most 
companies had been comprised of 42 privates since 1842.
This bill was passed a war measure, but it would have long­
term implications for the peace establishment.
Senate Bill 29 (raising a mounted rifle regiment and 
establishing military posts on the route to Oregon), 
previously passed by both Houses and being reviewed by the 
Senate Military Affairs Committee, was discharged from the 
committee after the President pro tempore broke a 22-22 tie 
on reconsidering the House amendments. The bill was quickly 
moved through the Senate and President Polk signed the bill 
on May 19.59
The increases of 1846 are remarkable because they were 
settled in the confusion of the first foreign war the 
country had fought in a generation. While the bill to 
provide a third mounted regiment was passed after war had 
been declared there appeared to be every chance that the 
measure would have passed without the war. During the
57Sellers, 418.
58Statutes at Large, 9:11.
59Ibid., 9:13. House Bill 23, a similar attempt to 
provide protection to the settlers in Oregon, was tabled in 
the House because it was thought the Senate Bill was better.
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debate on the bill it was widely understood that regular 
troops were the best way to provide protection on the route 
to Oregon. Even on the frontiers the preference for the 
volunteers had diminished except when discussing problems of 
an immediate or overwhelming nature. Fear of the Regular 
Army seemed to be on the decline.
While some of the 1846 increases to the Army were meant 
for the Peace Establishment, the attempts to increase the 
Army in 1847 and 1848 were purely measures to augment the 
Army during the Mexican War. As such, they are outside the 
scope of this study because they do not involve the 
peacetime establishment.
After the Mexican War had run its course the Regular 
army was quickly reduced as the volunteers of 1846 and the 
regulars raised in 1847 were sent home and the regular 
companies were reduced to 64 men each under the authority of 
the "Act to authorize an Increase of the Rank and File of 
the Army of the United States which had been passed May 13, 
1846.60 The Army quickly fell from its wartime high of over 
47,000 in 1847 to 10,744 in 1849. Soon after the war ended, 
however, many in Congress thought the Army needed to be 
expanded to face the changing demands of the frontier.
One Congressman who clearly saw the need to expand the 
Army was the Democratic Senator from Mississippi, Jefferson 
Davis. Davis, who had served as the Colonel in the famous 
First Mississippi Volunteer Regiment during the war, was the 60
60Statutes at Large, 9:11.
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chairman of the Senate Military Affairs Committee during the 
Thirty-First Congress. Davis wrote Secretary of War George 
W. Crawford in early 1850 suggesting the increase of the 
Army by two additional cavalry regiments to allow easier 
patrol of the new territories acquired from Mexico.61 
Although nothing came of Davis's suggestion until much 
later, his support for an Army increase was to continue.
On the first day of May 1850 Davis moved to postpone 
the prior order of the day to take up a bill entitled "An 
Act to increase the Rank and File of the Army, and to 
encourage Enlistments."62 The Senate allowed the motion, 
passed the bill, and sent it to the House with no 
substantial debate. The bill's main purpose was to allow 
the President to authorize the increase of any company on 
the Western frontier to a strength of 74 privates, an 
increase of ten men. Traditionally the Army's companies 
were only a fraction of the strength they were allowed. Due 
to death, desertion, and the difficulty of supplying 
frontier posts with new men, frontier companies were always 
undermanned. Allowing such companies to recruit to 74 
privates would allow them a better opportunity to remain 
near full strength. In essence the plan was to allow the 
Army to recruit at more than 100 percent for the companies 
on the frontiers. *
61jefferson Davis, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, eds. 
Haskell M. Monroe, et al., 7 vols. to date (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana University Press, 1971-), 4:355.
6^Globe, 31st Cong., 1st sess., 884.
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When the bill reached the House the Representatives 
several efforts were made to get the bill taken up out of 
order but these attempts were consistently defeated.63 The 
bill was finally debated, in its order, on May 23, 1850.
The first speaker in the debate, South Carolina Democrat 
Armistead Burt, supported the increase because he thought 
that death and desertion typically caused the loss of one 
quarter of the men recruited. The one condition that Burt 
applied to his support for the bill was that no officers 
could be added to the Army.63 4
TABLE 14
AUTHORIZED, ASSIGNED, AND AVAILABLE STRENGTH OF THE U. S.
ARMY, BY REGIMENT TYPE, 1850





2,100 1,799 (86% ) 1,155 (55%)
Infantry
8 regiments
4,464 4,094 (92%) 2,793 (61%)
Artillery 
4 regiments
2,802 2,716 (97%) 1,998 (71%)




Humphrey Marshall, a Kentucky Whig, gave a closely 
argued speech citing the need for the bill. His arguments, 
summarized in Table 14, dealt with the actual strength of 
the Army compared to its authorized strength. Marshall 
pointed out that the bill would solve the problem of the 
Army not being able to assign enough men to the various 
units (and improve on the Army's total of 92 percent 
assigned) even if it could not keep those assigned fit for 
duty. It should be noted also that the artillery units, 
which generally served on the eastern coast, had a much 
better manpower situation than units that served on the 
frontier, the infantry and mounted troops.
After adjourning for the day the House passed the act 
on May 24, 1850, by the comfortable margin of 107 to 59. No 
roll call for the vote was recorded.65 The two Houses 
quickly passed a compromise bill and the Act was signed into 
law by President Taylor on June 17, 1850.65 6
The increase of 1850 is best described as a technical 
adjustment to the Army's structure. The bill passed easily 
and with little debate. If fully enacted the Army would 
have seen an increase of nearly 1,500 men. The increase did 
not drastically affect the size of the Army to that extent, 
however; it only grew from 10,744 in 1849 to a high of 
11,376 in 1853. The importance of the act was that Congress 
recognized, and moved to fix, one of the problems facing the
65Ibid., 1081.
66Statutes at Large. 9:438.
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Army after the Mexican war. Other, more basic problems, 
would have to wait for a later time.
k k k
The decade of the 1840s does not easily lend itself to 
any broad conclusions about party and sectional views on the 
proper form of the regular army. The two major peacetime 
bills during the decade, decreasing the Army after the 
Seminole War and the addition of a third cavalry regiment in 
1846, did show that party influence was not strong on this 
issue. In 1842 the Whigs voted heavily for the reduction 
while Democrats did so by a small margin. In 1846 the two 
parties voted almost identically for the third mounted unit. 
As a whole, party allegiance was not important in deciding 
the proper size of the Army during the decade.
The region in which a Congressman lived in also played 
a minor role in determining how his vote was cast. The 
Frontier was the only region to vote against the reduction 
in 1842 and its near unanimity for the 1846 bill was far 
stronger support than from any other region. The North and 
South opposed the Frontier on the 1842 reduction bill, and 
it passed with a healthy majority in both sections. While 
all sections agreed to increase the Army in April 1846, the 
South had the weakest support on the issue followed by 
North. One of the intriguing items to come out of the study 
of the decade's major Army bills was that the South 
consistently voted as the region least in favor of a large 
regular army.
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One possible reason for such a regional breakdown in 
the 1840s was that the Frontier was changing, as was what 
was needed to protect it. The Frontier during the 1840s was 
different then in the previous decade. It had moved from 
the wooded northwest, trans-Mississippi region, and the 
swamps of Florida to the great plains. Where volunteers 
could be used on the 1830s Frontier they could not be used 
effectively in the 1840s because the areas which needed 
troops were now far beyond the settled sections of the 
country. Frontier Congressmen thus reduced their 
traditional reluctance to use regulars in their region.
There are less clear reasons as to why the South was 
generally less in favor of the regulars than the other 
regions. The lack of an ongoing threat in 1842 only 
partially explains the strong anti-Army Southern vote in 
1842. The South's less than enthusiastic support toward the 
peacetime provisions of the 1846 bills is interesting in 
comparison to the fervor it showed in passing the war 
provisions against Mexico. Southern support for the peace 




THE FOUR REGIMENT INCREASE OF 1855
In the middle of August 1854, a young Brevet Second 
Lieutenant, James Lawrence Gratten, was sent from Fort 
Laramie, Wyoming, with twenty-nine men to question members 
of the Brule tribe of Sioux Indians about a cow that had 
wandered away from a group of Mormon emigrants. What 
happened next was a matter of debate which reached all the 
way to Washington, but when the incident was over Gratten's 
command had been killed to the last man and the Congress was 
once again debating whether an increase of the Peace 
Establishment was necessary.1
Regardless of the degree of Indian unrest on the 
Frontier, the need for some increase in the size of the Army 
in 1855 was at least arguable. The strength of the active 
Army at the end of 1854 was 10,894, the same approximate 
number since 1846 and, indeed, almost 1,500 fewer than in 
1840. The United States had, of course, grown considerably 
larger during this period. The population had jumped 36 
percent between 1840 to 1850 (17.1 to 23.2 million people) 
and would continue at this rapid pace until 1 8 6 0 . 2  The
1-The best account of what came to be known as 
"Gratten's defeat" is located in David S. Lavender, Fort 
Laramie and the Changing Frontier (Washington D.C.:
Divisions of Publications, National Park Service, 1983).
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FOUR REGIMENT INCREASE OF 1855
In the middle of August 1854, a young Brevet Second 
Lieutenant, James Lawrence Gratten, was sent from Fort 
Laramie, Wyoming, with twenty-nine men to question members 
of the Brule tribe of Sioux Indians about a cow that had 
wandered away from a group of Mormon emigrants. What 
happened next was a matter of debate which reached all the 
way to Washington, but when the incident was over Gratten's 
command had been killed to the last man and the Congress was 
once again debating whether an increase of the Peace 
Establishment was necessary.!
Regardless of the degree of Indian unrest on the 
Frontier, the need for some increase in the size of the Army 
in 1855 was at least arguable. The strength of the active 
Army at the end of 1854 was 10,894, the same approximate 
number since 1846 and, indeed, almost 1,500 fewer than in 
1840. The United States had, of course, grown considerably 
larger during this period. The population had jumped 36 
percent between 1840 to 1850 (17.1 to 23.2 million people) 
and would continue at this rapid pace until 1860.2 The
^The best account of what came to be known as 
"Gratten's defeat" is located in David S. Lavender, Fort 
Laramie and the Changing Frontier (Washington D.C.:
Divisions of Publications, National Park Service, 1983).
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territory of the country had increased at an even greater 
pace, 69 percent, between 1845 and 1853 (1.79 to 3.02 
million square miles). A case could be made that even if 
the country had an appropriate defensive force in 1838,
1846, or even 1850, it might not have had one by 1855.
There was another problem that made defending the 
Frontier more difficult in 1855. As usual there was a 
disparity between the number of men authorized the Army and 
the number available for duty at any one time. One 
historian states that in 1850 the difference between actual 
strength and authorized strength was 2,164 officers and men, 
or nearly 17 percent of the total.* 3 A second writer 
suggests that although 13,821 men were authorized to the 
Army in June 1853, only 10,417 were on duty, and due to 
sickness or other reasons, just 6,918 were at their posts 
and available for duty--slightly more than half the total 
authorized strength. These men had to be enough to garrison 
fifty-four posts on the Frontier.4
^Extrapolating the rate of increase for the entire 
decade of the 1850s, it is probable that the population of 
the United States was between 27 and 27.5 million people in 
1855 .
3Warren W. Hassler, With Sword and Shield: American 
Military Affairs, Colonial Times to the Present (Ames: Iowa 
University Press, 1982), 144-45. Robert Coffman suggests 
that the Army averaged a deficit of eighteen percent in 
authorized versus available strength in the period before 
the Mexican War with a slight improvement thereafter. See 
Edward M. Coffman, The Old Army: A Portrait of the American 
Army in Peacetime. 1784-1898 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 42.
4Robert Marshal Utley, Frontiersman in Blue: The 
United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: 
Macmillan Co, 1967), 19.
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Many government officials thought that there was a lack 
of men on the frontier in 1855. President Franklin Pierce 
felt that any expansion of trade and commerce reguired an 
increase of both the Army and the Navy.5 Pierce's Secretary 
of War, Jefferson Davis, and many in the military were also 
pressing for an increase the Army's size.
In a letter to Charles J. Faulkner, the Chairman of the 
House Committee on Military Affairs, discussing the need for 
a new fort in Minnesota Territory, Davis wrote that "at the 
present time there is neither money to construct nor men to 
garrison" such a fort and that "it was mainly to give 
security to such exposed sections of the country that the 
increase of the army was asked for in my late annual report 
[1853]."6 The proposed fort at Pembina continued to be a 
thorn in Davis's side for the same reason; a lack of troops 
prevented the garrisoning of a post everyone thought should 
be manned. The Delegate from the Minnesota territory, Henry 
M. Rice, wrote Davis in January 1855 asking "for a single 
company of dragoons, light artillery, or even infantry if 
the others can not be spared."7 Once again Davis had to
5Roy Franklin Nichols, Franklin Pierce: Young Hickory 
of the Granite Hills. 2d ed. (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1958), 220.
^Jefferson Davis to Charles J. Faulkner, June 30 1854, 
Congress, House, Military Post Near Pembina River,
Minnesota, 33rd Cong., 1st sess., House Report 291, Serial 
744, 2.
7Henry M. Rice to Jefferson Davis, January 19, 1855, 
Letters received by the Office of the Adjutant General, 
1780-1917, Record Group 94, National Archives, microcopy M- 
567, reel 525, frame 252.
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reply that he had not a single company to establish the 
fort.8
The lack of men in the Army caused Davis nearly
constant embarrassment in his relations with Congress and
the Army through 1855. Rice plaintively asked if the
twenty-three men, the muster of an entire company stationed
at Fort Ripley, could be reinforced, especially since the
nearest post to it was Fort Snelling several hundred miles
away.9 Davis replied that
this is one of many like calls for troops, the 
necessity for which is in many cases alike 
palpable, but the power to comply with them is 
wanting.10
As was his habit when dealing with the various members of 
Congress, Davis closed his letter to Rice by suggesting that 
the only way Minnesota would get more troops was if Congress 
increased the size of the Army. This was an excellent way 
to link the problems of the individual Congressman with the 
needs of the Army, but it did little to make anyone happy.
Davis faced shortages of men in other regions of the 
country as well. In a long and often churlish exchange of 
letters with Brevet Major General John E. Wool, then 
commanding the Department of the Pacific, Davis chided Wool
8Davis to Rice, January 23, 1855, ibid., frame 257. 
9Rice to Davis, June 12, 1854, ibid., reel 504, frame
221.
l^Davis to Rice, January 19, 1855, Letters received by 
the Office of the Secretary of War, 1791-1889, Record Group 
107, National Archives, microcopy M-6, letterbooks, reel 35, 
page 362.
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for asking for more troops to be sent to his department even
though Wool should have known none would be available. At
one point Davis wrote to the General:
Your own knowledge of the numerical strength of the 
Army, and the demand for troops upon the frontiers, 
could only, in the contingency of an increase of the 
Army by an Act of Congress, permit you to hope for a 
larger force than had previously been ordered to your command.il
When Wool continued to complain that he did not have the men 
necessary to keep the Indians and settlers away from each 
other, Davis could only exhort Wool "to prevent disaster by 
vigilant attention to movements among the Indian Tribes and 
by the judicious location of the troops."!2 Davis was not 
unsympathetic to Wool's predicament but was once again 
limited in what he could do. He wrote to the beleaguered 
General that "another regiment has been for some time needed 
and when it is in the power of the Department to furnish one 
it will be done."l3 The Secretary of War could do no more 
than offer advice for he had no troops to spare.
Hjefferson Davis to Brevet Major General John E. Wool, 
March 1, 1854, Congress, Senate, Presidential Message 
Communicating Instructions and Correspondence with Major 
General Wool on Operations on the Pacific Coast, 33rd Cong., 
2nd sess., Senate Executive Document 16, 52.
l2Jefferson Davis to Brevet Major General John E. Wool, 
January 12, 1854, Ibid., 7-8. See also Jefferson Davis, 
Jefferson Davis. Constitutionalist: His Letters, Papers, 
and Speeches, ed. Dunbar Rowland (Jackson, Mississippi: 
Mississippi Historical Society, 1923; reprint, New York:
AMS Press, 1973), 2:322-23.
l^Davis to Brevet Major General John E. Wool, May 3, 
1854, Orders and Endorsements sent by the Secretary of War, 
1791-1889, Record Group 107, National Archives, microcopy 
M-444, letterbooks, reel 2, page 448.
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Among the higher ranking men in the Army the need for 
increasing its strength seemed all but self-apparent. The 
Commanding General, Brevet Lieutenant General Winfield 
Scott, told the House Committee on Military Affairs that the 
increase of the Army by four regiments was "highly 
necessary" and that
This is the minimum force that is essential to be 
added to the Army to protect the frontiers against 
the hostilities of Indians, the present force, on 
the frontiers being entirely inadeguate for that purpose.14 156
Scott also suggested improving on the 1850 increase by 
allowing all companies to recruit to 100 privates instead of 
allowing only Frontier companies to recruit to 74.15
After hearing from General Scott, the Committee on 
Military Affairs asked most of the Department heads in the 
Army for their views on possible expansion. Brevet Major 
General Thomas S. Jesup, the Army's Quartermaster General, 
flatly stated that the Army was "totally inadequate to the 
duties devolved upon it" and that any other country in 
similar circumstances would require 50,000 men to do the job 
that the Army was now performing. He went on to say that 
"every man . . . added by this section of the bill, will be 
required for the defense of our extensive frontiers."4^
14Congress, House, Increase and Better Organization of 





The only high ranking officer interviewed by the 
committee who did not think it necessary to provide the Army 
with both infantry and cavalry in 1855 was Colonel John J. 
Abert, Chief of the Topographical Engineers. He felt that 
five infantry regiments would be more useful than a mix of 
infantry and cavalry and that the cost would be cheaper.I7 
Overall, however, the senior officers in the Army felt that 
an increase in the size of the Army was needed to protect 
citizens adequately.
Unlike military leaders, the journals of the day did 
not see the increase of the Army as a major issue in early 
1855. Many of the nation's leading newspapers did not even 
address the issue of increasing the Army while it was being 
debated in the Congress. Those that did had mixed views on 
the subject.
One paper that did address the issue was the New York 
Herald. Even though fiercely anti-administration, the 
editor of the Herald came out for the increase. He stated 
that early opposition to the bill was "more of a personal 
character" and did not "extend to the principles 
involved."1® As the final days of the session neared the 
Herald ran a story that quoted Major Ben McCullough, whom 
the paper called an Indian fighter and Texas Ranger, as 
saying that "the regulars are best suited to the stations-- 17*
17 Ibid.
^ New York Herald. January 25, 1855, 185.
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the volunteers for war."19 The Herald then questioned 
whether the "blood of hundreds of our hardy pioneers" could 
be left neglected and the Indians left unpunished for their 
crimes. Discussing the appeals of the territories for more 
protection, the paper asked, "Are the legislators deaf to 
the appeals to humanity?"20 The Herald was clearly pushing 
for what the paper considered a needed increase in the 
strength of the Army.
A rival to the Herald, The New York Daily Times (later 
the New York Times) felt somewhat differently. While not 
strongly against an increase, the paper did give some 
attention to a speech of a leading Congressional figure 
against the measure, Senator Sam Houston of Texas. The 
paper stated that Houston was willing to "see nothing taken 
for granted when new schemes of territorial management and 
for increasing the standing Army in time of peace are 
broached."21 The paper felt that Houston's caution was 
understandable and praiseworthy.
The Whiggish National Intelligencer at first reported 
that the schemes discussed in Congress for the increase of 
the Army would meet with "almost universal concurrence."22 
Later the paper published several unsigned letters dealing 
with military issues. For the most part these letters were
19Ibid., March 1, 1855, 417.
20Ibid.
21New York Daily Times. March 1, 1855, 4.
22National Intelligencer, January 4, 1855.
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heavily in favor of increasing the Army even though they 
were also adamant that the artillery should not be reduced 
in the process.23 Overall the National Intelligencer was 
also for an increase.
The Congressional debates of 1855 can not be fully 
appreciated without understanding the changes that had 
occurred in the War Department and the Army in the previous 
years of the Pierce administration. These changes were 
almost entirely the work of one man, Jefferson Davis.
When Jefferson Davis accepted Franklin Pierce's offer 
to be his Secretary of War, the President-elect gained a man 
one historian described as "one of America's ablest 
peacetime secretaries."24 25* Other writers have described his 
tenure as "innovative"23 and Davis as "a reforming secretary 
on the model of Calhoun."23 For his own part Davis felt 
himself to be highly gualified to hold the position. After 
graduating from West Point (class of 1828) Davis had served 
on active duty for seven years before serving in the House 
of Representatives on the Committee on Military Affairs. At 
the start of the Mexican War he resigned to lead the 1st 
Mississippi Rifles and served ably until being wounded in 
action. After returning to Mississippi Davis was appointed
23Ibid., January 25, 1855; February 6, 1855.
24Hassler, 145..
25Clement Eaton, Jefferson Davis (New York: The Free
Press, 1977 ) , 84.
26Wiegley, 190.
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to the Senate in 1847 where he served on the Senate Military- 
Affairs Committee. Davis's self-assurance in military 
matters was to have a great impact during the Pierce 
administration. He was not without his detractors, however. 
As one biographer of Winfield Scott suggested, Davis "was 
profoundly conscious of military gifts less apparent to his 
contemporaries."27 Regardless of how he was viewed, Davis 
was an important man in any military debate.
When he sent his first report to Congress as Secretary 
of War in December of 1853, Davis laid out a broad and 
comprehensive plan to reorganize his Department and the 
Army. He proposed to raise the pay of enlisted personnel in 
an attempt to keep men in the service longer; add one 
additional regiment of dragoons, two regiments of riflemen 
and a company of miners and sappers; create a retirement 
list for officers; increase officer pay; overhaul the 
Military Academy by adding an additional year of 
instruction; fund multiple new coastal fortifications and 
interior improvements; change the system for regulating the 
government armories; and test the use of camels in the 
Southwest desert.28 jn his second report Davis further 
reguested that Congress make two artillery regiments into 
infantry and do away with the distinctions between line and 27
27Charles Winfield Elliott, Winfield Scott: The 
Soldier and the Man (New York: Macmillan Co, 1937), 649.
28congress, Congressional Globe. 46 vols. (Washington 
D. C.: Office of the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873), 33rd 
Cong., 2nd sess., 30-36. Hereafter cited as Globe.
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staff positions.29 All in all it was an impressive list of 
reforms that Davis submitted to the Thirty-Third Congress, 
probably the most wide-ranging army reform ever proposed up 
to that time. The problem for Davis was that by early 1855 
he had only been able to convince Congress to pass the pay 
increase for the enlisted troops. As one historian has 
noted, "most of Davis's reform ideas met with a cold and 
negative response" in Congress.
In early 1855 Davis presented a reorganization plan for 
the Army that "completely revised traditional military 
thinking on the modes and methods of army organization and 
operation."31 Davis was, simply put, trying to implement a 
new strategic plan for the Army in the West.32 Robert Utley
29Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., appendix, 1. With his 
attempt to increase the infantry at the expense of the 
artillery Davis ran afoul of Winfield Scott. Scott told the 
Committee on Military Affairs that Davis and he disagreed on 
the change and that in the end Davis "had more confidence in 
my opinion, with reference to artillery, than he had in his 
own." The change was never initiated but the topic became 
an item of contention in a long running Davis-Scott feud.
See Congress, House Report 40, 8.
3C)Larry Gara, The Presidency of Franklin Pierce, 
American Presidency Series, Donald R. McCoy, Clifford S. 
Griffen, Homer Socolofsky, general editors (Lawrence,
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 63. For a more
favorable view of Davis's ability to achieve what he wanted 
from Congress see Hudson Strode, Jefferson Davis: American 
Patriot, 1808-1861, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1965), 
273 .
31john Muldowny, "The Administration of Jefferson Davis 
as Secretary of War" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1959), 
88 .
32William C. Davis, Jefferson Davis: The Man and His 
Hour (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 234-35.
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described the situation on the frontier in the 1850's by- 
suggesting that
A highly mobile enemy skilled in guerrilla tactics 
demanded either a highly mobile counter guerilla 
force or a heavy defensive army large enough to 
erect an impenetrable shield around every settlement and travel route in the West.33
Davis decided to create a mobile fighting force which would
be able to confront the Plains Indians on their own level,
by using highly skilled light cavalry. It was for this new
force that Davis reguested the additional regiment of
dragoons in 1853.34 as Davis visualized it, the new,
larger, cavalry formations would stay in encampments in the
winter months and emerge in the spring to challenge the
Indians on the plains. Due to a lack of cavalry nothing
like this had ever been tried before. Davis very much
wanted the chance to implement such a policy.
When everything was considered, an increase of the Army 
was only one small part of what Davis wanted to accomplish 
in 1855. It was indeed "of a routine nature, "35 but one of 
vital importance to Davis and the Army.
Jefferson Davis was not the type of man to idly allow 
one of his projects to be decided without trying to 
influence events. When the Washington Union, a pro-
33utley, 9.
34General Scott agreed with Davis, at least partially, 
on this point. In 1853 he had suggested an additional 
regiment of mounted rifleman. See Congress, Senate, 
Commanding Generals Report, 1853, 33rd Cong., 1st Sess., 
Senate Executive Document 1, Vol. 2, Serial 691, 95.
35Muldowny, 1.
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administration newspaper, suggested that "there is no lack
of troops for the protection of the frontier" Davis wrote to
the editor, A.O.P. Nicholson, and scolded that such an
article "appearing in your paper" is "an embarrassment to
the administration in its efforts to obtain the necessary
increase of the Army."36 Davis also showed a willingness to
inject himself into the everyday affairs of the legislative
body of which he had once been a member. In a letter to
Charles Faulkner, Davis asked the head of the House
Committee on Military Affairs
how would it do, to separate the several measures 
for increase of the army, for the increase in pay, 
for the retired list, and for the organization . . . 
and move each through separately, as amendments of 
the army [appropriations] bill and try each on its own strength and carry such as we can?37
Whether or not the original idea came from Davis is unknown.
What is known is that the issues were indeed split and
handled separately.
On December 27, 1854, the House sent to the Senate, 
with little fanfare or debate, the Army Appropriations bill 
for the year ending 1856.38 House bill 562 was then sent to 
the Senate Committee on Finance where it languished for
36oavis to A.O.P. Nicholson, October 28, 1854,
Jefferson Davis, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, eds. Haskell 
M. Monroe, et al., 7 vols. to date (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
University Press, 1971-), 5:93. See also, Davis, 
Constitutionalist, 2:387.
37i,etter from Davis to Faulkner, January 25, 1855, Davis, Papers, 5:98.
38congress, House, House Journal, 33rd Cong., 2nd 
., Serial 776, 117. Hereafter cited as House Journal.sess
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nearly a month despite the efforts of James Shields, a 
Democrat from Illinois and a man who had served as a Major 
General of Volunteers in the Mexican War, to move it to the 
floor of the Senate. Only after Shields gave a passionate 
speech stating that "we are in imminent danger of an Indian 
war. The Indians are forming . . . and something ought to
be done to stop it" did the Senate vote 24 to 13 to debate 
the bill.39
Shields, and many others in the Senate, felt that the 
Army Appropriations bill for 1856 was important even though 
it did not call for an increase in troop strength in its 
original form. House bill 615, "a bill for the Increase and 
Better Organization of the Army and for other purposes," had 
been sent to the Senate on December 18 and had been stalled 
in the Committee on Military Affairs. This bill was part of 
Jefferson Davis's attempt to reorganize the Army. It 
contained three main provisions: first, to increase the 
number of regiments; second, to reorganize the staff and 
bureaus; and third, to provide a retired list for officers. 
The proposition of a retired list was a particularly irksome 
issue to some members of Congress and there had been calls 
in the Senate to have the issues stand separately. As 
Thomas Rusk, a Democrat from Texas, colorfully put it in 
reference to the bill, "each of those subjects should stand
3^Globe^ 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 377.
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on its own bottom."40 Thus House Bill 615 had not moved out 
of committee.
This situation changed drastically, however, when 
President Pierce sent a message to the Senate and House on 
January 16, 1855, not long after Gratten's defeat. The 
President, while transmitting the annual report of the 
Secretary of War to Congress, called for the "employment of 
volunteer troops . . . [as] the only practicable means of
providing for the present emergency."41 He went on to say 
that although the volunteers were to meet only a "special 
demand," such an emergency "serves to illustrate the urgent 
necessity of an increase of the Regular Army."42 By not 
only calling for volunteers but also an increase in the 
Regular Army as well, Pierce caused confusion throughout the 
debate to come. Shields, wanting to give the President what 
he reguested, then did an unusual thing. To expedite the 
raising of volunteers Shields amended the annual 
Appropriations bill on January 25, 1855, to include 3,000 
mounted volunteers to serve for eighteen months and 500 
Indians to act as mounted rangers and scouts. A separate 
section asked for commissioners who would negotiate with the 
Indian tribes in an attempt to reach a peaceful 4012
40Ibid., 168.
41James D. Richardson ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of 
National Literature, Inc., 1897), 6:2830-31.
42 Ibid., 6:2831.
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settlement.43 Shields's amendment touched off a heated 
debate that reexamined the issue of how best to protect the 
expanding white influence on the plains.
The first reaction to Shields's amendment was violent 
objection by Lewis Cass, a Democrat from Michigan, to any 
attempt to use Indians against one another even though he 
was for "any additional strength" needed to defend the 
country.44 Shields readily receded from the provision for 
Indian scouts, explaining he had only included it to please 
the administration and that he did not think the issue 
unduly important.45
Shields then stated several reasons why an immediate 
increase was in order. He pointed out that the area in 
which Indian troubles were likely contained 180,000 Indians, 
with between 6,000 and 8,000 warriors, and that the military 
had only 1,855 officers and men stationed in the area. 
Shields did not think such a number was "even a sufficient 
police force" and he agreed with the Secretary of War that 
without a show of force "nothing on earth could prevent a 
general Indian War."46 Shields then brought up the issue 
that was to be heard repeatedly in the debates, whether 
volunteers or regulars would be best for the coming 
campaign.




Shields, citing his own experience at leading both 
types of troops, explained to the Senate that for fighting a 
battle volunteers were as good as any soldiers, but he was 
unsure they were the right force to deal with a problem when 
the object was to deter a war instead of fight one. Shields 
supported the volunteers in the end, however, because it was 
what the administration requested.47
After Shields ended his speech, John Bell, a Whig from 
Tennessee, made several comments disagreeing with Shields.
He disputed the numbers of Indians that Shields said were 
involved in the difficulties and claimed that "we have 
always exaggerated the number of Indians in the frontier."48 
Bell then suggested that since "the close contiguity of the 
races excites passion which lead to disturbances," it would 
be better to try to understand the problem first instead of 
rushing to use force to settle the difficulties.49 Bell did 
not think that a call for volunteers was wrong, just 
premature and perhaps too costly. He also was in favor of 
some kind of increase in the regular force due to the 
general expansion of the Indian Frontier.
The next man to speak, R. M. T. Hunter, a Democrat from 
Virginia, proposed an increase of two regiments of regulars 
and 500 rangers, in place of Shields's original amendment 






both cheaper and better.50 Shields replied that although an 
increase in regulars would be needed eventually, the length 
of time to organize new units would take too long and that 
volunteers would be needed to fill the gap. He then went on 
to ask if Hunter would support the increase of four 
regiments of regulars reguested by the Secretary of War in 
the President's message of January 16. Hunter replied he 
would not because it was his opinion that such a bill would 
likely die in the House, much like a similar bill of the 
previous session, thereby leaving the frontier with no 
increased protection.51
When the Senate next took up the bill on January 29, 
Shields did several things indicating he might have had a 
change of mind on the increase. First he withdrew the 
section of his amendment dealing with Indian commissioners 
and then he allowed Hunter to substitute his two regiment 
and 500 ranger proposal in place of his own original call 
for 3,000 volunteers. Shields next amended Hunter's 
substitute by calling for four new regiments, two each of 
cavalry and infantry.52 Shields had gone from proposing an 
all volunteer increase to proposing an all Regular one. The 
famous Democrat from Texas, Sam Houston, vigorously 





Houston, a member of the Committee on Military Affairs, 
was the leading colorful figure in the Thirty-third 
Congress. In his amazing career Houston had served in the 
Congress of two nations (the United States and the Republic 
of Texas), had been President of Texas, Governor of 
Tennessee, lived with and fought against several Indian 
tribes, and had been proclaimed a member of the Cherokee 
nation while a trader in the Oklahoma Indian territory. 
Houston quickly made plain his opposition to the Shields 
plan by declaring that "every instance" of Indian hostility 
was provoked by whites.53 Houston thought that the Fort 
Laramie difficulty ("Gratten's defeat") was an isolated 
problem and reminded his fellow Senators that before the 
incident the entire frontier "all the way to California [had 
been] in peace."54 Houston was unhappy because new 
regiments were expensive, and he did not believe that 
regulars could fight Indians on the plains anyway. As 
Houston put it:
how can they [the Army] protect us against the 
Indians when the cavalry have not horses which can 
trot faster than active oxen and the infantry dare 
not go out in any hostile manner for fear of being 
shot and scalped?55
The plan Houston gave as an alternative relied on policing 
the Frontier with Texas-style mounted rangers and courting 





of 250 rangers to patrol the plains and of 500 infantry on 
the Mexican border to police the Indians and guard the 
frontier. He also wanted to establish trading houses on 
the plains with a small guard of just twenty-five men to 
encourage trade and friendly relations with the Indians.
For the emigrant routes Houston would have guard companies 
of 250 men to escort each group of settlers, which he would 
limit to about 1,000 each. A problem with Houston's plan 
was that even he did not know exactly how many of the 
battalions he had outlined would be needed. Added to the 
fact that Houston was proposing an entirely new type of 
formation, it is not hard to understand why his plan had 
little support. Houston saw his plan as one where it would 
be "wiser to send a few wagons with presents" to the Indians 
"than to send an army."56 in some ways Houston's arguments 
echoed those of John Bell, the important difference being 
that Houston did not favor any expansion of the Army.
The next speaker, the other Whig Senator from 
Tennessee, James C. Jones, admitted surprise that Houston 
would oppose his own administration on the issue and that 
Hunter partially did as well. Jones then guoted Davis's 
opinion that the increase asked for in his 1853 annual 
report would have been enough to forestall bloodshed. Jones 
chastised those in the Senate who thought it their duty "to 
know and understand the whole guestion" of frontier defense
• t56Ibid 440-41.
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better that Davis.57 Jones was particularly scornful of 
Houston's plan. Assuming three emigrant groups on two 
routes every year, Jones figured Houston's plan would 
require 1,500 men without protecting any particular place. 
Simply guarding emigrant trains did not make sense to Jones, 
and he warned that a plan like the one favored by Houston 
could require 10,000 men to execute.
On January 30, Thomas Rusk cautioned the Senate that to 
ask too large an increase would mean the loss of the whole. 
Interested in the politics of the possible, Rusk, like 
Hunter, asked for two regiments of mounted rifleman and 500 
rangers and declared his intention to vote against the 
Shields amendment.58 Hunter then pointed out that the 500 
rangers were only a short-term solution to the problems 
expected in the coming spring. After the crisis had passed 
and the regulars were ready, the rangers could be 
released.59
William C. Dawson, a Whig from Georgia, thought it no
argument to say that an increase of four regiments could not
pass the House. Pointing out that two-thirds of the
Congress were "administration men" he asserted that
it is a strange condition of things to see me 
standing here today, sustaining the measures of the 





friends oppose them on grounds strange and extra ordinary.15"
Hunter did not want to let Dawson's comment pass and 
suggested the Whig had become "a new made administration 
man" and declared that he, for one, would not blindly follow 
the administration.51 Dawson replied that he was not an 
administration man, and had no desire to be one, but that on 
this issue he felt the need to accept the President's 
urging. Thomas Rusk then chided Dawson for not 
understanding the interests of the frontier states since he 
would not
give us this protection, because he says we must go 
the whole figure [four regiments], or get nothing, 
we must, as good party men, come up to the 
recommendations made by the President60 12
Rusk then gloomily added that he did not think that an
increase of four regiments would pass even during the
present emergency. As a counter to Rusk's argument Shields
suggested that "if we provide now for only two regiments and
a fraction, we shall get no more for sessions to come."62
There was a clear divergence of opinion in the Senate of how
much of an increase was needed, and possible, at the time.
During the previous exchange the Whig from Maryland, 
James A. Pearce, pointed out that although there were barely 






of Florida, he would support an increase in the West so long 
as the troops were Regulars. Pearce had figures showing 
that the yearly cost of two regiments each of cavalry and 
infantry (approximately 3,154 men) would be 2.19 million 
dollars while the cost for 3,000 volunteers for a year would 
be over 3.4 million. Since Pearce expected further trouble 
on the Frontier he thought the cost of the new regiments 
would be justified through the years.64
When John Bell discussed the Army expansion on January 
30, his position had changed somewhat since he had spoken 
five days earlier. He still did not think the "emergency" 
was so pressing that volunteers were needed but he had 
warmed to the idea of expanding the Regular force. Bell 
gave several reasons why he favored an increase. One was 
that he distrusted the Mormons and wanted an occupying 
regiment in Utah at all times. A second was the large 
amount of territory that needed patrolling, over 10,000 
miles of borders alone by 1855.65
The next speaker, John B. Weller, a Democrat from 
California, called for an increase of the Army of "at least 
four regiments."66 Weller suggested that there was no 
difference of opinion in the Senate as to the need for some 
kind of increase in the military force of the country, only 





The next day Sara Houston once again addressed the 
Senate and pointed out that even though increases had been 
asked for each of the previous three years, no problems had 
occurred until what he derisively called the "crippled cow 
incident."67 Houston then went on to predict that the 
increase asked for by Shields would cause a general war that 
would take five years to end, stop emigration to Oregon, and 
cost up to fifteen million dollars.
In response to these assertions, Augustus C. Dodge, a 
Democrat from Iowa, produced a letter from an unnamed 
correspondent which reported that Governor Cummings of 
Nebraska had called for two territorial regiments of 
volunteers and that it was expected that he was to ask that 
they be taken into Federal s e r v i c e . if this was true, 
Dodge pointed out, then Houston's statements that all was 
well on the frontier could not be accurate. Dodge then 
accused Houston of tailoring his speeches on Army expansion 
toward "that section of the country in which he does not 
live" in an attempt to gain popularity. That the Whigs were 
not engaged in any outward partisan display pleased Dodge, 
but he worried that "now-a-days scarcely any measure can be 67*
67 Ibid.
^Augustus Dodge was the son of Henry Dodge, a fellow 
senator from Wisconsin and commander of the mounted ranger 
battalion formed in 1832 and the First Dragoons formed the 
following year. The younger Dodge, like his father, had 
served in the Black Hawk war in 1832.
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proposed that is not, in some mode or other, brought into 
the whirlpool of politics."69 70
On the last day of Senate debate on House ill 562 
Shields pointed out that the War Department had asked for 
volunteers only until regular regiments could be created.
He felt that not much would be lost if only regulars were 
used since it would not take much longer to raise and eguip 
them than volunteers. Lewis Cass then suggested that it was 
no coincidence that the Secretary of War and the head of the 
Committee on Military Affairs (Shields) agreed on such an 
important matter. Cass, a former Secretary of War under 
Jackson, also lauded Jefferson Davis's ability and said,
"The opinion of such a man ought to have weight, and it has 
weight with me."79
After the remarks by Cass a vote was taken on the 
Shields amendment (four regiments) to Hunter's substitute 
(two regiments and 500 rangers) and it passed by a vote of 
31 to 20.71 Once the vote on Shields's amendment had been 
taken several Senators expressed reservations about the 
bill. William Gwin, a California Democrat who voted against 
the amendment, said he had done so because he felt the bill 
would be rejected in the House and then held up in the 
ensuing conference committee. Albert G. Brown, a Democrat
69Ibid., 500.
70Ibid., 511.
71Ibid., 515; Congress, Senate, Senate Journal, 33rd 
Cong., 2nd sess., Serial 745, 184. Hereafter cited as 
Senate Journal.
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from Mississippi who had voted for the bill, stated that by- 
ignoring the President's call for volunteers, the Senate 
"would assume a very high responsibility."72 *
Brown was so upset that no volunteers were authorized 
by the bill as it stood that he moved to reopen the issue. 
Quoting Davis as saying that Regular forces could not be 
organized in time to repel the expected springtime problems, 
Brown asked the Senate how it could have felt it had done 
its duty without providing for the coming emergency. Brown 
then proposed an amendment that would raise not only the 
four new regiments but up to 3,000 volunteers for the 
protection of the plains as well.
John M. Clayton, a Whig from Delaware, then declared 
that if Brown's amendment was adopted then there would be no 
increase in the regular Army at all. Clayton was against 
the volunteers for he felt that regulars, "under the command 
of wise and experienced officers," were best suited to the 
task ahead.72 Shields then suggested that the ambiguity 
about the regular versus volunteer issue in the President's 
message had occurred because Pierce had no expectation that 
the Congress would act so quickly. Brown nonetheless 
persisted, and his amendment was defeated 13 to 35.74
After Brown's amendment was defeated Shields tried to 
amend the bill to include a retired list (part of the still
72Globe, 515.
72Ibid., 519.
74Ibid., 520; Senate Journal, 185.
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delayed House bill 615) and a pay increase for officers. He 
withdrew it after there were questions as to whether the 
motion was in order. The rest of the debate, covering minor 
items not of great interest, passed quickly and at the 
request of Sam Houston the vote on the third reading of the 
bill was taken and recorded as 32 for and just 7 against.75 
The Senate then voted for final passage of House bill 562, 
with amendments, on a voice vote.
A review of the three Senate votes on Army expansion 
indicates important sectional differences. Table 15 shows 
the breakdown by region on the vote on Shields's amendment
to increase the Army by four regiments.76 On this vote the
*
North and Frontier states each split evenly on the issue.
The South, therefore, was the deciding factor in the first 
vote. Interestingly Brown, one of only four Southerners to 
vote against the Shields amendment, stated one reason why 
some of those in the frontier states were concerned with the 
bill's passage--the fear that regulars could not be trained 
and equipped soon enough to be of any use in protecting 
settlers the following spring. The Frontier and Northern 
sections had no consistent positions on the increase. It 
was Sam Houston from Texas, after all, who was the leading 
spokesman for alternative methods to pacify the plains while 
John Weller from California preferred regulars.
75Globe, 525; Congress, Senate Journal, 33rd Cong., 2nd 
sess., 185.
76For the breakdown of which states are in which region 
in 1855 see Appendix 2.
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TABLE 15
SENATE VOTE TO INCREASE THE ARMY BY FOUR REGIMENTS
Region Yeas Nays Total
New England 4 (40% ) 6 ( 60%) 10 (100%)
Mid-Atlantic 4 (66%) 2 (33%) 6 (100%)
Midwest 4 (57%) 3 (43%) 7 (100%)
North (total) 12 (52%) 11 (48%) 23 (100%)
South 15 (79%) 4 (21%) 19 (100%)
Frontier 4 (44%) 5 (55%) 9 (100%)
Total 31 (61%) 20 (39%) 51 (100%)
Northern Freesoilers (Brainard, Chase, Gillette, Sumner) 
voted consistently against any expansion of the Army (or for 
volunteers), while many others from the North took the view 
that an increase was absolutely needed.
The second vote, that on Brown's amendment to add 
volunteers to the bill, was supported only in the Frontier 
states. Everywhere else it was decisively defeated. Table 
16 shows the vote by region. The Frontier states clearly 
felt the need for more protection than the Senate had 
voted.77 Unfortunately for them they could not come near to
77The two Frontier senators who voted against the 
measure were Sam Houston and Robert W. Johnson of Arkansas. 
Houston disliked volunteers because he thought they were 
more likely to inflame than calm the situation. Johnson's
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putting together a coalition to support the measure. The 
North, on the other hand, was disinterested in using 
volunteers at this point in the debate. With this vote 
those in the North who opposed any increase of the Army and 
those who wanted more regiments in the regular Army combined 
to deny any use of volunteers.
TABLE 16
SENATE VOTE TO ADD VOLUNTEERS
Region Yeas Nays Total
New England 0 (0%) 9 (100%) 9 (100%)
Mid Atlantic 1 (16%) 5 (84%) 6 (100%)
Mid West 0 (0%) 7 (100%) 7 (100%)
North (total) 1 (5%) 21 (95%) 5 (100%)
South 5 (29%) 12 (71%) 17 (100%)
Frontier 7 (77%) 2 (22%) 9 (100%)
Total 13 (27%) 35 (73%) 48 (100%)
One interesting point is that of the twenty senators 
who voted against increasing the Regular Army (nay votes
position is largely unknown but he was the Chairman for the 
House Committee on Indian Affairs in the 31st and 32nd 
Congresses and might have also felt the Indians to be 
blameless for the problems on the plains.
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in Table 15) fourteen also voted against Brown's suggestion 
to include volunteers while only three voted with Brown.78 
These fourteen Senators should be seen as the heart of the 
anti-increase faction in the Senate. Of the fourteen, nine 
were from the North and five were New Englanders while four 
were Southerners and only one, Houston, was from a Frontier 
state.79 New England was the only section in the Senate 
that did not support an increase in the number of men under 
arms in some way. The Midwest was only slightly in favor of 
the increase of the regular Army and had three Senators who 
opposed any expansion. In fact the North's support for the 
expansion of the Army was tepid at best in the Senate. The 
Frontier states clearly wanted an increase guickly and 
generally saw volunteers as the most timely, if not the 
best, solution. The South did support expansion in the 
Senate even though the region was not a solid bloc.
As many speakers in the Senate debate pointed out, the 
expansion of the Army was not really considered a party 
issue. On Democrat Shields's amendment to increase the 
regular army, 75 percent of Whigs but only 59 percent of
78Those voting against volunteers were Brainerd FS-VT, 
Bright D-IN, Butler D-SC, Evans D-SC, Fessenden W-ME, 
Gillette FS-CT, Houston D-TX, Hunter D-VA, Rockwell W-MA, 
Seward W-NY, Stuart D-MI, Sumner FS-MA, Toucey D-CT, Wade W- 
OH. Atchinson D-MO, Broadhead D-PA, and Rusk D-TX voted 
with Brown, while Adams, Gwin and Sebastian did not vote.
790f these fourteen only six went on to vote against 
the final passage of House Bill 562 while four voted for 
passage. One reason for this apparent change could be that 
since the bill was an appropriations measure, with many 
different issues, some members might not have wanted to 
reject the entire bill simply because of the increase alone.
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Democrats supported the administration (overall the measure 
received 61 percent). On Democrat Brown's amendment for 
volunteers, Democrats supported the measure only slightly 
more than Whigs 31 to 25 percent (27 percent overall).
These figures show little or no difference between the two 
main parties in the Senate on the expansion issue and should 
not be considered significant. Only the few Freesoilers, 
who voted against any increase, seem to have had any 
regularity on the issue.
The debate on the Army Appropriations bill of 1856 
reached the floor of the House of Representatives on 
February 9, 1855, when John S. Phelps, a Democrat from 
Missouri, moved the bill out of the House Ways and Means 
Committee to the Committee of the Whole on the State of the 
Union.88 The Committee of Ways and Means had reported the 
bill with a suggestion to cut the increase of regiments 
found in the Senate amendment from four to one. The bill 
lay tabled in the House for several weeks as other business 
was conducted and it was not until February 27, 1855, that 
the first speech on the subject was made.
Speaking first on the Army bill in the House was the 
former Missouri Senator and Democrat, Thomas Hart Benton. 
Benton quickly made it clear that he did not favor what he 
called an "intended permanent increase for a temporary 
exigency."80 1 He derided the concept of an "Indian Army" as
80House Journal. 507.
81Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., App., 334.
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impossible and suggested that the real purpose of the 
increased Army was to invade Cuba.82 Even if there was a 
need to protect settlers on the plains Benton thought that 
regular troops would be ill-equipped for the job due to a 
lack of knowledge of Indian ways. Benton also thought that 
the quality of men in the Army would be a problem in any 
case. He strongly suggested that the performance of the 
Army revolved around material rewards and that many regulars 
had "no public spirit, no patriotism" and would do poorly 
trying to control Indians.83
Benton then presented his own plan to deal with any 
potential problems on the plains, calling for eight 
battalions of mounted rangers, numbering approximately 300 
men each, to be raised for a period not to exceed three 
years. The rangers were to move continuously during the 
campaigning season and not tie themselves down to any fixed 
base of operations. In many ways Benton's concept resembled 
Houston's, but Benton was more concerned with helping 
settlers already on the plains, while Houston was more 
preoccupied with emigrants moving to the northwest. Benton 
wanted to link the efforts of the settlers, who would be 
familiar with the area, with the better trained and equipped
82Cuba was a touchy subject in Congress, especially for 
those from the South. Benton was intimating that the 
Southern states would use the new regiments in an attempt to 
conquer Cuba to provide more land for cotton production and 
the furtherance of slavery. No other Congressman, North or 
South, made such a reference during the debate even though 
the idea had been mentioned at other times.
83Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 339.
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rangers. He assured the House that the addition of local
influence into any military operation would bring about more
peaceful solutions. To go along with this "armed settler"
concept Benton wanted to award 320 acres of land to anyone
with five years' residence in the areas needing
protection.84 In conclusion, Benton pointed out that a
similar 1832 Florida law had worked to great effect during
the Seminole problems in the 1830s.
After a couple of days spent on other matters, the
House returned to the Army bill on March 1. Charles J.
Faulkner, the chairman of the House Committee on Military
Affairs and a Virginian Whig, complained that the House did
not spend enough time discussing army affairs and that such
a lack of debate was "a monstrous violation of propriety."85 86
Faulkner continued to blame the House for its lack of action
while complimenting part of his party:
I spoke of the press--and in this connection it 
gives me pleasure to commend the elevated and 
patriotic tones which the leading Whig press of 
the country has assumed upon the question. It 
exhibits a just discrimination in vindicating the 
Executive from responsibility for the recent 
outrages upon our frontiers, and in casting blame 
where it should fall— upon Congress, but more 
especially upon this House of Congress.88
Faulkner himself wanted an Army increase commensurate with
the increase in the size of the Union and also because of





previous twelve months. Using strong language, Faulkner 
stated that the four additional regiments were "the minimum 
force necessary" and that any delay in the increase would be 
"highly reprehensible and . . . deplorably fatal."87
Faulkner did not think the United States had an adeguate 
Army and, at one point, suggested that a 50,000 man Army 
would be more appropriate than the one of 15,000 to be 
created by the act.
Faulkner also spent a great deal of time explaining to 
the House why Regulars would be more valuable than 
.volunteers in the emergency. His first argument was simply 
that the President wanted Regulars and that is what he 
should get. He also warned that the Senate was firmly 
against volunteers and that if the House voted for them 
nothing would be done to address the problems facing the 
plains. A third reason was that, unlike Benton, Faulkner 
felt that Regulars would "be more circumspect than 
volunteers" and that passions would be better controlled 
with impartial troops.88 Faulkner also felt it was better 
for professional soldiers to protect the citizens since they 
had a covenant to do exactly that. A fifth reason was one 
both sides of the issue were interested in, expense.
Faulkner suggested that calling up 3,000 volunteers for a 
year would cost the Federal Government almost $4 million 




million. He also pointed out that several New Mexico 
volunteer companies that had served the previous year had 
cost six times the average of regular companies. Faulkner 
thought that repeatedly using volunteers to deal with 
emergencies was both shortsighted and wasteful.
Strongly opposing most of Faulkner's arguments was John 
Phelps. Phelps, citing the deaths of 300 citizens and 60 
regulars during the previous twelve months, 9̂ wanted some 
relief for the plains immediately. He did not care about 
Senate opposition or give credence to arguments that 
volunteers were not up to the job. His overwhelming desire 
was to ensure that there was an armed force on the plains in 
the spring of 1855 capable of dealing with any Indian 
uprisings.
One particular sore spot for Phelps was that he 
believed the Army consisted mostly of men from the eastern 
part of the country, most foreign born.90 Phelps doubted 
that from his Missouri district "you could enlist twenty men 
to serve for five years in the Army."91 Phelps doubted that 
the Regulars would be effective in fighting Indians on the
89ibid. There is no indication in the debates as to 
why Faulkner's and Phelps's numbers on this subject 
disagree.
9°in this Phelps was right. During the 1850s, 66 
percent of the men recruited by the Army were foreign born. 
This was up from 36 percent in the thirties and 40 percent 
in the forties. The majority of the men enlisted did indeed 
come from the Northeastern cities. In 1855 1,444 enlisted 
from New York while only 291 did so from Tennessee and 
Louisiana combined. See Coffman, 137-144, passim.
91Ibid., 1014.
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plains because of the lack of experienced riders and 
marksmen.
Phelps also disputed Faulkner's claim that volunteers 
would be more expensive. First he stressed the temporary 
nature of the volunteer increase. According to Phelps, once 
the country had the four regiments "fastened upon it, we 
will never be able to dispense with [them]."92 93
Phelps felt that the continued cost of the new
regiments would be an unwanted burden long after the need
for them had expired. In a more subtle argument, Phelps
objected to the estimate of two and a half million dollars a
year as the cost of four Regular regiments. Phelps pointed
out, and probably correctly, that the figure did not account
for various hidden training and recruitment costs not
normally included in the cost figures for regulars. He used
figures from the Seminole war to suggest that, at times, the
cost of volunteers could be slightly lower than regular
troops. Still Phelp's main concern was to get forces into
the field quickly. Ending his speech he said,
Protection promised in September will not do.
Protection promised next year will not do.
Protection is needed against the ravages which are 
expected to be perpetrated this summer upon those 
who will travel upon the plains.92
With that, Phelps suggested a substitute to the amendment




3,000 volunteers, furnishing their own horses, for a period 
of twelve months.
After Phelps offered his substitute the House heard 
from a member with a totally different point of view, Mike 
Walsh. A Democrat from New York City, Walsh stated that he 
wanted to send neither Regulars nor volunteers into the 
plains to secure peace with the Indians and wished instead 
to send agents who were "honest, humane, and magnanimous 
men."94 95 Walsh thought that the history of relations with 
the Indian a shameful thing and suggested he would have been 
happy to leave the remaining western land under Indian 
control. He realized that this was not realistic, however, 
so he supported the increase of the Regular Army to protect 
the innocents who would be caught in the inevitable problems 
due to western expansion. Walsh reversed the usual argument 
in favor of using volunteers— that they would know the 
Indians well--by suggesting that this would cause problems 
since "the Indians know them too."95
James L. Orr, a South Carolina Democrat, partially 
agreed with Walsh's comments when he suggested that 
volunteers were more apt to commit atrocities since their 
officers were not able to control them effectively. To Orr 
the possibility of an "Indian hunt" was always present when 




generally treated poorly but he was much more willing than 
Walsh to use force to protect the settlers.96 97
The Mississippi Democrat, William T. S. Barry, actually 
suggested increasing the Army by five, rather than four, 
regiments. He felt that volunteers would be less useful 
than regulars because "they volunteer not for peace but for 
war" and that "they go out, not to come home with bloodless 
laurels."97 Barry also stated that he was also for treating 
the Indians kindly as long as no citizen was put in danger 
because of it.
One of the few independents in the Congress was the 
next to speak. Caleb Lyon (from New York) was unsure that 
Regulars would be able to deal effectively with plains 
Indians and was afraid that any guick influx of untrained 
men in the region would spark problems. He favored using 
volunteers.
As might be expected, the Delegate from the Oregon 
Territory was adamant for the increase. Joseph Lane called 
for six new regiments to be "permanently in service, 
permanently on duty" and bluntly stated that the frontier 
could not be settled without passage of the bill. Lane did 
not want protection for his constituents, but also wanted 
revenge upon those who had "massacred, tomahawked and burned
96 Ibid.
97Globe, 33rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1028.
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to death" his friends, and he called on Congress to provide 
that capability.98 *
James McDougall, a Democrat from the neighboring state
of California, took a different view from Lane. He wanted
only 500 volunteers on the theory that immediate relief was
preferable to waiting. As for Regulars, he said that
our present Army was not formed for the present time 
and for a Republic as expanded as our own, and it 
does not answer for the present necessities of the 
Confederacy."
The next speaker, Charles Skelton, a New Jersey 
Democrat, did not have a problem with increasing the regular 
Army but he wanted the increase to be limited so that there 
would be no accumulation of "a load of lumbering 
officers."100 At this point Lane jumped back into the 
debate to tell the House that such an amendment would be 
harmless since there would be war as long as there were 
Indians and that the officers raised would always be needed.
After several attempts to have the Committee of the 
Whole House rise, the Alabama Democrat George S. Houston 
suggested a compromise amendment. He wanted not only one 
new cavalry regiment (as was thought sufficient by the House 
Ways and Means Committee) but 2,000 mounted volunteers and 





to Houston's figures such an act would increase the Array by 
5,200 men.101
When Faulkner attempted to speak on Houston's amendment 
several members cried "No!," and "Vote it down," and, by 
voice vote, the House did just that. The chair then asked 
for a vote on the Senate amendment to the bill (asking for 
four regiments) and it was passed, also on a voice vote. 
Several members then asked for a division (in particular the 
Iowa Democrat Bernhart Henn) but the chair had already 
recognized someone else who wanted the floor to amend a 
separate part of the bill. Because of this oversight no 
vote was recorded on the motion to increase the Army in the 
Committee of the Whole.
The rest of the debate on House Bill 562 passed quickly 
in the committee and on March 2 the House itself considered 
the Senate amendments. After considering several other 
issues the House first voted to amend the Senate amendment 
to increase the Army by including a Brigadier General. The 
House then voted to adopt the new amendment by a vote of 121 
to 6 0 . ^ 0 2  The breakdown of the vote among the regions is 
contained in Table 17.
l01Ibid. The number of men expected by increasing 
company strength was 2,500, with the new cavalry regiment 
generating an additional 700 men.
102iphe House Journal gives the vote as 121 to 60, House 
Journal, 513. The Globe states the figure as 121 to 61, 
Globe, 33rd Cong., 2 sess., 1064. According to the raw data 
in both sources the true total is 120 to 61.
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TABLE 17
HOUSE VOTE TO INCREASE THE ARMY BY FOUR REGIMENTS
State Yeas Nays Total
New England 16 (70%) 7 (30%) 23 (100%)
Mid-Atlantic 35 (65%) 19 (35%) 54 (100%)
Midwest 20 (52%) 18 (48%) 38 (100%)
North (total) 71 (62%) 44 (38%) 115 (100%)
South (total) 38 (73%) 14 (27%) 52 (100%)
Frontier 11 (79%) 3 (21%) 14 (100%)
Total 120 (67%) 61 (33%) 181 (100%)
Unlike in the Senate, where the region that disliked the 
Army increase the most was New England, in the House it was 
the Midwest. Only three states (that cast more than three 
votes) voted against the amendment, with two of these, Ohio 
and Indiana, being from the Midwest (the third was Maine).
In general the North was once again less likely to vote for 
the increase than was the South.
As in the Senate, party discipline in the House was not 
particularly strong. More Democrats than Whigs voted for 
the measure, both proportionally (70 to 61 percent) and 
absolutely; but the difference was still small when compared 
to variation by region. However, if party and section are 
combined, as in Table 18, a slightly sharper picture of who
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supported the measure emerges. As Table 18 shows, the 
combined effect of party and section made Southern Democrats 
much more likely to vote for the Army expansion than 
Northern Whigs.
TABLE 18
HOUSE VOTE TO INCREASE THE ARMY BY PARTY AND SECTION
Section/Party Yeas Nays %Yea
Northern Whigs 23 (55%) 19 (45%) 42 (100%)
Northern Democrats 48 (68%) 23 (32%) 71 (100%)
Southern Whigs 11 (69%) 5 (31%) 16 (100%)
Southern Democrats 27 (75%) 9 (25%) 36 (100%)
All Whigs 34 (59%) 24 (41%) 58 (100%)
All Democrats 75 (70%) 32 (30%) 107 (100%)
Freesoilers 0 (0%) 2 (100%) 2 (100%)
Frontier 11 (79%) 3 (21%) 14 (100%)
North 71 (62%) 44 (38%) 115 (100%)
South 38 (73%) 14 (27%) 52 (100%)
Total 120 (67%) 61 (33%) 181 (100%)
The reverse is not true as Northern Democrats voted nearly 
identically to Southern Whigs, showing, perhaps, a cross 
pressure between the party and section a Congressman 
represented. It needs to be pointed out, however, that even
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Northern Whigs narrowly supported the measure, as did every 
group in the House except for the two Freesoilers.
After the House had sent its version of the 1856 Army 
Appropriations Bill to the Senate the controversy 
surrounding the bill did not disappear. After the first 
conference committee the House rejected the compromise even 
though the Senate receded on five of the six points of 
contention. The problem that upset the House was not 
related to the increase of the Army, however, and after two 
further attempts at a conference the House finally agreed to 
a compromise on the final point. In the rush to conclude 
the business of the session the final vote to pass the 
conference version of the bill was accomplished by a voice 
vote in both houses.103
The four regiments raised in 1855 did not, as most in 
the Congress expected, end up on the plains or in Oregon.
In fact one historian suggests that the majority of the new 
strength ended up in the Department of Texas.I®4 one 
company of the newly formed Tenth Infantry did become 
involved in the punitive campaign against the Brule 
Sioux.1^5 The campaign was not one urgently needed to 
safeguard the plains however, and the whole affair came off 
as a bit of an anticlimax. In the campaign's only *1045
lO^utley, 13n. Richard Peters and George Minot, eds., 
United States Statutes at Large 10 vols. (Boston: Charles 
C. Little and James Brown, 1846-1861), 10:635.
104Utley, 71.
105Globe, 34th Cong., 1st sess., appendix, 17.
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engagement the Brule lost eighty-six killed and over seventy 
wounded and captured (many of the latter women and children) 
while the soldiers from Fort Kearney lost but five killed 
and seven wounded.106
It would seem fair to suggest that the increase to the 
Regular Army was generally supported, if sometimes by small 
minorities, in all regions in the country in 1855. It would 
also be appropriate to point out that the South and Frontier 
states were more willing than the North to add to the 
Regular Army. The North supported the enterprise coolly and 
if votes from the region would have been needed in any great 
number the measure could have failed.
John Muldowny has stated that in general, Congressmen 
from the Northwest, West, and Southwest favored Jefferson 
Davis's reforms while those from the Northeast and South 
opposed them.107 For the increase in 1855 this is not 
entirely true. In fact the increase was one of the few 
Davis proposals about the Army that met with much success 
during his term.
One reason is that it was easy to understand how the 
increase in territory after the Mexican War would 
necessitate the growth of the Army. With the lag of seven 
years between the end of the war and the increase, however, 
a direct link between the two events cannot be firmly 




routes, the threat of the Mormons in Utah, the dearth of 
troops in the Department of the East, and the unreliability 
of volunteers were also used to justify the increase. These 
arguments point out that 1855 could have seen a change in 
the way the Congress dealt with the United States Army.
There was no reason why the country could not have changed 
its policies to ensure protection of the plains. The mass 
migration along the Oregon Trail was a different situation 
than had been faced before and it was possible to envision a 
new defense arrangement. In large part then, the increase 
passed because most Congressmen felt comfortable with the 
protection it would provide the citizens of the country. It 
also passed because few felt it necessary to block the 
increase for political reasons. Considering the atmosphere 
of the times that in itself was remarkable.
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CONCLUSION
The general trend between 1821 and 1855 was to increase 
the strength of the Army. As Appendix 1 shows, the Army 
increased by 176 percent (from 5,733 men to 15,911 men) 
during the period. Such an increase can be accounted for in 
two ways. First, the Army of 1821 was too small for the 
duties it was assigned. Calhoun's problems of manning the 
frontier started almost immediately after the 1821 reduction 
took effect and, as the addition of the First and Second 
Dragoon Regiments showed in 1833 and 1836, more troops were 
needed on the Frontier. A second reason for the upward 
trend was the growth in the size of the country. Between 
1821 and 1855 the territory of the nation grew by 69 percent 
(from 1,787,000 to 3,020,000 square miles).1 While several 
leading figures in the period, chief among them John C. 
Calhoun, felt that external threats were important, the size 
of the United States Army was "fixed by the requirements of 
the westward movement rather than the menace of a foreign 
power."2 The new territory, different in many ways from the 
regions settled by 1821, required not only more men, but men 
trained and equipped in different ways.
'̂-Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 2:1114.
2Robert Marshal Utley, Frontiersman in Blue: The 
United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: 
Macmillan Co, 1967), 2.
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One check on the growth of the Army throughout the 
period was Congressional unwillingness to spend heavily on 
defense. Robert Utley suggested this occurred because of 
"the inability of most Congressmen to face up to the fiscal 
realities of territorial growth" and that such "parsimony" 
affected both "the size of Army and its logistical 
support."3 The Congress consistently gave the Executive 
branch less than what was requested between 1821 and 1855, 
on many occasions even refusing to take seriously plans to 
increase the Army. The decreases of 1821 and 1842 were both 
driven in large part by concerns over the state of the 
Treasury and occurred even as the Commanding General was 
requesting a larger, not smaller, Army. The Army grew in 
size after 1821 because the need for more protection on the 
Frontier was a stronger factor than the Congressional desire 
to keep the cost of the Army down.
Which party a Congressman belonged to seemed to have 
little impact on how he would view proposals to increase or 
decrease the size of the Army in the period. Party 
allegiance played only a minor role in deciding the 
individual bills considered and none at all when discussing 
the entire period. In 1821 the Democrats were slightly more 
likely than the Federalists to support reduction (66 versus 
62 percent), but it was a group of Democrats, the Old 
Republicans, that voted by the greatest percentage to cut 
the Army. After the 1830s, where the confusion during the
11 .3 Ibid.,
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formation of the second party system made identifying 
Congressional affiliation difficult, the 1840s showed the 
parties agreeing on both the decrease of 1842 and the 
increases of 1846. The role of parties in the debates was 
somewhat important during the individual votes although 
which party was more in favor of the Army depended on the 
year. The Democrats were much less in favor of the 1842 
decrease (53 to 67 percent), while the Whigs were much more 
in favor of adding to the Army in 1846 (84 to 78 percent). 
Finally, in 1855 Democrats favored the increase of the Army 
more than the Whigs (70 to 59 percent). As was suggested in 
the introduction, the role of party played only a minor role 
in the period.
There were also debates where sectional location had 
little to do with how a Congressman voted. The 1821 vote 
showed a remarkable consistency in which all three sections 
voted identically for the decrease being considered. The 
role of section mattered in the 1830s, not on the main issue 
of increasing the Army but on the secondary issue of what 
kind of troops to provide. As was discussed in Chapter 
Three, frontier Congressmen were more interested in militia 
and volunteers, troops from their region, than in regulars.
In the introduction, the possibility that the Frontier 
would favor a large Army more than the North or the South 
was discussed. This holds true only for the Frontier after 
1838 and for the Senate only during 1855. As the Army 
became more involved with activities away from the settled
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parts of the Frontier after the late 1830s, Frontier 
Congressman began to support more regulars. This support 
lasted up to 1855. The South gave erratic support to the 
Army throughout the period, however. Only in 1855 did 
Southern Congressmen support the Army more than Northern 
ones and then only by a 73 to 62 percent margin. There was 
little difference between the two sections throughout the 
period.
In the debates and votes on the proper size of the 
peace establishment, section and party differences meant 
little. Not only were the percentages between the various 
groups usually similar, but also at no time did any section 
or party vote against the prevailing sentiments of Congress. 
This was true even when there were important sectional and 
party guestions at stake, such as the Missouri Compromise 
(Sixteenth Congress) and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (Thirty- 
Third Congress).
Many outstanding figures spoke on the Army issue 
between 1821 and 1855. Chief among them were the two best 
nineteenth century Secretaries of War, John C. Calhoun and 
Jefferson Davis. Calhoun, who served as Secretary of War 
longer than any other man in the era, took little part in 
the issue after he left office. Davis took a different 
approach, serving on the Senate Committee on Military 
Affairs both before and after his time in the Cabinet and 
advocating Army expansion up to the eve of the Civil War. 
Also important in the debates was Thomas Hart Benton, the
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Frontier's leading voice for the Army for many years while 
serving mainly in the Senate but also in the House. 
Curiously, all the important figures identified with the 
Army question were Army supporters. Also of note were the 
number of outstanding men who had little or no input on the 
issue. None of the Presidents in the period, with the 
exception of James Polk, put much effort into the issue, 
letting their Secretaries or Congress take the lead. 
Congressional giants Daniel Webster and Henry Clay also took 
little note of the debates. Such disinterest points out the 
lack of importance many saw in the issue.
There remains much work to be done in the area of Army 
and Congressional relations between 1821 and 1855. It would 
be possible, through research in state archives, to get a 
clearer picture of the party affiliation of Congressmen in 
the 1830s (and to a lesser degree those few members not 
identified in the Sixteenth Congress). It would be 
interesting to determine whether any of the factions then 
forming themselves into the parties of the second party 
system took extreme views on the issue. It would also be 
useful to make a much closer inspection of the materials in 
the National Archives, two areas in particular: the 
proceedings of the two Committees on Military Affairs and 
the other committees which dealt with the issue and the 
letterbooks of the Secretary of War, his key officials, and 
important military commanders. Due to time and distance 
constraints only the most cursory examination was made of
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these items. There also remains much work that could be 
done in the collections of the different Congressmen and 
high-ranking officers who usually attract little attention 
but who would be very interested the size of the Army.
Other military topics in the period suggest themselves 
as needing study, the most important being a study of the 
militia. From the debate on the Regular Army it seemed as 
if the trust in the militia suffered a sharp decline after 
1821. The reasons for this seem unclear and further study, 
especially if directed towards the guestion of section, 
could shed further light upon John Hope Franklin's 












































^Russell F. Wiegley, History of the United States Army 
(New York: Macmillian Co, 1967), 566-7.
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APPENDIX 2




























The following House districts are also included in the Frontier region:1 the 17th, 19th, and 20th Massachusetts 





























^The raw data for determining which districts were to 
be placed in differing regions than the rest of their states 
comes from maps and data in Stanly B. Parsons, William W. 
Beach, and Dan Hermann, United States Congressional 
Districts (New York: The Free Press, 1982) and Kenneth C. 
Martis, ed., The Historical Atlas of United States 
Congressional Districts (New York: The Free Press, 1982).
^No Vermont nor New Hampshire districts were moved 
during this Congress since all Representatives in the two 
states were elected on general tickets. New Hampshire 
continued this practice throughout the period.
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The following House districts are also included in the 
Frontier region in 1833: the 5th, 6th, and 7th Maine; the 
4th and 5th Vermont; the 19th, 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th 
New York; the North Carolina 12th.
The following House districts are also included in the 
Frontier region in 1836: the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Maine 
the 4th and 5th Vermont; the 13th, 14th, 18th, 25th, 28th, 































The following House districts are also included in the 
Frontier region in 1836: the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Maine 
the 4th and 5th Vermont; the 13th, 14th, 18th, 25th, 28th, 










































































































Size of companies in the United States Army; 1785-1855





1796 52 52 52
1798 60 52 70
1799 92 48 92 92
1800 62 52 52
1802 64 64
1808 68 66 66 68
1812 100 100 100 68
1813 90 90 90 68
1815 68 100 68
1821 42 45
1832 42 45 100* 2
1833 42 45 60
1836 42 42 60
1838 80 58 60
1842 42 42 5018463 100 100 100
1848 64 64 6418504 74 74 74
1855 74 74 74
1-For an excellent source on the size of companies 
before 1838 see Congress, Senate, Report from the Secretary 
of War; in compliance with a Resolution of the Senate, with 
Statements of the Number of Troops Employed in the War with 
the Seminole Indians, 25th Cong., 2nd sess., Senate Document 
226, Serial 316.
2The companies cited are from the Battalion of Mounted 
Rangers for 1832 and the various cavalry and dragoon 
regiments thereafter.
3The Act to Increase the Rank and File of the Army (May 
13, 1846) increased all the companies to 100 with the 
provision that after hostilities with Mexico had ceased all 
companies would be reduced to 64 men.
4The Act to Increase the Rank and File of the Army 
(June 17, 1850) increased only those companies actually in 
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